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WILSON AND A SECOND TERM

BY THE EDITOR

We favor a single Presidential term, and to that end urge the adoption of an amendment to the Constitution making the President of the United States ineligible for re-election, and we pledge the candidate of this convention to this principle.—From the Democratic platform of 1912.

WHETHER or not, as a matter of policy, not of principle, the service of a citizen as President of the United States should be limited to a single term is neither a new nor, at the moment, a vital question. It was raised and discussed at length in the Constitutional Convention of 1787, and the virtual compromise which has since maintained was adopted. The views of Mr. Wilson, formulated before he became President, while interesting and perhaps even important as those of a close student of democratic government, may be regarded as academic and not now calling for consideration. Suffice it to say that his argument, as set forth with notable clearness in his letter to Representative Mitchell Palmer, though to our mind far from convincing, is substantially that which prevailed in the Great Convention and has been upheld by the people for more than a century. His position, therefore, is supported by the power of precedent backed by fairly successful operation. That the question will again confront the Democratic party in June, in view of that organization's declaration in 1912, seems inevitable, but the issue can hardly assume the proportions of one involving the danger of serious dissension.

The real point raised by Mr. Wilson's oddly belated publication concerns, not his theories and beliefs, but his candidacy and his good faith. Is he in honor bound by the Baltimore Declaration to decline a renomination? And if so, to whom is he obligated? To the country? To his party? To Mr. Bryan who drew the resolution and "achieved" his nomination? Or to himself as a professedly scrupulous keeper of political pledges? These are the questions, involving grave considerations, personal as well as political, which demand immediate and conclusive answers.

1. *As to Mr. Bryan.*

President Wilson's appointment of Mr. Bryan as Secretary of State—a position for which his unfitness was as obvious at the time as has since been demonstrated—was a virtual admission, either of obligation or of apprehension. Some think it was attributable to a blending of the two emotions indicated, superinduced by the tactful insistence of Colonel Edward Makepeace House, the solitary counsellor and mutual friend. It matters little. The prospective menace was eliminated for a time at least and, in the view of the public, whatever of obligation rested upon a grateful spirit was lifted by handsome recognition. Seldom, if ever, has ruthless betrayal of a friend won more bountiful reward from an innocent recipient of personal advantage than that bestowed by Mr. Wilson upon Mr. Bryan. While none denied its suitability, all conceded its adequateness; not excepting Mr. Bryan himself, who forthwith submerged himself somewhat ostentatiously in the temporarily placid waters of a happy Administration.

We shall not soon forget the surprise and gratification which we ourselves experienced during that joyous period as a consequence of Mr. Bryan's demonstration of the completeness of his immersion. We were aware, as it happened, of his discovery at Baltimore of the Single Term as a fundamental principle of Democracy and of his insistence before the Committee on Resolutions upon its adoption. We knew that the supporters of Mr. Clark readily acquiesced in the proposal for the simple reason that their candidate had on more than one occasion expressed his approval of the suggestion and had declared his willingness to accept the restriction as binding upon the candidate. And we were apprized further that the for-the-moment personal representative of Mr. Wilson, Mr. William F. McCombs, so stoutly

resisted the adoption of any resolution definitely pledging the nominee to refuse a renomination that Mr. Bryan was forced to accept as a compromise the somewhat ambiguous declaration finally engrafted upon the platform.

Why at that particular time Mr. Bryan was so insistent upon the resuscitation of a proposition thrice rejected by his party has never been divulged. Although duly heralded as a traditional and undying principle, one looks in vain for its promulgation in either 1900 or 1908, when Mr. Bryan was the candidate and the author of the platform; consequently it was not the usual reaffirmation; it was a virtual novelty interjected seemingly for a specific purpose. Some have imagined that Mr. Bryan felt that others, like himself as quoted in recent years, should be satisfied with a single term. Others have suspected that he wished, in the event of his failure to attain his ambition in 1912, to remove the most formidable obstacle to his candidacy in the present year. In any case, he carried his point after a fashion and, in a speech at Harrisburg shortly before he resigned, he indicated unmistakably that the thought remained in his mind, if not as a positive menace to President Wilson's candidacy, at least as something to conjure with in subsequent political trafficking with his former chief.

But to the guileful no less than to the guileless be their just dues! Despite the firm assertion of Mr. Wilson, while a candidate, that the Democratic platform "says what it means and means what it says," others less adept at making and construing perplexing phrases continue to experience difficulty in determining whether this singular concept is in fact a concrete pledge or a mere abstract notion. We doubt not that the President's own impression is quite clear, but for some reason he has not seen fit, contrary to his well-known custom and somewhat to our own embarrassment in attempting a defense of his position, to take the public into his confidence. Indeed, to the best of our knowledge, he has never referred to the paragraph, as in fact he did not in his letter to Mr. Palmer, thus still leaving us uncomfortably in the dark as to whether he considers it a part of a "platform" that is "not a programme" or of a programme that is not a platform.

Be that as it should be, Mr. Bryan is on record by word and deed as a frank and unequivocal interpreter of his own (and Mr. McCombs's) mystifying utterance. The quiet

but determined effort on the part of a number of patriotic citizens headed by the Honorable Wayne MacVeagh, who dreaded the possibility of Theodore Roosevelt returning to the White House, crystallized on June 4th, 1912, when the House Committee on the Judiciary authorized its Chairman, the Honorable Henry D. Clayton, to report favorably a resolution proposing an amendment to the Constitution to the following effect:

The Executive power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America. The term of the office of President shall be six years, and no person who has held the office by election or discharged its powers or duties or acted as President under the Constitution and laws made in pursuance thereof shall be eligible to hold again the office by election.

The imminence of a National campaign and the press of work upon Congress prevented consideration of the report at the time, but after the election of Mr. Wilson upon a platform pledging the candidate to "the principle" avowed, the proposition was renewed in the Senate and on February 1st, 1913, it was adopted by that body, seventeen anti-Roosevelt Republicans voting affirmatively and only one Democrat, Mr. Shively of Indiana, voting in the negative. The sentiment of the House was overwhelmingly in favor of the resolution, but the Democratic leaders, feeling that their newly elected President was entitled to consultation upon a matter of so much importance and having no late information respecting his attitude, deferred action until his views could be ascertained.

During this interim Mr. Bryan demonstrated his own sincerity beyond the possibility of question. In a communication addressed to the Honorable Robert L. Henry of Texas, he urged that it was only the *principle* they were striving to embody in the Constitution, not an inhibition upon any individual,—which he felt would be unjust. He proposed, therefore, that the resolution be so changed as to leave no question of the re-eligibility of Mr. Wilson, Mr. Taft or Mr. Roosevelt in 1916. He thereby, as all must admit, relieved himself wholly of the charge of self-seeking in his insistence upon the insertion of the plank at Baltimore. Meanwhile the President-elect intervened in the letter to Mr. Mitchell Palmer dated February 13th, which was duly exhibited to Chairman Clayton and other prominent Repre-

sentatives, who promptly bowed to the wish of their new leader and buried the resolution.

Mr. Bryan was informed of the occurrence and raised no objection. Three weeks later he began his so-called service as Secretary of State under President Wilson. By his act, then, no less than by his words addressed to Mr. Henry, he signified his own understanding that the Baltimore declaration did not and should not bar President Wilson from accepting a renomination. The irresistible conclusion is that, as an objector at this late day, Mr. Bryan would have no standing in the court of Public Opinion and that an effort upon his part to discredit Mr. Wilson as the violator of a pledge would serve only to convict himself of stultification and duplicity when, as matters now stand, he fairly deserves the highest credit for an act which has at least the merit of genuineness and perhaps of magnanimity.

2. *As to the Democratic party.*

Although Mr. Wilson can hardly be regarded as what is commonly termed "a strong party man," we are confident that neither he nor Colonel House, especially at this somewhat precarious juncture, would deny a measure of obligation to the Democratic party. But to what, if any, extent does this accountableness apply with respect to the Single Term? Ignoring for a moment the many and variegated Democratic platforms, of which at least in the olden days not a few were constructed chiefly "to get in on," we turn naturally, and conformably to custom, to the dicta of venerated Democratic statesmen. Of these the foremost are the three who, prior to 1913, were held by common assent the greatest of Democratic Presidents—Thomas Jefferson, Andrew Jackson and Grover Cleveland.

Each of these, we are bound to admit, was a staunch advocate of the Single Term. Jefferson wrote to Francis Hopkinson from Paris in 1789:

Since the thing (re-eligibility) is established, I would wish it not to be altered during the life of our great leader (Washington), whose executive talents are superior to those I believe of any man in the world, and who alone by the authority of his name and the confidence reposed in his perfect integrity is fully qualified to put the new government so under way as to secure it against the efforts of the opposition. But having derived from one error all the good there was in it, I hope we shall correct it the moment we can no longer have the same name at the helm.

Jackson, too, in his first annual message, declared that "it would seem advisable to limit the service of the Chief Magistrate to a single term of four or six years" and reiterated his conviction in far stronger terms in his second message and frequently thereafter, to the end, as he wrote in 1834, that "our liberties would possess an additional safeguard."

Cleveland also declared against a second term with characteristic positiveness immediately after his election in 1884.

And yet both Jefferson and Jackson were renominated and re-elected and Cleveland accepted two subsequent nominations without evoking serious criticism. Not even the personal authority and prestige of these great leaders could suffice to impose the Single Term upon the party as a tenet of its doctrine. Despite their adherence to the policy, therefore, it is Mr. Wilson, not Mr. Bryan, who is in strict accord with the accepted precepts of his party. And if Jefferson, Jackson and Cleveland could be so readily pardoned for failing to suit their actions to their expressed convictions, surely no fault can lie against Mr. Wilson whose course has been both consistent and in line with Democratic tradition.

3. *As to Mr. Wilson.*

Not only is a good name, as the Preacher remarked, "better than precious ointment"; it is, even in these degenerate days, a tangible political asset. Undoubtedly, as has been so often suggested, the candidacy of Mr. Wilson in 1912 profited in no small degree from the split in the Republican party; but chief among the various factors which contributed to his success was his reputation. He appeared before the eyes of the people as one of highly sensitized conscience whose marked aloofness from the sins, if not the temptations, of the world had been attained through a course of rigid moral training. It was this valuable possession which drew to his support thousands of our best citizens who might otherwise have been attracted to the banner borne aloft by Mr. Roosevelt with the approval, since withdrawn, of Miss Jane Addams. As President, too, in consequence of common recognition of his lofty motives, Mr. Wilson has been spared no little criticism which would have been visited relentlessly upon one known as a hardy politician.

But pre-eminence of whatever nature is never wholly free from attendant disadvantages; chief among which in this

instance is the exceptional expectation of a stern or obstinate moralist as contrasted with the modest demand put upon a more tolerant or easy-going person. If Solomon had Mr. Wilson in mind when he defined the "good name" as "rather to be chosen than great riches," we can but believe that he also glimpsed Our Colonel when he added, "—and loving favor rather than gold and silver." The distinction becomes clear and its unfairness manifest when one stops to think that a thing done by Mr. Roosevelt and laughed away as a mere idiosyncrasy might readily be regarded as a grave offense on the part of Mr. Wilson. That, we take it, is the reason why political antagonists of the President are striving so earnestly to make it appear that, in accepting a re-nomination, he would be guilty of a moral dereliction no less reprehensible than that of Mr. Roosevelt, a possible opposing candidate in the coming campaign, when he repudiated his voluntary pledge never to seek a third term. The two cases, of course, are in no wise parallel or alike, as a recital of the circumstances and analysis of the criticisms will clearly show.

Brushing aside as unworthy of consideration the sneers which constitute the usual accompaniment of a general partisan assault upon a President by opposing members of Congress, Mr. Wilson stands accused upon two points: first, that by his silence he tacitly endorsed the Baltimore declaration and so appealed to the voters under a false pretense and, secondly, that after having been safely elected, he surreptitiously smothered the resolution putting that declaration into effect, in the interest of his own personal ambition. With respect to Point No. 1, it should be recalled that, for the first time in history, consideration of the platform was deferred until after the naming of the candidate. This was done at the instance of Mr. Bryan for some actual reason known only to himself but ostensibly to make certain that "the principles avowed should accord with the views of the candidate." As we have already noted, the fact that this specific plank did not harmonize with Mr. Wilson's judgment was brought to the attention of Mr. Bryan and other members of the Committee by his personal representative, Mr. William F. McCombs. If then, the real purpose of the unusual order of procedure was to "make the platform square with the candidate," clearly when the unexpected nomination had been accomplished the obligation to remove

the disparity rested, not upon the candidate, but upon the Committee,—who made no sign.

To the assertion that Mr. Wilson's tacit acquiescence compares unfavorably with the blunt refusal of the Honorable Alton B. Parker to accept his nomination in 1904 unless the Gold Standard was definitely upheld, it suffices to say that the plank to which Mr. Parker objected constituted the overshadowing vital issue of the campaign, while that confronting Mr. Wilson was of so little importance that probably not one-tenth of the delegates who voted for it even knew it was incorporated in the platform. Bearing this fact in mind and considering further that this could have been but one of several minor declarations not wholly to the candidate's liking, it must be evident to any fair mind that peremptory dictatorial action on the part of Mr. Wilson would have been regarded throughout the country as unnecessarily meticulous and unduly presumptuous. Moreover, he could later, as in fact he did in his speech of acceptance, make the fact clear that he did not accept the platform literally in all its parts as a definite "programme." Herein we find no cause for complaint except possibly—and only possibly, at that—from the viewpoint of hypercriticism.

The second accusation—that of Mr. Wilson smothering the resolution in his personal interest—involves questions of fact and propriety. That his letter addressed to Mr. Mitchell Palmer had the effect indicated and was designed to have it there can be no doubt. But to assert that he was "lobbying," inferentially unworthily, in his own behalf is to speak absurdity. He had become the leader of the Democratic party, and the Democratic Congressmen naturally and properly sought an expression of his judgment upon an important proposal, which in effect had not been passed upon by either the party or the country, before taking irrevocable action. It was Mr. Wilson's plain duty to submit both his opinion and the reasons underlying it, and he did so with notable cogency. Refusal to have done so would have constituted either an evasion of responsibility or a species of self-stultification.

He spoke, moreover, exclusively from the standpoint of public policy, as is evidenced by the simple fact that, if the resolution had been passed and the amendment adopted, so far from impairing his own political prospects, it would have left him eligible to re-election for a term of six instead of

four years, thus opening the way for the possible distinction of being the first and only citizen having served as President for ten consecutive years.

Barring the difficulty of reconciling the long delay in publishing the communication with the assertion contained therein to the effect that "I am speaking to redeem my promise that I would say what I really think on every public question and take my chances in the court of Public Opinion," which may perhaps be regarded as an ignorable circumstance, we fail to perceive how so much as a suspicion of Mr. Wilson's good faith can lie in any fair mind as a consequence of the course which he pursued in this matter.

4. *As to the country.*

The primary responsibility of a President, despite many manifestations to the contrary during the past twenty years, is not to himself nor to any other individual, however serviceable, and not to his party, but to the country. This consideration not only transcends but, in the event of conflict of obligations, it overpowers all others combined. Even though Mr. Wilson were convinced that his own fidelity, his debt to Mr. Bryan and his party's declaration committed him to refusal of a renomination, he would not be bound, in the existing condition of National affairs, by such a conclusion. Technically, moreover, he has made no pledge to that effect to the country either directly or inferentially. The Single Term was not an issue in the campaign. It was not referred to, so far as we can recall, in a single speech by a Republican, a Progressive or a Democrat. It was not passed upon by the electors. The people declared their preference for Mr. Wilson over Mr. Taft and Mr. Roosevelt upon grounds which were wholly foreign and bore no relation to it.

Clearly, then, the broader consideration with respect to the President's duty to his country must prevail. And as to that there can be no question. Mr. Wilson has dominated the Democratic party so completely that, in so far as the coming campaign is concerned, it is a Wilson party; its legislative no less than its executive acts are his, initiated by him, established by him; barring a few hapless diplomats, its office-holders are "Wilson men"; its policies, domestic and foreign, upon which the country will render judgment in November, are his policies. Nobody else does or could personify all of them—neither Mr. Bryan nor Speaker Clark nor Mr. Underwood. Mr. Wilson stands alone—a unique embodi-

ment for the time of the party of Jefferson and Jackson, and more distinctively so than either of those redoubtable statesmen. So far from impugning his own integrity by accepting a renomination, he would be recreant to his trust and play the craven's part if he should refuse to accept the test at the bar of Public Opinion. And Mr. Wilson need have no fear that a people which held Jefferson, Jackson and Cleveland blameless for ignoring what they did say will hold him to wrongful account for what he did not say.

There is no issue in the Single Term and none can be made by the Republican party, by Mr. Roosevelt, by Mr. Bryan or by anybody else. Regardless of futile attacks, regardless even of his own inclinations, Woodrow Wilson must be the next Democratic candidate for President.

PEACEMAKERS OR LAODICEANS?

THERE is a blessing promised for the Peacemakers. There is also a condemnation pronounced upon the Laodiceans. Perhaps one of these days, when we are tired of counting the numbers of peaceful travellers slain at sea, it may be of curious interest, and even of practical profit, to consider whether we are likelier to win the one or to incur the other.

The natural and commendable impulse at the beginning was, no doubt, toward neutrality and the benevolent offices of the peacemaker. We all remember the President's exhortation to neutrality, not only in deed and word but in thought as well. We recall, too, his characterization of the war, when it had been in progress for several months, as "a war with which we have nothing to do, whose causes cannot touch us, whose very existence affords us opportunities of friendship and disinterested service." Those were fair words. Theoretically they were quite true. Beyond doubt they expressed the desire and the aspiration of every right-minded American. It would have been a gratifying thing to remain entirely untouched by the menace, the horrors and the losses of the war. It would have been a noble thing to retain the confidence, the esteem and the friendship of the belligerents on both sides, so as to be able to do acts of friendship, of kindness, and humanity to them both, and in time to exercise our good offices for a composure of the strife and a restoration of peace on terms congruous with justice and with the welfare of the world.

The vision, however, passed. In its place there came too soon the grim and most unwelcome reality. We have been drawn more and more into the hideous embroilment. Some of its most appalling atrocities have fallen upon us. Losses and bereavements have come to us through it. Problems and perplexities, too, have been thrust upon us. Our relations with more than one of the belligerents have been strained almost to the breaking point. Our opportunities of friendship and disinterested service have been improved toward only two of the minor states. One of them is believed to regard us with profound gratitude—in which she exercises toward us a charity as great as it is unappreciated. By the chief belligerents and by most of Europe we are, if truth must be confessed, regarded with an unpleasant mingling of surprise, regret, distrust, contempt, aversion—with almost every feeling which we should prefer them not to have toward us. Not within the memory of living men has the United States stood so badly before the world as at the present time.

Nor is it clear that we are thus merely suffering without blame the proverbial fate of those who try to please all and end by pleasing none. It is not sure that we have tried to please all. We have more probably tried to avoid displeasing any; which is a very different thing. But in neither could we be considered blameless. To do either was axiomatically impossible, and he who knowingly attempts such an impossibility is not void of blame. But if it were not impossible to do either, it would be undesirable; so undesirable as to be most culpable. For above most wars in our time, if not in all time, this is one which involves great principles of international ethics, in its causes, in its purposes, and in the manner of its conduct. We may not say that one side is altogether right in all things and the other altogether wrong. But we may say with certainty of conviction that on each important issue of the war one side is right and the other is wrong; though it may not be the same side that is right or wrong in every case. A nation cannot agree with both the right and the wrong.

We shall do well to consider whether the error was not in exalting neutrality above principle; in practicing neutrality for its own sake instead of as mere means to an immeasurably higher and nobler end. There is no virtue in neutrality *per se*; while there may be much evil. Your typical neutral

for the sake of neutrality is the Laodicean, sordid and selfish, and neither hot nor cold. Your typical neutral who is neutral for the sake of thus serving a higher aim is he who, like Terence, thinks nothing of unconcern to him which concerns humanity. It would be monstrous to assume that because of our neutrality we were to regard with apathy or unconcern the repudiation of treaties, the violation of national and international rights, and the outraging of the fundamental principles of humanity.

"I hope," said the President a few months ago, "that we shall never forget that we created this nation not to serve ourselves but to serve humanity." But it was not serving humanity to iterate and reiterate words that seem to have been empty for eight long months, when our own non-combatant men, women and children were butchered wholesale, and when international law at sea and on land was flouted and made the jest of "frightfulness." It was not service to mankind for us to reserve our harshest protest to a later date, against some interference with our commercial gains!

That is why all Europe looks askant at America to-day. That is why we have lost caste among peoples struggling for the very life of liberty and democracy. We have been neither cold nor hot; wherefore humanity is moved to spew us out of its mouth.

COMMERCE AFTER THE WAR

THREE things are obvious. One is that our export trade has enormously increased since the beginning of the war. The second is that the increase has been due chiefly to the conditions produced by the war. The third is that the ending of the war will change those conditions and will thus powerfully affect our commerce. Such are the elements of the problem which confront us.

The increase in our export trade in the calendar year 1915 over 1914 was considerably more than a billion dollars, or nearly 75 per cent. That was gigantic, both positively and relatively. Never before had a nation such an increase in a single year, while just the amount of increase alone would have made a very respectable total export trade for almost any country. As our import trade did not increase, but actually declined, the balance of trade was of course enormous-

ly in our favor. In fact, our exports were about double our imports.

Now the simple fact of so great an increase in one year would of itself be abundant proof of the special and temporary nature of its causes. It is quite inconceivable that so great a growth could proceed from ordinary and permanent causes. The same conclusion is suggested further and convincingly by the circumstances of the case. It is obvious that the war must greatly affect trade. It increases the demands of those belligerents which have access to our markets for munitions of war and other goods which their own disturbed condition and other activities prevent them from themselves supplying. It also increases the demands upon us of neutral states which formerly got their supplies from countries which are now belligerent and therefore unable to provide them. Finally this conviction is confirmed by inspection of the figures. In Europe our sales have enormously increased to those belligerents which have retained the use of the high seas and are therefore able to get our goods—France, Italy, Russia and the United Kingdom—and to those neutral states which are most closely in touch with the belligerents—Denmark, Greece, Norway and Sweden. Elsewhere there has been little or no increase. To Canada, to Mexico, to Australasia, and to Japan, there has been only a small increase, while to China there has been an actual decrease.

We might clinch the argument by citing the values of various classes of exports. There have been large, in some cases enormous, increases in exports of explosives and other military munitions; of animals, breadstuffs, meats, automobiles, shoes, clothing, harness, and other articles useful for military purposes. On the other hand there have been large, in some cases enormous, decreases in exports of agricultural implements, sewing machines, typewriters, steel rails, lumber, pig iron, tools, and other goods not susceptible of military use. The significance of this is beyond question. The increased demand is a war demand. Our commerce is war commerce. We are selling war supplies; we are selling other goods to countries whose domestic industries have been interfered with by the war; and we are selling to countries in which the war has freed us for the time from effective rivalry.

Now what will be the effect of the ending of the war upon the three classes of increased exports?

Well, in the first place there will be a pretty complete

cessation of the demand for purely military supplies. That will mean a large reduction of our export trade. It will also mean, necessarily, an extensive readjustment of industrial activities in this country. Large establishments which have been created, or greatly expanded, for the production of munitions of war, will find their occupation gone, and will therefore have to go out of existence or else transform their activities into the production of other classes of goods. When, metaphorically, swords are beaten into ploughshares, sword factories will have to be turned into ploughshare factories. Establishments which have been supplying the demands of war will have to begin supplying the demands of peace.

In the second place, European countries now belligerent and therefore comparatively non-industrial, will restore and resume to some extent their own industries, the lack of which we are now supplying, and will therefore cease to purchase from us so great amounts of non-military supplies. How great our loss of trade from this source will be is matter for speculation only at this time.

In the third place, there will be a renewal, to an extent also now undeterminable, of the former competition in various neutral markets, particularly in those of South America, where Great Britain, Germany and France have been our chief rivals.

The second and third of these reductions are the more uncertain in respect to size because of certain qualifications which may prove to be of great importance. Thus, while European nations will resume their own industries as far as possible, we must bear in mind that their efficiency, their productive potency, will be greatly diminished by the losses of the war, while at the same time their needs will be greatly increased by the necessity of repairing the material ravages of the war. They will have fewer workmen and less efficient workmen than before the war, and they will have a great deal more work to do. In some respects, therefore, the demand for American supplies may be maintained, at least for a considerable time. Indeed, they may actually be increased, in some lines of goods.

Again, this same state of affairs may compel European countries to devote all their available efficiency to the supplying of their own needs and the needs of their immediate neighbors, and may thus prevent them from reengaging in

the South American and other foreign trade in which they were formerly our successful rivals.

The lessons are as obvious as the fundamental facts. We must anticipate and be prepared for the radical changes in industry and commerce which the ending of the war will inevitably bring, so as to avoid economic embarrassment from them. It will be well if the vast industrial establishments which are now producing only military supplies and which then will have to abandon that business can be turned readily and without delay to the arts of peace, and particularly to the production of those goods which hitherto we have purchased abroad and for lack of which we are now suffering. To cite a couple of examples: We shall hope to see the United States begin the manufacture of its own supplies of dyes, of which it already produces the raw materials. We shall also hope to see it produce its own supplies of drugs for medicines, and of chemicals for agriculture and the arts; so that never again can a foreign war raise to almost prohibitive prices the medicines of the sick, or handicap our arts and industries by similarly increasing the cost of essential goods which can just as well be made here as elsewhere.

We shall hope, too, to see the United States so adapt itself to the requirements of South American trade, and so ingratiate itself with its customers there, that it will be able to retain the commanding place which through the exigencies of war it is now gaining in those markets. It is significant that our exports to Argentina last year increased by 52 per cent, to Brazil 20 per cent, and to Chile 55 per cent. We shall be disappointed if final returns do not show that these increases have put us easily in the first place in the markets of each of those countries. If so, can we hold that place? Rather, will it not be a reproach to us if we fail to hold that place? Our European rivals got into those markets ahead of us, in the days of our neglect of them, and when at last we woke up to the desirability of supplementing the Monroe Doctrine with commercial relations, we found it impossible to displace them in peaceful competition. But now they have been ousted by their own war and we have got in. It remains for us to show that we can hold the markets against them, as successfully as they held them against us.

These post-bellum problems may seem to some to be remote. Two years ago a European war seemed immeasurably more remote. Yet the war came, and found most nations

unprepared: That the war will end is of course certain, and it may end as suddenly and as unexpectedly as it began. It would be a reproach to us if we permitted its ending to surprise us and to find us as unprepared, industrially, as its beginning found most of the world unprepared in military matters. For while we did not know that the war would ever begin, we do know that it will end. Preparedness is the wise order of the day. But there is an industrial preparedness as well as a military preparedness, and while we are cultivating the one, as we greatly need to do, it would be deplorable for us to neglect the other, of which we have no less need. We believe in the prudence and the wisdom of the injunction that in time of peace we should prepare for war. It is no less wise that in time of war we prepare for peace.

GREECE AND THE POWERS

KING CONSTANTINE is his own best spokesman. The neutral course of Greece in the War of the Nations has been variously commented upon, pro and contra. It has been defended against criticism by the Greek statesmen who have guided it, and by men in other countries who approved it because it comported with their interests. But by far the most lucid explanation of it, and the most convincing vindication of it, so far as it is to be vindicated, came from the lips of the King of the Hellenes himself, in his very frank talk with a press correspondent.

The present predicament—for such it must be called—of Greece in her relation to the warring Powers constitutes, however, one of the strangest ironies of history, a review of which inevitably arouses sympathy with the Allied Powers in their thought that the Hellenic Kingdom should array itself outright upon their side. We scarcely need the reminder that after the raids and conquests of Macedonians, Romans, Serbs, Bulgars, Crusaders and Venetians, it was the Turks who finally crushed Greece into poverty and barbarism, so that the very name was lost. That, then, is the first count in the story, that Turkey was the despoiler and oppressor of Greece. The second is that the first impulse for the political regeneration of Greece was given by Russia. That was in the latter half of the eighteenth century, when Russian emissaries incited the Greeks to plan rebellion against their oppressors; when a Russian expedition—not

official but not officially disowned—invaded Greece and strove to lead a general uprising for independence; and when, finally, Russia went to war with Turkey, defeated her, and in the ensuing treaty constituted herself the protector of the Greek Church in the Turkish Empire, and thus made it possible for Greek merchants to sail under the Russian flag. It was then, in 1774, that the Greek national movement really arose.

The third count, a complex one, came in 1820-21. The Congress of Troppau met, under the dominance of that "Holy" Alliance of Metternich's against which we had presently to issue the Monroe Doctrine. The Greeks made an appeal to it for aid and sympathy. Under Austrian dictation this was refused, and Prussia said "Ditto" to Austria. Here then were the present great Teutonic Powers turning a deaf ear to the Greek prayer for rescue from Turkish tyranny. But worse than that soon followed.

In 1821 the Greek Revolution began. Turkey strove to crush it with ruthless cruelty. The Greek Patriarch at Constantinople was officially murdered at the door of his own cathedral and his body treated as carrion. Several other Greek prelates shared his fate. The entire population of the island of Chios was massacred, and Turkey prepared to mete out a like fate to all Greece; as now, under German patronage, she did to Armenia. What, then, was the attitude of the "Christian" Powers of Europe?

Alexander I of Russia, as the Protector of the Greek Church, purposed intervention, and his Ambassador presented to the Turkish Government a strong protest against the savagery that was being practised. His note was in fact a scathing indictment of Turkey for unspeakable infamies; comparable with those of Timur Leng—and Wilhelm II. But Russia did not wish to intervene single handed. It was desirable, she thought, that several of the great Powers should unite, partly in order to make the intervention more irresistible, and partly to avoid the appearance of designs of selfish aggrandizement on the part of any one of them. At that time Austria was the foremost of the Continental Powers, and application was accordingly made to her, at least for her good will and approval, if not for her actual aid. What was the Austrian reply, to which Prussia continued to say "Ditto"?

The Austrian reply was threefold. First, Metternich

wrote, with a cynical and callous wickedness for which we shall look far to find a parallel, that "for three or four hundred thousand people to be hanged, impaled or otherwise butchered was nothing to him!" Even Timur Leng had been satisfied with a tower of only eighty thousand human skulls! Afterward he hoped that the Greek question would be solved by the simple expedient of killing off the entire Greek nation. Next, he wrote to the Sultan, or the Sublime Porte, urging and encouraging an accession of ruthless severity in the suppression of the Greek Revolution. Finally, he persuaded the visionary and fanatical Czar that the Greek Revolution was in fact only part of a widespread and wicked conspiracy against all sovereigns, which it was the duty of all members of the Holy Alliance to suppress. In that way he actually succeeded in getting Russia to withdraw all aid and sympathy from Greece; until after the death of the deluded Alexander I in December, 1825, and the accession of his brother Nicholas, who was not so easily duped by the Austrian trickster and tyrant. So Greece was left to work out her own salvation.

Meantime, what of the other Powers? Byron and Canning in England were foremost in pleading the cause of Greece before the world, and in giving her actual aid; the former at the cost of his fortune and his life. In France, too, Thiers, Cousin, Hugo, Chateaubriand, Lamartine, Béranger, de Broglie and their compeers and many others were ardent and effective advocates of the Greek cause. From both those countries money and arms were freely sent to aid the revolutionists; even long before there was organized and official intervention in their behalf. So it came that in 1825 the representatives of the Greek people formally placed their "liberty, independence and political existence under the absolute protection of Great Britain."

Austria, too, intervened, but as an ally of the Turks. In 1825 the Turks were besieging Missolonghi, the chief stronghold of the revolutionists. Some of the chief operations were on the water, between the Greek and Turkish fleets. But many of the Turkish vessels flew the Austrian flag; and when at last the Greek commander, Sakhtouri, won a victory which was almost a modern Salamis, among the vessels which he captured were five Austrian transports, laden with 1,300 barrels of gunpowder. It is an interesting coincidence that now, just ninety years later, the Teutonic Powers should

again be rushing arms and ammunition from Central Europe down to aid the Turks in a war against Christian peoples.

The curtain rose on the last act of the drama late in 1826, when Nicholas I of Russia, freed from the Austrian obsession which had controlled his brother, determined upon effective intervention. He announced this to the Teutonic Powers. The answer came from Metternich for Austria, and from Bernstorff—there was a Bernstorff then—for Prussia, to the effect that they would not join Russia in any such act, and that if she persisted in it they would hold themselves free to pursue an independent policy. This was meant as a veiled threat to Russia, that Austria and Prussia would ally themselves with Turkey against the former Power. At the same time Metternich wrote to the Turkish Government, encouraging it to hold out resolutely against Russia, and suggesting the reply which it should make to Russia's demands.

But Nicholas was not to be deterred by the Teutonic menace, when he knew that the two great Powers of Western Europe were ready to assist him. So in July, 1827, Russia, France and England entered into an alliance; just as they are allied to-day. The treaty was made in London, and it bound the three signatory Powers to intervene for the ending of the war in Greece, by mediation if possible, and if not, by force. Of course, the only ending which they would accept would be one granting independence to Greece. Mediation failed, and so recourse was had to force. A French army of 14,000 men under General Maison was sent to Greece for a land campaign, and many British officers aided the Greek troops. Finally in October of that year came the decisive naval battle of Navarino, which destroyed the Turkish Power at sea. On the Greek side were the allied fleets of England, France and Russia. On the other side were the fleets of Turkey and Egypt, with Austrian ships close at hand with supplies of ammunition for them. Practically it was a battle of England, France and Russia against the Turks and Teutons. The Austrian Emperor denounced it as an act of assassination.

The work of Greek redemption was completed during the following year by the Russian land campaign against Turkey. Already a former Russian Minister had been chosen President of the Greek Republic. After independence had been completely established, another treaty was made at London by the same three Powers, Great Britain, France

and Russia, by which Greece was placed under their protection and its independence was guaranteed by them forever. The first King of the Hellenes was a Bavarian, who proved so unsatisfactory that the Greeks expelled him, and almost unanimously elected an English prince, the eldest brother of Edward VII. in his place. But the three protecting Powers had bound themselves not to place any member of their reigning families on the throne; so, on the nomination of Great Britain, the Danish prince, George, was chosen, the father of the present King Constantine, and was provided with a civil list from the treasuries of the Powers.

This, then, is the present situation: Greece stands between two groups of allied Powers. On the one side are Turkey, Austria and Prussia, her traditional oppressors. On the other side are Russia, France and Great Britain, her liberators and protectors and the founders of her present ruling dynasty. On the one hand her traditional foes, on the other her effective friends. Between the two, her king insists upon maintaining the largest possible degree of neutrality. Yet it is not surprising that a large part of the Greek people find their sympathies going out almost irresistibly toward the Allies to whom Greece owes her independence and her very existence as a nation and a people, and to whom King Constantine owes his crown. Nor is it strange that those Allies have thought that Greece should show her gratitude for their inestimable services to her, by giving them her aid against not only their present enemies but also her own traditional and inveterate foes.

HYMEN'S WIRELESS

THE flowers of Deutschland's culture are perennial, innumerable, and beyond praise; but the most delectable that we have yet culled has been blooming modestly in our midst for we know not how many fragrant months or years, yet we have only just encountered it. Its native soil is Berlin, where, in the sunny spaciousness of Unter den Linden, it has flourished as the *Heirats-Zeitung*, under the affectionate nurture of Herren Fritz Podzeus (most mellifluous of cognomens!) and John Ringlau; but it had an offshoot in these barbarian States, where it thrust its leaves and blossoms through the hospitable soil of upper New York. Let this precious manifestation of sweetness and light be

self-described: It is, we learn, "The advertising medium of the greatest Matrimonial Office in the world. It stands [mark carefully!] "for the promotion of morality and the legitimate introduction of Ladies and Gentlemen who wants (sic) to be married." It is "published irregularly, according to wants. Subscription, one dollar per year, which includes visits to both offices, in New York and Berlin." If you wish attention, enclose sufficient stamps to cover expenses, "as fees for arranging marriages are not sueable." Introductions will be made if the fee of one dollar is paid and satisfactory reference furnished. But note this carefully: "Personal interviews," cautions the Editor, "should be arranged in advance, as I am often absent making introductions." Moreover, do not try to put anything over on this strictly moral institution: "through the exchange of cipher letters there was much swindling and foolery indulged in, therefore I open all cipher letters." As far as is humanly possible, satisfaction is guaranteed—"it may safely be predicted that a suitable helpmate will be found for every applicant," even though "eighteen thousand marriage inquiries are now awaiting attention."

Restricted space, we are told, has made it impossible to project into the hymeneal void, through the throbbing wireless of the *Matrimonial News*, these eighteen thousand appeals; but several hundred are contained in a recent issue, where they may be observed with the discreetly sympathetic interest that their own delicate reticence prescribes.

Even the most amiably disposed cannot but note with regret that, in most of these cases, the mating instinct is modified by practical considerations. Some of these shy souls, it is true, offer rather than demand—as, for example, the "Lady, orphan, 22 years, of a cheerful disposition," whose advertisement heads the first column of the first page of our invaluable contemporary. Being the possessor of "about two million dollars," she desires to marry "a suitable gentleman"; and in like case is the "European Lady," in the same column, who, apparently unaffected by war-time retrenchments, "has two million dollars in her own right," and "wishes to marry a gentleman of perfect form, good character, happy disposition; mechanical engineer preferred." But sentiment and generosity both fly precipitately out of the window as we round the corner of the neighboring column and encounter "Father, a large manu-

facturer," who "wishes to marry his only daughter to a gentleman who has at least \$50,000—but [note the subtle implication of the "but"] a man of respectability." This, alas! is the prevailing note, proclaiming an age commercialized, insensible, spiritually moribund. What shall we say of the lady who is so indifferent to the sweet promptings of Eros that, though she is eighteen, has "a fine form," and \$400 in cash, must marry "a rich man"—"otherwise she will wait two years"? But commercialism is not all on the distaff side: for here is a "Lawyer, Protestant, 26, 5 ft. 10 in., \$10,000 income, a good swimmer," who—content neither with his own exceptional advantages nor with the bright prospects of emotional reward which they would seem to assure—seeks "lady up to 30 with \$100,000." And next to him are a group of equally abandoned mercenaries: first, a "Stump Speaker, 46, 5 ft. 8 in.," who, not satisfied with an income of \$2,000, "seeks lady with \$250,000"; second, an "Iceman, 29, \$5,000 income, \$15,000 in banks" (admirable captain of industry!), who "seeks lady up to 28, religion and nationality immaterial, with \$2,000"—a modest requirement, surely; but, then, an iceman can afford such luxuries of magnanimity; third, a "Poet, Protestant, 52 years of age, 5 ft. 7¾ in., weight 127, \$4,200 cash," wishes to marry "lady with \$5,000"; fourth, a "Count, German, 64, bachelor, 5 ft. 11 in., the real article, speaks four languages," whose consort must be in the \$200,000 class—though she "may be up to 50 years old"; last—and most heinous—a "Prince, 30 years of age, first-class education," who would wed "lady or widow [no widows are ladies in the *Matrimonial News*] with five million." A Machiavellian master of subtlety! We observe, incidentally, that the maturity dead-line varies liberally—from 24 up to 55. Incomparably less disturbing to the idealistic vision than these unabashed materialists is the "Engineer, 27, 5 ft. 7 in., weight 140," in a neighboring column, who "wishes to marry into a machine factory"; and his presumably repentant neighbor, "Bartender, Protestant, 39 years of age," who "wishes to marry into the coffee business."

Reading on, one turns misanthropist. Sentiment, fond illusion, the wand-like touch of Romance—whence have they fled? But let us not be too hasty in diagnosis: here, after column upon column sodden with materialism and avarice—here, at last, is the bright face of Romance: "Miss, school

teacher, 27 years of age, 5 ft. 4 in., weight 130, Protestant, no cash, but to inherit," wishes to marry "a gentleman with brown eyes." And there is an idyllic suggestion in this simple, bucolic confession of "Noble Lady, 34 years of age," who "wishes to marry a farmer." But Romance sorrowfully turns her face to the wall when we arrive at the next column, for here again is the lure of gold: "Lady, mother, 52, daughter, 19, controls at least thirty millions, wishes to marry two gentlemen of sunny disposition, and will go hand-in-hand with them peacefully on life's journey"—a hymeneal four-in-hand to which none but the sour of heart will fail to wish the happiest of trips.

Here we may profitably pause for a moment to consider those matrimonial qualifications which appear to be most frequently favored. "Congeniality" leads, with nine votes; "integrity" and "education" tie for second place, with seven votes each; "enterprise," with six, runs them close; "respectability" wins four votes; "affection," "sobriety," and "geniality" three; "honor," "industry," "intelligence," "refinement," "ambition," "style," "prominence," and "reliability" run neck and neck, with two votes each. Only sentimentalists will deplore the solitary vote cast for pulchritude—one only for "beautiful"! But what will the Eugenists think of the single vote for "healthy"? There are quaint and provocative specifications: one lady desires to wed a "post-office official," another "a head-waiter or publican," another "any respectable man"; and a widow who owns a corset factory longs for "a gentleman who will help her conduct her business." The Nobel Prize for candor should go to the "Spinster, 40 years of age, 5 ft. 4 in., weight 124, very homely," who "seeks husband, widower with one child preferred. Photo and address with Editor"; or perhaps to the "Steady, sober, ambitious, healthy American gentleman," who wishes to meet "lady of medium height, dark complexion, one who works at some gainful occupation"; and who adds, with one eye on the rising cost of living and the other on the reproachful shade of Anthony Comstock, "Please state number of children desired, if any."

And so we come regretfully to the final page of this enthralling publication, hoping wistfully, as we reach the end, that at least two of its contributors may meet and mate: The "active, aggressive, successful young business man of

large affairs, not yet in the full prime of life, very best health, does not use liquor or tobacco, fond of God's great outdoors and the joy of living," who "wants to meet a companion and chum in the form of a beautiful, cultured, refined Christian lady of wealth and breeding"; and the "Widow of a banker, many millions," who "wishes to marry a prominent gentleman with a happy disposition, who would make her life a perfect revelation." But we fear, alas,—as we wish of our wives and sweethearts,—that they may never meet, since we learn from the public prints that last week the editor of the *Matrimonial News* and *Heirats-Zeitung*—Herr Fritz Podzeus—passed away. His malady was of the heart. He died a bachelor.

OUR LATIN-AMERICAN POLICY

BY EX-SECRETARY OF STATE RICHARD OLNEY

TWENTY years ago a practical application of the Monroe Doctrine seemed to be called for and was made. Subsequent events have not weakened it, but rather enlarged its scope and increased the esteem in which our people hold it.

The relations between the United States and the countries of South and Central America—commonly spoken of collectively as Latin America—have as a rule been friendly, though not intimate. Those countries on the one hand have relied for their commercial and financial connections almost wholly upon Europe and treated their relations with the United States as mostly official and perfunctory. The United States, on the other hand, has viewed those relations in pretty much the same way, while until within a very short time our capitalists, producers and manufacturers have failed to realize the advantages of trade and intercourse with the peoples of the South American continent. The one marked exception to this condition of things has been the Monroe Doctrine—a policy whereby the United States declares itself prepared to resist any aggression by a European state upon the independence or territorial integrity of any other American state. The policy simply means protection and security for any other American state, and, maintained and exercised in good faith, cannot easily be objected to by any other American state. In that view it is a policy directed against Europe only, and until recently it represented our entire Latin-American policy.

Within a short period, however, the United States has developed a distinctive rule of action in respect of Latin America, which in one sense certainly is in the interest of Europe and not against it, and whose only connection with the Monroe Doctrine is the desire and purpose of the United States to avoid any clash with Europe over the practical ap-

plication of the Doctrine. Perhaps what has been done in the course of developing the new policy may be considered as a tacit acknowledgment and acceptance of the claims of European jurists and statesmen that if the United States assumes to protect the political independence and territorial integrity of other American states it must see to it that such states abide by and perform their international duties and obligations. At all events, that is what the United States has been doing and is doing with the acquiescence of European states in various well-known instances. Instead of standing by and looking on while a European state enforces its international rights as against a lawless or defaulting American state, the United States has intervened, has in effect warned the European state concerned off the premises, and has itself caused international justice to be done. It has undertaken the protection of the lives and property of Europeans when threatened by riots and revolutionary movements. It has exacted indemnities and penalties for injuries suffered by them, and has collected debts for European states and their citizens by occupying ports and collecting and applying customs revenues. In cases of this sort it has, in effect, charged itself with duties and trusts analogous to those devolving upon the receiver of a bankrupt corporation.

Consequently, whether the supplemental policy above sketched is or is not the logical and inevitable sequence of the Monroe Doctrine, it is now no longer aimed at Europe only, but also trenches upon American states themselves. It is a policy, indeed, which as respects such states impairs their independence. It does not alter the case that the intervention of the United States in the manner described may be for the best good of such states. Such intervention is in clear conflict with the basic principle of international law, which asserts the absolute equality *inter sese* of all states, great and small.

But our Latin-American policy, hitherto practically limited to the Monroe Doctrine and its corollaries, has necessarily taken on a wholly new development by reason of our acquisition of the Panama Canal and the Panama Zone. The United States is now a South American power, with extensive territorial interests acquired at immense cost. It holds the Canal in double trust—on the one hand for the people of the United States, on whose behalf it is bound to make the operation of the Canal efficient and, if possible, fairly

remunerative; on the other hand for the world at large, on whose behalf it is pledged to give to all nations the like facilities in the use of the Canal upon equal terms. In both relations it has assumed to protect the Canal against all assaults from every quarter, whether they come in the shape of military invasion or of economic competition. Hence, on the one hand the United States has fortified the Canal and will undoubtedly take all other measures necessary to protect it against military attack. Hence, on the other hand, the United States has initiated measures looking to the pre-emption of all other routes practicable for a rival canal.

It sufficiently appears from these premises that the Latin-American policy of the United States now has the following objects:

First. To secure every American state against loss of independence or territory at the hands of a European Power, as means to which end the United States will resist aggression by such Power by force of arms, if necessary, while, in the case of the weak and backward states, removing any excuse for such aggression by itself seeing to the performance of their international duties;

Second. To secure its interest in the Panama Canal by whatever military measures may be appropriate or necessary; and

Third. To protect its interest in the Panama Canal and Zone by whatever measures may be appropriate and necessary to prevent unjust and ruinous competition.

These being the general objects aimed at by our present Latin-American policy, what is the best and most obvious course for the United States to pursue in order to ensure their accomplishment? By way of preface it may be well to note that an extensive discussion of the Monroe Doctrine in the press and otherwise has been going on during the last twenty years and has elicited some novel propositions. The most drastic of these is that the Monroe Doctrine has become archaic—not only fails to serve any useful purpose, but impairs our freedom to consult our own interest—and should without hesitation be consigned to the scrap heap. An ex-President of the United States qualifies that proposition by contending that the Monroe Doctrine should no longer be deemed applicable to those of the South American states which maintain stable and law-abiding governments and whose growth in wealth and power and all the elements of

modern civilization puts them on a plane with all responsible states. And one of the great newspapers of the country, having its eye on the Panama Canal and the Panama Zone, suggests that our line of protectorates or quasi-protectorates should be extended to countries bordering on the Caribbean Sea, but should go no farther.

These propositions seem to partake of an academic rather than a practical nature. It is hardly conceivable that if another American state desires and needs help as against European or other foreign aggression, the United States will not respond to its appeal, whether the state attacked is a great state or a small state and whether or not it borders on the Caribbean Sea. In all probability it may be safely assumed that the Monroe Doctrine, as originally conceived and designed to accomplish the one end originally contemplated, will not be repudiated by the American people in our day and generation. The true question, therefore, is: How shall the Latin-American policy of the United States be so shaped and enlarged that, while preserving the Monroe Doctrine in its original spirit and application, it shall at the same time adequately provide for and protect the new interests the United States has acquired through its proprietorship of the Panama Canal?

The efforts of the present Administration for the pacification of Mexico distinctly point the way to the course to be pursued. The striking feature of those efforts is the co-operation between the United States and South American states. That the co-operation has been highly beneficial to all interests concerned is unquestionable, and, should normal conditions in Mexico follow, as now seems probable, it must be largely credited with the result. Nevertheless, and however more or less valuable such co-operation in this particular instance, its chief value lies in its tendency to introduce into our Latin-American policy a new and important factor, which in all respects—ethical, political and practical—should operate decidedly to the advantage of the United States and all American states.

Our Latin-American policy as represented by the Monroe Doctrine has always been woefully weak at one vital spot. The United States, the originator of it so far as America is concerned, failed to receive any substantial support for it from Great Britain except for a comparatively short period. Ever since, the United States has been the sole asserter and

sponsor of the Doctrine. The other American states have been content to enjoy its advantages while in no way assuming any share of its burdens. Realizing that the United States assumes those burdens not from benevolence but from considerations of self-interest, they have no special reason for gratitude, and as a rule exhibit none. On the contrary, the more they have gained in wealth and general importance, the more their pride seems to take offence at a doctrine which, in a degree at least, makes them stand to the United States in the relation of wards to a guardian. Further, the proceedings by which the United States has felt constrained to compel some of the smaller and less advanced American states to perform their international duties have unquestionably excited uneasiness in all. They feel those proceedings, however temporary or however beneficent in purpose and result, to be distinctly menacing and to indicate purposes and ambitions on our part quite inconsistent with their dignity and safety as independent states. This feeling has been greatly intensified by the lawless violence which robbed Colombia of its territory for the purpose of the Panama Canal enterprise. It thus comes about that, in its relations to Latin America and Europe respectively, the United States now figures as a self-appointed guardian of the independence of the one and the self-appointed guarantor of the rights of the other—both the guardianship and the guaranty being submitted to rather than desired, and neither gaining for the United States any special consideration or reward—while our glaring invasion of Colombia's sovereignty makes us "suspect" in the eyes of all Latin America. A futile attempt to remove or lessen the suspicion led to the ex-President's suggested qualification of the Monroe Doctrine already noted. This situation is obviously anomalous and unnatural and cannot be expected to last. The best practical solution of its difficulties as already intimated would seem to be indicated by the course of the present Administration in its handling of the Mexican situation. For the rôle of sole dictator of affairs on the American continent as now undertaken by the United States, there should be substituted co-operation between the United States and the other principal American states for the promotion and protection of their common American interests. In short, what is to be desired in place of the present unsatisfactory status is a Concert of American states, with powers, objects, and means of accom-

plishing them defined with all practicable precision. The detailed provisions of any plan for such Concert it is unnecessary now to consider. But certain of the great objects to be attained have already been indicated. The Concert would put all American states behind the Monroe Doctrine, so enlarged as to mean the protection of every American state not only against European aggression but against foreign aggression from whatever quarter. The discretion of the Concert would decide when in the common interest it was necessary and proper to so far invade the independence of any particular state as to compel it to recognize and perform its international duties, and would also determine by what state or states the decision of the Concert should be enforced. And, the United States having become an important South American as well as North American Power by virtue of its construction and ownership of the Panama Canal—a purely American enterprise world-wide in its significance and consequences, and which the United States proposes to carry on not merely for its own account, but as trustee for all nations and peoples—the Concert would unquestionably make appropriate and adequate provision for its security and defense against all dangers, whether military or economic.

The advantages of the Concert for the accomplishment of these several ends are apparent. In place of being a self-constituted agency, the Concert would hold credentials from a practically “United America” as represented by the states the most populous, the most powerful in material resources and military strength, and the most advanced in all the constituents of modern civilization. It would wield an authority well-nigh irresistible, not merely because of its superiority in physical forces, but because the diverse interests, policies, and rivalries of the many states concurring in a result would be a practical guaranty that the end in view was the general interest of the whole Concert, and not the special interest of any particular state. It would follow that as a rule, and except in extraordinary cases, a mandate of the Concert might be expected to be self-executing and not dependent upon the use of physical force for its effectiveness.

Still another important advantage of such an American Congress remains to be stated. The Monroe Doctrine is without recognition in international law. It exists as a policy of the United States, firmly settled at this moment, but subject

to change at pleasure. But an established Concert of American states on the lines and for the purposes already outlined might well challenge recognition as coming within the purview and entitled to the sanction of international law. A Federation of the World—a Parliament of Man—may be a dream. But if it ever becomes a reality, it will be by a process of gradual approach and as the result of a merger in a world-wide unification of many groups of nations which, through geographical proximity, racial affinities, common institutions and modes of thought, have been led to form themselves into local federations for the attainment of certain common ends. In the last analysis, the true basis of international law is the usages and practices of the great civilized states of the world. As those usages and practices necessarily change with the advent of new conditions, international law, which is a progressive science, also changes in order to meet the new conditions. It cannot be doubted, for example, that the conception of the absolute equality of states and the unconditional independence of each is now displaced by the conception that every state is perforce a member of an International Society of States and by virtue of that relation both acquires rights and assumes obligations. The whole International Society is in theory at least the common superior by which the rights and obligations of each member should be determined and enforced. In point of fact, of course, and while the logical status is perfect, there has been no world-wide organization of civilized states and no action by them as a whole. On the other hand, international controversies often arise which are local and limited in their nature and in which only a group of states has a substantial interest.

In such cases, long established international practice seems to justify the conclusion that the particular group concerned may legitimately settle such controversies even if the settlement involves over-riding the resistance of a particular state. The principle applied in every such case is of course the general welfare—the greater good of the greater number—the common interests of all the members of the group rather than the special interests of one or a few members. The many instances in which groups of European states have thus settled controversies between their members, always on the plea of acting for the good of the whole group, are too well known to need citation. That their de-

cisions have often been criticized and sometimes with only too much justice may be admitted. Yet on the whole the operation of the various European concerts has been considered to be beneficent especially in their tendency to prevent wars between the members of a group. For that reason and on the grounds already stated, and because there can be no useful and effective co-operation between states for common objects unless each can be made to subordinate its special interest to the general interest, international law must be regarded as acquiescing in the authority of a group of states to control the actions of its members whenever there is a real exigency calling for such control and provided always that the authority is exercised in good faith, by the use of reasonable and appropriate means and with all practicable regard to the rights, interests, sentiments, and traditions of the several peoples concerned. Tried by such a test, an American Concert established for the objects and with the purposes already stated, and providing for their accomplishment through strictly necessary and appropriate agencies, might confidently contend that principle as well as the usages and practices of civilized nations amply justify its existence and purposes. Obviously no rule of international law can be violated by an American Concert undertaking to protect every American state against European or other foreign aggression. So it is difficult to contend that such a Concert's intervention in the affairs of an American state with no other aim and no other result than to bring about the performance of international duties is not calculated to strengthen the ascendancy of international law rather than to weaken it. And it is yet more difficult to believe that an American Concert for the maintenance and security of the Panama Canal should not be recognized as a fit subject for the protection of international law—on the contrary, as a neutralized canal enuring to the benefit of humanity at large, the Panama Canal might well be held as matter of international law to be under the guardianship of each and all of the civilized states of the world. Modern writers on international law concur in the principle which is thus stated by one of them—"Canals which connect great bodies of water and are international in character, modify the course of the commerce of the world, and their status is therefore a matter of international concern."

If opinions may differ as to the merit of any or all of the

foregoing suggestions, there surely can be no difference as to the necessity of determining with the least delay practicable what our future Latin-American policy is to be. "Preparedness" for defensive war is demanded by the country notwithstanding the immense burdens it entails. It involves many besides strictly military problems, and among them one of the most serious is for what contingencies we are to prepare and for what causes we are to be ready to fight. Shall we preserve unchanged our traditional attitude as the champion of every American state against foreign aggression without regard to its consent or request or its preference to take care of itself or to seek some other ally than the United States, and without regard to the surely incurred hostility of the aggressive foreign Power? It has often been claimed and sometimes effectively asserted that the United States in its own interest and for its own welfare must firmly resist any surrender of independence or cession of territory by an American state to a foreign Power even if the same be entirely voluntary. Suppose, for example, that an American state undertakes to permit an overseas Power to plant a colony on its soil, or to convey to it a port or a coaling station, is the United States to resort to war, if necessary, in order to defeat the scheme? These are only some of the inquiries which go to show the necessity of a speedy and comprehensive revision of our Latin-American policy. The replies to them involve possibilities which must be taken into account in any intelligent estimate of the kind and measure of military "preparedness" the United States ought to initiate. Obviously our "preparedness" means one thing with the co-operation of Latin America secured through the American Concert suggested, and a wholly different and much more difficult and burdensome thing without such co-operation. The difficulties of arranging such a co-operation are not to be underrated. Yet the exigencies of the situation are apparent and threaten not merely the United States but all American states. It is matter of self-preservation for each—and each should realize the vital interest it has in supporting a Concert which is formed on lines broad enough to cover all measures essential to the security of all, which is wholly defensive in nature, and which carefully abstains from any unnecessary impairment of the sovereignty of each.

RICHARD OLNEY.

THE PROPOSAL FOR A TARIFF COMMISSION

BY F. W. TAUSSIG

THE proposal for the establishment of a permanent tariff board or commission is regarded in many quarters as showing the way to a solution of the tariff question. There is much to be said for it. But there are serious difficulties and limitations, and above all troublesome questions about the character and make-up of the proposed board, and the course of action to be followed in improving our general political organization.

The first thing that needs to be borne in mind is that no tariff commission can settle policies. No administrative body of any kind can decide for the country whether it is to adopt protection or free trade, to apply more of protection or less, to enact "a tariff for revenue with incidental protection" or a system of purely fiscal duties. Such questions of principle must be settled by Congress,—that is, by the voters.

It is further to be borne in mind that the advocacy of a "scientific" settlement of the tariff does not carry us far. There are no scientific laws applicable to economic problems in the same way as the laws of physics are applicable to engineering problems. If we extend the term "science" to economics, we must remember that it can refer in this subject only to certain generalizations and to a body of useful information, not to a system of clear-cut principles or laws. Some of the economic generalizations are well established; others are of a very tentative and provisional sort. I believe some things are established concerning the working of protective duties; but I would not for a moment pretend that there is such a consensus of opinion on the subject as to give us a body of principles applicable at once in legislation, or

such as to enable us to decide at once on a method of procedure. For example, it is often maintained, not only in the United States, but in other countries as well, that the "scientific" solution of the question is that of the equalization of competition, or the equalization of costs of production. The underlying idea is that such duties shall be imposed as will equalize the difference between cost of production within a country and a lower cost of production in foreign countries. Now, I do not myself believe that this is a scientific or a commendable basis for the levying of protective duties. Consistently carried out, it amounts to saying that all industries are equally worth having; that when differences in cost are great, duties should be correspondingly high; that every industry, no matter how ill adapted to a country's natural resources or its industrial qualities, should have the equalizing protection; that we should never stop to consider what are the directions in which we can apply a country's labor and capital to greatest advantage. The equalizing proposal is perhaps a convenient and workable way of dealing with a protective system which is established and to which important industries have adjusted themselves. Quite conceivably Congress might adopt such a principle, and request a tariff commission to frame a bill based upon it. But it cannot, in my judgment, be said to rest upon any established economic principle, or to be scientific in any accurate sense of the term.

One other preliminary remark may be made. Much is said at the present juncture about the importance of a tariff commission in order to put the country in a state of industrial "preparedness." The war, it is said, must necessarily come to a close before very long, and then new conditions of international competition will have to be faced. Should we not have a careful and elaborate inquiry as to the best way of facing the coming situation? On this matter also I doubt whether a tariff commission can help us much. No one, not the ablest set of men, even though provided with any amount of money for engaging "experts," can possibly learn what sort of industrial conditions will have to be faced when the war comes to an end. We could not go to European countries for the purpose of investigation, or send agents to European countries, for the obvious reason that the respective Governments would not allow us to peer into their affairs. Even if we could send agents and get all possible information concerning existing conditions, no prediction could be made

concerning the course of development after peace. And if all these difficulties could be overcome, there would remain yet a further difficulty in the way of getting "prepared." The elaboration of a tariff bill at the hands of a commission is necessarily a slow process. The experience of the defunct Tariff Commission of 1909-12 indicates what must necessarily happen. That Commission was composed of able men, and it had large resources. It conducted excellent investigations and made valuable contributions to the understanding of some phases of the tariff. But it needed a couple of years to carry on its investigations, and even then was compelled to send in reports before the investigations were completed, because of political pressure to induce it to make some sort of early showing. If a tariff commission had the task of preparing a complete bill on all the complicated schedules, involving the vast range of our industries, it would be quite unable to report or recommend anything until a considerable period had elapsed. No; the commission project must be judged, not with reference to any immediate emergency, real or supposed, but with reference to its value as a permanent policy.

Incidentally, I venture to express my opinion that there is exaggeration in the talk about necessity of preparedness for the coming conditions of peace. No doubt there will be a jar, a shock, when the war comes to a close. But it is not likely to be at all so great as that which came at the outbreak of the war. Then there was a crash from a clear sky. Now, everybody knows that the change is certain to come, and everybody is more or less on the lookout for it. It is in the highest degree improbable that the end of the war will cause an industrial crisis in any country at all comparable to that of the midsummer of 1914; least of all in the United States. No doubt, there will be a period of readjustment, of uncertainty, very possibly of depression; then a gradual settling down to the new conditions. And as this gradual settlement takes place, I am by no means sure that any far-reaching change in international trade will be experienced. Certainly, so far as imports of manufactured articles into the United States are concerned, I see no probability that they will be greatly swelled. European industry is much more likely to be weakened than to be strengthened by the fearful strain of the war, and for some years in the future is less likely to be a formidable competitor than before. Un-

doubtedly, there will be varying conditions in different industries; but I see no indications of a portentous outpouring of exports. Whether the great struggle will eventually have far-reaching consequences upon the commercial relations between nations, it would be hazardous now to predict. But any long drawn out and slowly developing consequences of this kind can have no bearing upon the immediate tariff problem confronting the United States. To repeat, the tariff commission project should be considered without regard to the war contingencies.

Nevertheless, there is much to be said in favor of a permanent tariff commission or organization of some sort. Even though it could not solve the tariff question on a "scientific" basis, or take the tariff out of politics, or evolve a scientific tariff, or put the country in a state of preparedness, there are plenty of matters on which it could be helpful.

The one thing on which a body of this kind could be of service is in the more careful preparation of tariff legislation. It could aid in the accurate, honest, and consistent carrying out of whatever policy Congress,—that is, the party to which the voters had given control of legislation,—might wish to carry out.

Everybody knows that the traditional ways of framing tariff legislation have been in the highest degree haphazard. There has been rough and ready settlement by the committees in charge, influenced in a general way by the advice or pressure of the Administration in office. The House Ways and Means Committee has framed its bill; the House of Representatives itself has then amended its committee bill. The Senate Finance Committee has made more or less hash of the House bill, and the Senate itself has made more or less hash of its own committee bill. Then the Conference Committee of the two Houses get together. That Conference Committee, always under pressure because of short time, holding its sessions in secret, dominated by a few individuals, influenced more or less by advice from the White House, has evolved the final tariff bill. And this Conference Committee bill had to be passed once for all, if there was to be any tariff legislation whatever, in the shape in which it came from that committee.

All of the bodies concerned,—the House Committee of Ways and Means, the Senate Finance Committee, the Conference Committee, the President and the Secretary of the

Treasury and the officials of the Treasury Department,—have had a flood of statements and representations and statistics poured in on them. They have been veritably swamped by the mass of interested testimony. The legislative committees have had clerks or experts, selected hurriedly and put to work hurriedly—often selected because some one had a pull and wanted to get a job. Even the most conscientious chairmen and members of the committee could not possibly make themselves informed about the meanings of all the figures and the classifications and the specific duties and the ad valorem duties. Influential persons could “fix” legislation and work “jokers” in, and eventually bring into effect provisions which could not be said to be intended by Congress or by anyone except an occasional conniving member of Congress. Our tariffs have been settled in ignorant and irresponsible fashion. Of this we have become painfully aware, and it is natural that we should look for some sort of a remedy.

A permanent tariff commission, it may well be argued, could be, and would be, of much service. It could ascertain just what a given duty meant, just what sort of arrangement and classification was expedient, whether a particular phraseology entailed consequences not at all obvious on the surface (this has been the gist of “joker” legislation). If composed of really able and experienced men, its recommendations would have weight. No one supposes that Congress would adopt them as a matter of course. They must always be in line with the general system of industrial policy,—toward protection or toward free trade, toward making duties higher or making duties lower,—which the political conditions determined. They would necessarily be subject to change by Congress. But they would probably have a strong backing from public opinion; they would enable high-minded and conscientious members of Congress (and these constitute the majority) to ascertain the exact situation and to support careful legislation. A commission might greatly improve the situation.

There is, however, another aspect of the case to which little attention has been given in current discussion, and which seems to me of the first importance. What *kind* of a commission shall we try to set up? Shall it be an entirely independent body, like the Interstate Commerce Commission or the Federal Trade Commission, quite separate from the

ordinary administrative agencies of the Government? Shall it be concerned primarily with industrial investigations, and shall it give advice chiefly on questions of industrial policy? A commission quite independent, and giving attention chiefly to matters of policy, is most commonly advocated. And yet there are serious difficulties in the way of such a plan.

In the first place, the very existence of a permanent tariff commission whose main purpose would be to recommend tariff legislation to Congress, would be a constant *incentive to change*. The only excuse for continuing existence for such a commission would be that the tariff needed continual readjustment. The commission itself would feel bound to justify its usefulness by unremitting investigation, and it would necessarily have to make repeated recommendations to Congress. But one of the things borne in on every thoughtful observer of tariff changes, whether an economist by profession, like the present writer, or an experienced man of affairs, is that incessant changes in tariff legislation are bad. Better a low tariff once for all, or a high tariff once for all, than constant shifting or incessant suggestion of shifts. The industry of a country can adapt itself to almost any tariff system if only that system be settled and maintained. Moreover, one of the general principles or "scientific" statements which the economist can safely lay down is that such benefits as accrue from a system of free trade are secured only if low duties are maintained for a long time; and, on the other hand, that such gains as are obtainable from protective duties (by protection to young industries, for example) are secured only if the protective duties are maintained for a long time. A permanent tariff commission whose duty it was to make repeated reports and recommendations would tend to constant modification, constant change, constant unsettlement.

Hence if we are to have a commission whose duty it shall be to shape the tariff or solve questions of policy, I am inclined to think well of some such plan as that of the Tariff Commission of 1909-12. Let its duty be to make inquiries, to secure a body of accurate information, to make recommendations *for a given situation*. Let it be avowedly for an immediate purpose: to serve Congress and the committees in framing a particular piece of legislation. Such was the case also with the Tariff Commission of 1882. The recommendations of that Commission, it is true, were by no means followed in

their details when Congress passed the Tariff Act of 1883. Nevertheless, the tariff of 1883 was a better piece of legislation because of the recommendations of the Commission than it would have been without them. It is not too much to expect that even greater weight would be given to the recommendations of a similar commission in the future, and that it would serve even more to make a tariff act careful, well-balanced, consistent.

It is conceivable, however, that we should have a commission whose duties should be not solely or primarily those of report and recommendation on general policy, but which should have to do mainly with current administration and with the settlement of current administrative questions. This is precisely the situation with the Interstate Commerce Commission and the Federal Trade Commission. They have stated duties in connection with the administration of legislation. These, indeed, are their chief duties. The Interstate Commerce Commission is a sort of court. Its chief business is to decide specific matters at issue between the shippers and the railways. The new Federal Trade Commission is given jurisdiction of a similar kind. Both have, in addition, the power and the duty to make investigation and report. But it is not incumbent upon them to be mainly or continuously on the lookout for changes in legislation. They are chiefly concerned with the administration and improvement of the existing situation, and they recommend legislation only so far as their experience enforces upon them the desirability of changes consistent with the general spirit and policy of the legislation already in force.

Now there are administrative questions in connection with the tariff which are constantly calling for solution, and which at the same time bring to light the need of changes in legislation. There are vexing questions of classification under the tariff,—whether a particular piece of machinery should be classed as a manufacture of wood or a manufacture of iron, whether the chief component material of a fabric is wool or silk. There are questions on the methods of appraisal of duties. There are investigations in foreign countries relating to the values upon which ad valorem duties shall be based. There are inquiries concerning the extent of American trade in foreign countries, as well as concerning the exports which come into the United States from foreign countries. There are the strictly legal ques-

tions of interpretation which now go to the Court of Customs Appeals. There are statistics to be compiled and intelligently presented.

For all these matters we now have dispersed and complicated arrangements. We have the Board of General Appraisers, which is a sort of court for deciding on the appraisement of merchandise. The Assistant Secretary of the Treasury in charge of customs instructs collectors on the classification of customs; and the Customs Divisions of the Treasury Department have similar duties for the routine cases. There are special agents of the Treasury who go abroad and make investigations and reports. Consuls and consular agents abroad make similar investigations. The Bureau of Domestic and Foreign Commerce in the Department of Commerce has a staff of commercial agents who make reports concerning the development of American trade in foreign countries. On the other hand, the newly established Federal Trade Commission is making inquiries of its own concerning the possible development of foreign trade. There are a number of agencies working upon various phases of the same general problem.

There is thus a large body of more or less scattered information which would be useful to Congress. And notwithstanding this multiplicity of agencies, there remains information which a committee of Congress would wish to have and which can not now be had, or, at all events, is not readily accessible. A single body, having the duty of collating and co-ordinating the available information, and equipped to secure such further information as might be desired, could render important service. Further, it is at least possible that such a body should be given administrative functions or some powers of supervision and co-ordination, and should thus be of service not only to Congress but to the executive departments also.

There are two possible ways of gathering and co-ordinating the desired information. It might be done by a purely executive board or sub-department; say, a bureau consisting of permanent officials in the Treasury Department or in the Department of Commerce. Something of this sort now exists in the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce recently established in the Department of Commerce. Under this arrangement the information would be given to Congress not by an independent tariff board, but by permanent

officials regularly serving in the executive departments. The other alternative is that of an independent board having no direct administrative duties and no close affiliation with any existing department, but serving as a sort of clearing house and organizer, and responsible to Congress alone.

On general principles there is much in favor of the first plan. It would seem, indeed, that the very object for which the various officials in the different departments exist is not simply the administration of existing laws but the consideration and suggestion of improvements in them. Unfortunately, the traditions of American political life present serious obstacles to the assignment of such functions to the department officials. The higher administrative appointments in all departments are regarded as political. The personnel changes with every Administration. Not only the members of the Cabinet, but all the responsible and well-paid officials are shifted with every political overturn. That this is a serious evil, and one that grows more serious with the increasing complexity of legislative problems, is recognized by every intelligent observer. The great bane of American politics is the absence of good permanent positions. The good positions are not permanent, and the permanent positions are not good. It is only the minor posts, whose salaries are not large enough to constitute political plums, that are left to permanent officials. And yet these obscure permanent officials, because often they alone are experienced and well-informed, have great influence in shaping current administrative practice and the details of legislation. It has been said with much truth that the Government of the United States is run by \$1,500 clerks. We have sore need in our public service of a body of able, well-paid, permanent officials, whose positions shall not be affected by party changes, who shall not simply follow in mechanical fashion the precedents of their offices as they have found them, who shall be able to give intelligent advice as well as useful information.

Nevertheless, it will be urged, and with much force, that under the existing traditions of our political life the only way to secure a permanent, dignified, able, non-partisan body is through the establishment of an independent board. A board composed of administrative officials would necessarily be subordinate to the heads of the several Cabinet departments, and would be supposed to be under their political influence. To have the desired non-partisan and impartial

character, it is said that a tariff board must be composed of new appointees,—independent persons, and men of larger caliber than can now be expected as sub-officials in the departments. One's attitude on a problem of this sort is necessarily influenced by one's general expectations and hopes on political matters. Will there never be in our Federal service a permanent body of officials, experts in their subjects, not changing with every Administration? Will public service never offer a professional career to men of large ability? Will all the good places in the departments always remain within the spoils system? I can understand that, in view of the rooted habits of the present and the past, it may be concluded that permanent expert service can be got only by the establishment of a separate commission. I hope for myself that we shall learn to make our regular administrative machinery better, that we shall improve the existing system step by step instead of getting round it step by step. But it is easy to understand the attitude of those who believe existing traditions and ways, even though admittedly bad, to be so strongly intrenched as to make it hopeless to attack them directly.

The essential thing is that we should have a permanent and really non-partisan set of officials whose first duty should be to assist Congress in the intelligent and careful framing of tariff legislation. Its main function should not be to give advice to Congress upon questions of policy, or to undertake investigations which rest upon the assumption that some particular policy is to be carried out. It has been proposed, for example, to establish a tariff commission whose most conspicuous duty should be to ascertain the difference between cost of production in the United States and cost of production in foreign countries; the assumption being that this is the basis upon which tariff legislation ought to be constructed. It is tolerably certain that a tariff commission which proceeded on a basis of this sort, and whose functions were mainly concerned with investigations implying the application of this principle, would be under suspicion, and would probably be turned out whenever a political party came in by whom this particular principle was not accepted. And, similarly, any commission which is established as a move in the political game, even though not overtly for any specified sort of investigation, will be under suspicion, and will be given a cold shoulder when a new party comes in.

This was precisely the case with the Tariff Board of the Taft Administration. It was a good board, and it did good work. But it was regarded, not unnaturally, as a device of the Republicans, and it was consequently dropped when the Democrats came in. If we are really to have a useful, permanent, non-partisan board, it must be appointed in such a way, and its duties must be defined in such a way, as to make clear its purely advisory and non-political functions. Necessarily, much would depend upon its personnel; but much also would depend upon the attitude of the political parties at the time of its establishment. If its establishment is simply a political move by one party or the other, it is almost certainly doomed to failure.

It does not follow that a tariff board can be of no service whatever in guiding Congress and the country on the larger and more difficult questions of industrial policy. It could undertake investigations on the character and the development of American industries, on the conditions of competition between foreign and domestic industries, on the prospects of growth and development for American industries, which would throw light on disputed questions of industrial policy. Investigations of this sort, however, take time, and are more likely to be carried out with sole regard to the ascertainment of the facts if they are not undertaken with direct reference to any pending legislation or proposals for legislation. They should be conducted slowly, quietly, without any flourish of trumpets. They are more likely to command the respect of Congress and of the public if carried on by a board which had already established its usefulness and its impartial spirit by routine work more nearly of an administrative sort. The more ambitious and high sounding its regular duties, the less likely is it to be really successful. Let it be given mainly the duty of assisting Congress in the intelligent elaboration of whatever policy the country has decided to follow, and make no pretense of removing the determination of policy from the quarter where in the end it necessarily belongs: Congress and the voters.

F. W. TAUSSIG.

THE ADMINISTRATION'S MILITARY POLICY

BY RICHARD STOCKTON, JR.

CONGRESS, "pork barrel" political methods, and public indifference and ignorance, according to the military men, have been responsible for the past military unpreparedness of the United States. Now, however, when the public is really demanding that there be reasonable preparation, and when politicians are anxious rather than afraid to support adequate defense, it seems as though the military men themselves are about to fight like children over the details of the laws which are to secure the desired result. In fact, it is not unlikely that much of the opposition which the Administration's plans will have to face will be due to differences of opinion among the military authorities.

That there will be a strong fight on the Administration's proposed military policy is now certain. To no small degree this is due to the fact that the Administration is attempting to meet political conditions and at the same time to conciliate several opposing parties of military men, by offering plans that satisfy none of them.

There is a very strong element among our army that considers that compulsory service is the only possible solution of our problem, while the majority of Regular Army officers think that a Regular Army of about 250,000 men at peace strength, with a reserve which would give a trained war strength of over 500,000 is desirable. Opposed to this view are the highest officers of the Organized Militia, or, as it is more popularly called, the National Guard. These officers, very naturally, hold that all efforts should be turned toward establishing a better militia, under the control of the various States, but under the general direction of the War Department. As a third school of thought there is a

growing number of officers who feel that compulsory service, or a large standing army, are both so opposed to the American ideals that they will be adopted only under the compulsion of necessity, and that the militia, under State control, is absolutely out of the question as a part of any good scheme for national defense. This group consists of Army officers with an unusual amount of political knowledge and of National Guard officers with more than the average degree of military knowledge.

The present plans, however, not only oppose the first and second theories, but also fail to satisfy the third party. It must be admitted that, from a military viewpoint alone, a standing army of 250,000 or more, with reserves to maintain the force and bring it up to war strength, and a backing of a million or more trained citizens, is the true solution, and that compulsory service to maintain such a force would not only be fair and advantageous, but probably would be necessary. But those who advocate such a plan have taken up a hopeless cause, which we may dismiss at once as impossible of enactment in our laws. The present plans call for a slight increase in the Regular Army, a Continental Army of citizen soldiers, and more money for the National Guard. They include the regular increase to appease the Army, more money to satisfy the Militia, and provide for the Continental Army as the real attempt to give the nation an effective land force. This programme might well be the foundation of a most excellent military policy. If, however, we fail to consider both political and military conditions in proper proportion, the proposed plans cannot but cause controversy and result in another patchwork military policy.

When the plans of the Administration are carefully analyzed in such a manner there are three things which become evident:

First: That the War Department is not recommending what our military experts think we should have (a large Regular force) but rather what the Secretary of War hopes Congress may grant.

Second: That in attempting to meet political conditions the War Department is proposing a new citizen soldiery (The Continental Army) which is impractical; and that we continue to spend money on an old citizen soldier organization (The Militia) which can never be efficient.

Third: That, although separately both these forces must

be failures, a combination of the good points of the existing and proposed citizen soldieries will probably result in a fairly dependable force, second in efficiency to a Regular Army only.

The proposed increase in the Regular Army is so badly needed as to be almost unquestionable. No military authority can oppose it. The question will, therefore, narrow down to a struggle between those who will be satisfied with nothing but a State-controlled National Guard and those who want a Federal force as a citizen soldiery, ignoring the State troops entirely or in part.

There is no doubt of the fact that it is largely personal interest that will cause the militia to oppose a Federal force. The National Guard is ridiculously inefficient and cannot but remain so as long as it is under the control of the various States. It is for this reason that a Continental Army, properly organized, or some similar force of citizen soldiers under central control, offers the only practicable solution to our present military problem.

The Guard, however, through its higher officers, has already indicated that it fears the effect of the Continental Army scheme. The Guardsmen want to be in the "first line." They want Federal aid, and they intend fighting for it. They will oppose being relegated to the background with all of the influence of 130,000 male citizens of the United States, who can bring to their aid some of the most influential politicians and members of Congress.

Nevertheless, the now well known words of George Washington apply equally well to the militia today and to that of the Revolution. After our early struggles, Washington felt compelled to render this opinion of the militia: "If I were called upon to declare under oath whether the militia had been most serviceable or most harmful, upon the whole I should subscribe to the latter."

We spend over twelve million dollars a year on our present militia force, while our experts know well that it does not, and cannot, accomplish the ends for which it is in existence. In the Revolution, in the War of 1812, in the Civil War and in the Spanish American War there can be found only confirmation of Washington's words.

The National Guard, nevertheless, has much to be proud of. When the obstacles that it must overcome are considered, it is a remarkable force. Its efficiency amazes many

army officers who are aware of the existing handicaps. Among its commissioned officers are a few of the finest soldiers in the United States, and although the lives of a body of troops frequently depend upon the training, experience and skill of their commander, there are many Guard officers in whose hands soldiers would be glad to place themselves. In fact, there are a number who would be preferred to the average Regular of equal rank.

Such facts, however, should not prevent us from considering the efficiency of the National Guard, as a whole, from a strictly impartial viewpoint. According to the report of Brigadier General Albert L. Mills, U.S.A., the chief of the Division of Militia Affairs of the War Department, "the Organized Militia is not fitted to enter upon the work of maneuver campaigns." General Mills, in the same report, continues that "our trained troops, or first line, consist of the Regular Army and Organized Militia." As the Regular Army consists of only about 90,000 men and the Organized Militia of about 130,000 men, it will be seen that this War Department report might well read "two-thirds of our trained troops, or first line, are not even fitted to play at war."

How, then, can these troops be fit to take part in an actual combat? If we would answer that question we would solve a problem that has been worrying our military experts for some time. The real truth is that we have no first line, for the Regular Army is too small, and the Guard is both too small and too inefficient to furnish a first line of defense against any of the great Powers.

The inefficiency of the militia is not due to the members themselves. It is not because the officers are not intelligent and willing and hard working, or because the enlisted men are not physically fit, nor is it because the officers or men are lacking in bravery or other characteristics that go to make up good soldiers. On the contrary the officers are intelligent, and work at a personal sacrifice of time and money that is the wonder of those who are acquainted with the facts, and there is very capable raw material among the enlisted men. In every war, and in many domestic emergencies, the individual citizen soldier has been shown to be brave to the point of recklessness, but at the same time it has been proved that the militia apparently cannot be developed into the organized fighting machine that is needed in modern war.

Were Washington alive today it is extremely improb-

able that the progress made by the National Guard of this time would cause him to change his views in the slightest. Some of the States have excellent militia troops, while others maintain but farcical imitations of real soldiers. New Jersey, for instance, is rated fairly high in militia efficiency, but soldiers who have seen New Jersey's militia at close range must wonder how troops can be very far below the efficiency of the Jersey Guard and still be called soldiers.

The most charitable thing that can be said of the worst State troops, found largely throughout the South and West, is that they mean well. In Arkansas on one occasion the officers were all seen to wear their sabers backwards, in the manner of the most approved hero of the popular priced stock company. Of course the manner in which sabers are worn is of no importance, but it is an indication of the general knowledge of the officers in question.

The militia of today consists of numerous small "armies," varying in size from a depleted regiment to a division and varying equally in efficiency. How any other result can be expected of a force of soldiers subject to the whims of some half a hundred Governors, Legislatures and Adjutants General, it is hard to understand. Unity of control and team work are the great necessities of a military force, and in the State troops these qualities are, of course, entirely lacking. The General Staff of the Army has commented upon this fact as follows:—

Our traditional theory of a small Regular Army and a great war army of citizen soldiers is not yet embodied as a definite institution. The mobilization of our citizen army would not result in a well-knit national army. It would be an unco-ordinated army of fifty allies, with all the inherent weaknesses of allied forces, emphasized by the unusual number of allies.

A great fault of the Guard lies in the fact that it is a very poorly balanced force. Armies are like athletic teams, and require a proper proportion of each of the special units which make up the finished machine. As a baseball team needs pitchers, catchers and fielders, an army needs infantry, cavalry and artillery. This nation, on paper, has been said to have sixteen divisions, four of which are supposed to come from the Regular Army and twelve from the Organized Militia. The National Guard has considerably more than its proper number of infantry regiments for such a scheme, but

it is short 76 batteries of field artillery, 61 troops of cavalry, 12 field hospitals and 34 ambulance companies. The artillery shortage, in other words, amounts to thirteen regiments and the cavalry shortage to over five regiments.

Official reports of the War Department blame this lack of the most important auxiliary arms to the "failure of certain States to respond to the *appeal* of the War Department" when the latter asked that certain of the infantry regiments be changed to other arms of the service. What greater example could one want of the worthlessness of the present militia system? It is self-evident that any organization of which an essential requirement is central control and team work must entirely lack that essential under a plan whereby the central power may appeal in vain to the subdivisions. Furthermore, the 11,000-man shortage of the militia coast artillery is said by the War Department to be due to the fact that "repeated efforts to induce the delinquent States to meet their obligations to supply coast artillery troops have met with no satisfactory response. The condition is aggravated by the fact that the States can give no good reason for their failures."

A foreigner, reading such official documents, would probably find such statements most amusing. The American citizen, however, must find them shameful and alarming. They show that the day is not past when even more serious failures of obedience may occur in the militia, and as has been the case a number of times in the past, States may refuse to allow their troops to respond to the President's call.

Similarly, the War Department is unable to secure adequate training and discipline under the present system. In rifle practice, for instance, which is a very important part of a soldier's education, we find that there has been practically no improvement in the Organized Militia for years. In the last available reports it is shown that 111,140 men were supposed to have fired the instruction or record courses, but that actually only 66,974 fired at all. Men who fire the rifle are divided into six classes, namely: unqualified, second class, first class, marksmen, sharpshooters and expert riflemen. The War Department report shows that only 42,599 qualified as second class or better. A man does not have to be an extraordinary shot to qualify as an expert, while it is assumed that those who fail to qualify at least as second class are of no practical value in the firing line. It will, therefore,

be seen that only thirty-eight per cent of the Organized Militia would have sufficient skill to use their rifles with any real effect in war.

The instruction of officers and men from a theoretical standpoint is still unsatisfactory, and the Guard is still full of high ranking officers and staff officers who are absolutely incompetent. The most important officer in any State is the Adjutant General. In many cases these men are appointed from civil life to a position which practically places them in command of the troops of the State. Many of these generals would be unable to pass the examination for the grade of second lieutenant, and there are few who would be able to lead a corporal's squad in the field without considerable aid from some seasoned officer.

The elective system of choosing officers naturally results in the selection of the most popular rather than the most efficient officer. In many States, however, this system cannot be abolished as long as the Guard remains under State control, for the Constitution of the State makes it compulsory. The military courts in most States are the worst part of the absurd militia system of the United States, and in the best States these courts are not fully successful in maintaining discipline and dignity. Naturally under such conditions there is little discipline in the troops.

It is hardly necessary to say that we shall make a great mistake if we rely on the force of militia described above for national defense, or to point out that no pay, or other tinkering with present conditions, can eliminate such deep-rooted evils. The cause is political influence, and State control, and until both of these are removed the National Guard will be but a useless burden as far as national defense is concerned.

This, of course, is responsible for the proposal to form the new Continental Army. That force, however, is almost as impractical an idea as is the militia, and it cannot ever become successful unless the details so far announced are materially changed. Increasing doubt is being expressed as to the possibility of securing 133,000 men annually who are willing or able to devote two months each of three successive years to military training, and it is most improbable that an efficient corps of officers and non-commissioned officers can be secured. Such an organization as the Continental Army would require a large number of well trained officers and non-commissioned officers, and in order that they might have the

proper amount of experience it would be necessary that they remain indefinitely in the service. It is hard to imagine from where these men would come. Furthermore, to be successful the Continental Army must be a localized force. It must be supported by the enthusiastic approval of the locality from which its various sub-divisions may be recruited. To secure such approval the Continentals will require more than two months in a camp far away from their home station. They will need a permanent organization, effective in both winter and summer. They will need to appear before the public in exhibition drills, ceremonies, and other entertainments which will retain the interest of their own members and of civilians. Meetings will be required to keep up the *esprit*. Moreover, the officers will need to attend schools of theoretical and practical instruction throughout the winter months if they are to keep abreast of progress to the degree that is necessary to make them able to drill new men in the field, and the men should master the elementary drill in armories before going under canvas. For all these purposes the Continental Army will need the armories and other facilities which the National Guard now has.

Still more urgent will be the Continental Army's need for some of the better officers of the National Guard. It is ridiculous to suppose that the proposed citizen soldiery will be so plentifully supplied with officers that we can afford to ignore the many excellent ones in the Guard, and as a matter of fact it is a shame to waste the time of good officers on troops organized under our present militia laws. No doubt many of our best National Guard officers will try to get a commission in the Continental Army and will be so commissioned if such a force is raised.

This will greatly weaken the Guard, and when taken in connection with the existing difficulties of maintenance, the competition between the two forces for enlisted men, and the decreased prestige which the militia will have as a third, rather than a second force, will undoubtedly be the means of soon and entirely destroying the Organized Militia.

Hence, it is apparent that the Guard and the Continentals will not only seriously hamper each other, but that each system has many features which are quite necessary to a successful citizen soldier force. Under the circumstances it becomes evident that the situation calls for a combination of the old and the proposed plans, under which we would secure

a Continental Army under Federal control, but formed with the present Guard as a foundation, and containing the good of both plans.

In such a force the War Department would be able to regulate the number and kind of troops, and thereby secure a well balanced fighting force. It would be able to eliminate the useless and inefficient Guard officers who secured their rank through political or social influence. It could prescribe an adequate and impartial system of examinations for officers, could enforce a uniform system of training, could maintain real discipline, and would be able to order drills during winter months, and thereby make a prohibitive length of summer field-training unnecessary, though at the same time this training could be made considerably longer than is now required of the Organized Militia. Possibly such a citizen force can be maintained without universal service, and possibly not. If not, however, compulsory service in a Federal citizen soldiery would be far more acceptable than in a Regular force.

The great objection to such a scheme naturally comes from those who desire to retain the National Guard as the plaything of the State politicians and to gratify the vanity of the numerous and splendidly attired militia general officers. Furthermore, the money that is expended on the State troops adds no small amount to the contracts which are at the disposal of the State officers, and the adjutants general and other high militia officers take pride in their rank, and are by no means averse to the salary which often goes therewith.

These men use every possible means to emphasize the fact that the Constitution of the United States reserves to the various States the right to train the militia. That, of course, is a fact. It is the reason that our new force cannot be the Organized Militia, but must be termed the "Continental Army" or some other name which will properly designate citizen soldiers, without their being militia. The new force will be raised under the provision of the Constitution which permits the central government to raise and support armies—either regular, volunteer or citizen soldier, as the clause does not specify that these armies must be limited to any one kind.

There now remains no good reason for retaining the various little State "armies." The Constitution of the United

States, and the Civil War which was fought to maintain it, decided that no individual State can make war, either upon a foreign nation or upon its neighboring States, unless it be by act of Federal Congress, binding upon the entire nation. For any State to violate this provision is treasonable, and if there are those who encourage the maintenance of the militia with the idea that it may protect the State against national aggression or repression they are merely encouraging treasonable thoughts. Such sentiments surely have no proper place in our laws or institutions. States should settle their differences by the ballot, and while it is not impossible that some day some part of these United States may again take up arms against the Union, certainly our people should make no provision for troops with that idea in view.

This becomes especially so because it has been found that there is no real need for militia as a State police. The militia is even less fitted for duty in local domestic disorders than it is for war. Little as is the training which it receives for any purpose, it is almost entirely devoted to preparation for war and hardly at all for the purpose of preparing it for duty in small local disturbances. The rifles with which the militia is armed are of the most powerful kind, capable of shooting almost three miles. The bayonets are among the most deadly of close weapons, and the field artillery is out of the question for use in any local disturbance which does not border on actual civil war. Hence, both in training and equipment the Organized Militia is less suited to local police work than is a State constabulary which is armed and trained for the purpose, or even a good sheriff's posse. For very serious disorders provision could be made permitting Governors to use the Federal citizen troops stationed within their respective States.

The real soldiers in the Organized Militia, including most of the field officers and practically all the captains and the lieutenants, are strongly in favor of absolute Federal control. They do not care if they are in the National Guard of California, or of New York, or of Minnesota, or of Texas, as long as they are a good fighting force, and a part of the recognized and efficient land forces of the United States. They take little or no pride in being State soldiers, except insofar as their particular State may have a reputation for having a better guard than others. The State duties in strikes and other riots are only disagreeable, while the

thought of defending the nation against an invader is always a source of pride to a soldier, regardless of what other sentiments may be aroused.

While the Federal Government could not compel the States to allow their militia to enter the Federal Force or to loan or transfer the armories, it could pass laws which would make it sufficiently attractive to cause the States to desire to make the change, and where they refused, a new force along the same lines could be raised. However, it is thought that most States would make the change, which would save many of them hundreds of thousands of dollars annually, and it is certain that the average Guardsman would gladly remove his State letters from his collar and substitute therefor the letters "U. S."

It is apparent that the plans for our national defense are incomplete. In the first place, the American citizen should know that a large regular force, with compulsory service, is the true solution, according to the almost unanimous opinion of military experts. That disregarded, as it surely will be, our citizens should understand that they are wasting good money in attempting to maintain a State controlled militia, and that more will be wasted if it is attempted to raise a Continental Army without incorporating the many valuable features of the militia system.

Wars are won and lost largely by the degree of thoroughness and efficiency in previous preparation. The Federal Government, which must declare and conduct war, should have absolute control of the preparation of all fighting units which it will be compelled to use. Every cent which the United States spends on a military force of which the control is vested in forty-eight practically independent States is an almost total military waste.

We should maintain but two forces in this nation, each with its reserves. One should be a Regular Army of sufficient force to perform the duties of peace without hardship, and the other a "Continental Army" of Federal citizen soldiers, replacing the militia entirely for the purpose of national defense, but taking over its personnel, equipment, and the features of the present militia organization which time has shown to be valuable.

RICHARD STOCKTON, JR.

NAVAL DEFENSE

BY REAR ADMIRAL BRADLEY A. FISKE, U.S.N.

THERE has never been a time since Cain slew Abel when men have not been compelled to devote a considerable part of their energies to self-defense. In the early ages, before large organizations existed or the mechanic arts had made much progress, defense was mostly defense of life itself. As time went on, and people amassed goods and chattels, and organized in groups and tribes, it came to include the defense of property—not only the property of individuals, but also of the tribe, and the land it occupied. Still later, defense came to include good name or reputation, when it was realized that the reputation, even of an organization, could not be destroyed without doing it an injury.

At the present day, due to the complexity of nations and other organizations, and to the long time during which many of them have existed, the question of defense has become extremely difficult. The places in which defense has been brought to its highest excellence are the large cities of the civilized countries; for there we see that the defense of life, property and reputation of every individual has been carefully provided for. This has been made possible by the intimate intermingling of the people, the absence of racial rivalries, and the fact that the interests of all are identical in the matter of defense of life, property and reputation; since, no matter how bad any individual may be, he wishes that others shall be good, in order that he may be safe.

The defense of reputation has two aspects: the practical and the sentimental. The practical aspect regards the defense of that element of reputation which affects ability to “make a living”; while the sentimental aspect is concerned with the purely personal reputation of the individual, or with the individuals of an organization or a nation. The sentimental aspect is much more important, especially in enlightened nations, than is realized by some who have not thought

much about it; for there is, fortunately, in every decent man a craving for the esteem and even the affection of his fellow men; and a knowledge that, no matter how wealthy or powerful he may be, he cannot be happy if he knows that he is despised.

The fact that individuals organize to acquire the strength of united effort brings about, among organizations, a spirit of competition like that among individuals. It is more intense, however, because no man alone can get up the enthusiasms that ten men acting together can get up, and ten men cannot get up as much as a thousand. The longer any organization is maintained, the sharper this spirit of rivalry grows to be, due to the feeling of clan-ship that propinquity and material interests evoke. Its acme is found in those organizations called nations, that have lived together, nourished from the same soil, for generations; where the same loves and jealousies and hates that they now feel were felt by their fathers and their grandfathers and their great-grandfathers for centuries back. Among a people possessing the potentialities of national solidarity and greatness this feeling waxes into a self-sacrificing devotion to the nation and to the land that bore them.

That there should be such a thing is sometimes deplored; because patriotism, like all human qualities, has its bad side and its unfortunate effects. If it were not for patriotism there would probably be no war, and the greatest suffering that the world endures would thus be obviated. But if it were not for patriotism there would be no competition among nations; and in any one nation there would be no national spirit, no endeavor on the part of every man to do his part towards making her strong, efficient and of good repute. In the same way, on a smaller scale, many people deplore the necessity of competition among organizations, saying that it is ruthless and selfish; that it stamps out the individual; that it makes every man a mere cog in a money-getting machine; that it brings about strife, hatred, jealousies, and sometimes murders; that, if it were not for competition, all men would live together in peace.

This may be so; but if it were not for competition there would probably be little of that strenuous endeavor without which no effective progress in advancing the welfare of men has ever yet been made. Of course, it may be that what we call "progress" has really not advanced the welfare of

men; that the savage in Samoa is as happy as the millionaire in New York; that knowledge itself is not an unmixed benefit; and if we accept this view, we may logically declare that competition, progress and patriotism are all disadvantages. But who will go so far? It seems to be a fact that we cannot get something for nothing: that every plus has its minus, every joy its pain; that if men succeed in passing beyond the savage state, and in overcoming the forces of nature, so that they can live in houses with every modern luxury and convenience, they must pay for it by a condition of competition that causes personal jealousies among individuals, commercial wars among organizations, physical wars among nations.

Yet the instinctive desire of everyone is for peace and comfort, for the maximum of good with the minimum of exertion; and therefore the normal person dislikes to see interjected into human life the abominable confusion of war. From this it comes about that every nation, even if it consciously brings about a war, always endeavors to make it appear that the other party is the aggressor. For this reason in every country the army and navy are said to be for the "defense" of the country. No nation, no matter how aggressive its policy may secretly be, openly declares that it intends to provoke aggression. This does not mean that any nation ever deliberately raises an army and navy for aggression, and then consciously deceives the world in regard to its intention; for men are so constituted as to feel more or less unconsciously that their interests and desires are proper and those of their opponent wrong; and every nation is so firmly persuaded of the righteousness of its own policies as to feel that any country which exhibits antagonism towards these policies is trying to provoke a fight.

Now these policies, especially after a nation has adhered to them for long, seem vital in her eyes, and they usually are so. To Great Britain, whose major policy is that she must be mistress of the seas, it is vital that she should be. Her people are surrounded by the ocean, and unless they are willing simply to eke out an agricultural existence, it is essential that she should be able to manufacture articles, send them out in ships to all parts of the world, and receive in return money and the products of other lands. In order that she may be able to do this, she must feel sure that no Power on earth can restrain the peaceful sailing to and fro of her exporting and importing ships. This assurance can be had

only through physical force; it can be exerted only by a navy. Germany has been gradually coming into the same position, and the same clear comprehension, owing to the increase of her population, the growth of their desire for wealth, and their realization of the control by Great Britain and the United States of large areas of the surface of the earth. Germany's determination to break down, at least in part, that overpowering command of the sea which Great Britain wields has been the result. The ensuing rapid growth and excellence of Germany's navy and merchant marine brought Germany and England into sharp competition. Military and naval men have seen for years that these competing nations would have to go to war some day in "self-defense."

In the minds of some people the idea of what constitutes "defense" is rather hazy, and "defense" is deemed almost synonymous with "resistance." Perhaps the clearest idea of what constitutes "defense" is given in a sentence in Webster's Dictionary, that reads:

The inmates of a fortress are *defended* by its guns, *protected* by its walls, and *guarded* against surprise by sentries.

The distinction is important, and the partially aggressive character of defense it indicates is exemplified in all walks of human and brute life. Any animal, no matter how peaceably inclined, will turn on his aggressor—unless, indeed, he runs away. No one ever saw any brute oppose a merely passive resistance to attack. Every man recognizes in himself an instinct to hit back if he is hit. If it be an instinct, it must have been implanted in us for a reason; and the reason is not hard to find in the universal law of self-protection, which cannot be satisfied with the ineffectual method of mere parrying or resisting.

Naval defense, like military defense, therefore, is not passive defense only, but contains an element of "offense" as well. When the defense contains in large measure the element of offense, it is said in military parlance to be "offensive-defensive"; and the most effective defensive is this offensive-defensive. When a defending force throws off its defensive attitude entirely, and advances boldly to attack, it is said to have "assumed the offensive"; but even this assumption, especially if it be temporary,—as when a beleagured garrison makes a sortie,—does not rob the situation of its defensive character.

For these reasons the dividing line between offense and defense is very vague; and it is made more vague through a realization by all military people that the offense has certain decided advantages over the defense (unless the defense has the advantage of position); so that when strained relations between two nations come, each is so fearful that the other will take the offensive first, when the two nations are near each other, that it is apt to take the offensive first—in pure *self-defense*! A striking illustration is the action of certain European Powers in the latter part of July, 1914.

In addition to the sincere convictions of either party, there is also apt to be considerable yielding to the temptation to persuade the world that the other party is the aggressor, merely to get the sympathy that usually goes to the innocent victim—the support of what Bismarck called “the imponderables.” Few wars have been frankly “offensive,” like the conquests of Alexander, Cæsar and Pizarro, at least in modern times; each side has usually claimed (and often sincerely believed) that its action was demanded in self-defense, and that its cause was just.

To some in the United States naval defense means merely defense against invasion. This notion is of recent growth, and certainly was not held by the framers of our Constitution. Section 8 of Article I defines the powers of Congress; and although eight of the eighteen paragraphs deal exclusively with measures of defense on sea and land, only one of those paragraphs (the fifteenth) deals with invasion. The first paragraph reads:

The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imports and excises, *to pay the debts and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States*; but all duties, imposts and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States.

The juxtaposition of the words “common defense” and “general welfare” in this admirably written paragraph could hardly have been accidental, or have been due to any other cause than a juxtaposition of those ideas in the minds of the Constitution’s framers. And what more natural connection can there be between any two ideas than between those of common defense and general welfare, since the general welfare of no country has ever continued long unless it was defended. Now the general welfare of every maritime Power has always been intimately concerned with its sea-

borne commerce. It is only by means of sea-borne commerce, for instance, that Americans can live in the way Americans wish to live. "General welfare" means more than mere existence. A mere existence is the life a savage lives. Furthermore, the general welfare of a country requires the safety of its exported and imported goods while on the sea, and includes the right of its citizens to travel with safety in every land, to buy and sell in foreign ports, to feel a proper measure of self-respect and national respect wherever they may go, and to command from the people of the lands they visit a proper recognition of their claims to justice.

Naval defense may, therefore, be said to consist of three parts:

1st—Defense of the coast against bombardment and invasion.

2nd—Defense of the trade routes traversed by ships carrying the exports and imports of the country.

3rd—Defense of the national policy, including defense of the nation's reputation, honor and prestige.

Of these, defense of the coast against bombardment and invasion is the easiest, and defense of the national policy the most difficult; because in preventing bombardment and invasion the defender has the strategical advantage of being nearer home than the adversary; while in the defense of a country's policy, a naval force may have to "assume the offensive," and go even to the far distant coasts of the enemy—as the Russian fleet went to Tsushima, where it met its death.

In that part of naval defense which is concerned with trade routes, the strategical advantage must go, in general, to that side which is the nearer to the locality where the decisive battle may occur.

In laying down a policy of naval defense, however, it is not necessary to consider these three parts separately, because no nation can ever tell whether in the distant future its naval defense will have to be used directly for any one of the three, or for all. In general terms, it may be stated that in nearly all naval wars the fleet has been used more for the defense of the nation's policy than for the actual defense of the coasts or the trade routes. This does not mean that there has never been a bombardment or invasion, or that the defense of trade routes may not have been the cause of the war itself; but it does mean that in actual wars bombard-

ment or invasion has been rare, the capture of merchant vessels has played a minor part, and the deciding events have been battles between two fleets, far from the land of either.

Due to the fact that within modern times most of the important countries of the world have been those of Continental Europe, with frontiers contiguous, and in fact identical, the defense of a country has been largely committed to the army, and most of the wars have been on land. The country standing in exception to this has been Great Britain, whose isolated and insular situation demanded a defense that was strictly naval. The tremendous advance in recent times of the engineering arts, by which ships became larger and faster, and able to carry more powerful and accurate guns than ever before, has enhanced the value of naval power, and enabled Great Britain to reach all over the surface of the earth, and become more powerful than any Continental nation. Thus she has made out of the very weakness of her position a paramount tower of strength.

Naval defense was taken up systematically in Great Britain in the eighth century by King Offa, to whom is credited the maxim, "He who would be secure on land must be supreme at sea"; but it must have dropped to a low ebb by 1066, for William of Normandy landed in England unopposed. Since that time Great Britain's naval defense, committed to her navy, has increased steadily in effectiveness and power, keeping pace with the increase in the national interests it defended, and utilizing all the growing resources of wealth and science which the world afforded. Until the present crisis, Great Britain's naval defense did its most important work during Napoleon's time, when Great Britain's standing, like the standing of every other European nation, was subjected to a strain that it could hardly bear. So keenly, however, did the nation and the nation's great leader, Pitt, realize the situation that the most strenuous measures were adopted to keep the navy up, press gangs even visiting the houses of subjects of the king, taking men out, and putting them by force on board His Majesty's ships. But the British Navy, even more than the British Army, brought Great Britain safe out of the Napoleonic danger, and made the British the paramount nation of the world.

Since then Great Britain has waxed more and more powerful, her avowed policy being that her navy should be equal to any other two; realizing that her aloofness in point of

national characteristics and policy from all other nations made it possible that a coalition of at least two great nations might be pitted against her at a time when she could not get an ally. Accompanying the growth of the British Navy has been the establishment of British foreign trade, British colonies, and British bases from which the navy could work, and the general making of a network of British commerce and British power over the surface of the earth. No nation has ever occupied so dominant a position in the world as has Great Britain during the last two centuries; and she has done it by means of her naval power. This naval power has been, in the language of Great Britain, for the "Imperial Defense"; not for coast defense alone, but for the defense of all the imperial interests, commercial and political, and even the imperial prestige. And this defense of prestige, it may here be remarked, is not a vainglorious defense, not an exhibition of a swaggering, swashbuckling spirit, but a recognition of the fact that the minds of men are so constituted that the prestige of an individual, an organization, or a nation has a practical value and is an actual force. No Government that appreciates its responsibilities will willingly risk the prestige of the nation which it governs, because it knows that any weakening of it will be followed by a weakening of influence, and a consequent increase of difficulty in attaining some "end in view."

The greatness of the British Navy, compared with that of the British Army and the other elements of Great Britain's Government, has taken on magnified dimensions during the last half century. So long as warships used sails as their principal motive power, so long were they forced to employ methods of construction and equipment that forbade the efficient employment of high power guns, the attainment of great speed, and the use of instruments of precision; so long, in other words, was their military effectiveness prevented from increasing greatly. But when the British Navy decided to abandon sail power altogether and propel their ships by steam, a new phase was entered upon, in which every resource of the engineering arts and the physical sciences was called into requisition; and now, on board a dreadnought, battle cruiser, destroyer or submarine, can be found the highest examples of mechanical and electrical art and science. Every material resource which the brain and wealth of man can compass is enlisted in her naval defense;

and in order to take advantage of the rapidity and certainty of movement they afford for operating fleets and ships, there has been a great advance in methods of operation, or, in military parlance, "staff work." To assist this work, the radio, the cable, and even the humble typewriter have contributed their essential share, with the result that to Great Britain's naval defense there has been devoted an extraordinary degree of efficiency, continuous effort, a more varied activity and a larger expenditure of money, than to any other object of man's activity.

The United States Navy, to which is committed the Naval Defense of the United States, has followed the same lines as the British; and its task, while in some ways easier, is in other ways more difficult. Perhaps the chief reason why the naval defense of Great Britain is so difficult is the extreme closeness of her borders to the borders of her possible foes—for the English Channel is only twenty-three miles across from Dover to Calais. And yet the very narrowness of the Channel there lends a certain element of assistance to the defender of either coast against an enemy like Germany, because it enables the defender, by simply protecting that narrow area, to prevent an enemy from passing to the sea or from it, except by going around the British Isles. But while it is interesting thus to compare the tasks of two navies by comparing the lengths of coast line, populations, wealth, and areas of their countries, or their distances from possible antagonists, such comparisons are really misleading; for the reason that all nations are on a par in regard to the paramount element of national defense, which is defense of national policy. It was as important to Belgium as it was to Germany to maintain the national policy, and the army of Belgium was approximately as strong as that of Germany in proportion to her wealth, area and population; but nevertheless the Belgium army was routed, and Belgium was conquered by the German army.

Much has been written to prove that the sole reason for the possession of the paramount navy by Great Britain is that the soil of Great Britain cannot support her people. In an essay, entitled *Naval Power*, which the present writer contributed to the United States Naval Institute in 1911, the fallacy of this was shown; and it was pointed out that even if Great Britain grew more than enough to feed her people, life could be made unendurable to the sixty millions living

there (or to the people in any civilized and isolated country) by an effective blockading fleet. *The question of how great a navy any country needs depends, not on the size, but on the policies of that country, and on the navies of the countries that may oppose those policies.* The navy that a country needs is a navy that can defend its policies, both offensively and defensively. If, for instance, the United States does not wish to enforce any policy that Great Britain would oppose, or to oppose any policy that Great Britain would enforce, then we may leave her navy out of consideration. But if we decide that we must maintain a certain policy which a certain country may oppose, then we must have a navy at least equal to hers; because we do not know whether we should have to meet that navy near our coast, or near hers, or far away from both. For the reason, furthermore, that a war with a European Power might occur at a period of strained relations with some Asiatic Power, we must realize the temptation to that Asiatic Power to seize the opportunity and attack us on the Pacific side, knowing that we should need all our navy on the Atlantic side. This seems to mean that in order to have an effective naval defense (since we are precluded by our policy from having European allies and no South American country could give us any effective naval help) we must have on each ocean a fleet as strong as that of any nation on that ocean against whose wishes we may have to enforce a policy—or against whose policy we may have to oppose resistance.

The essential requirement of any defense is that it shall be adequate; because an inadequate defense will be broken down, while the attack will retain a large proportion of its original strength. In the United States Naval Institute, in 1905, the present writer showed, by means of a series of tables, how, when two forces fight, the force which is originally the more powerful will become gradually more powerful, relatively to the weaker, as the fight goes on. That, for instance, if two forces start with the relative powers of 10 and 8, the weaker force will be reduced so much more rapidly than the stronger that when it has been reduced to zero the stronger force will have a value of 5.69. The values mentioned indicated the actual fighting strength—strength made up of all the factors—material, physical, and psychic—that constituted it. Of course, none of these factors can ever be accurately compared; but nevertheless the tables seemed to

prove that in a contest between two forces whose total strengths are as 10 and 8 one force will be reduced to zero, while the other will be reduced not quite one-half.

One of the lessons drawn was "the folly of ineffectual resistance." Doubtless a clearer lesson would have been "the folly of ineffectual preparedness"; because, when the decision as to resistance or non-resistance is forced upon a nation, the matter is so urgent, the military, political and international conditions so complex, and the excitement probably so intense, that a wise decision is very difficult to reach; whereas the question of what constitutes effectual preparedness is simple, and needs merely to be approached with calm nerves and an open mind.

Inasmuch as the psychic element in defense is the strongest single element, it is apparent that if the decision is reached to prepare an effectual defense the nation must be absolutely united, and must appreciate at its full value the debilitating influence of opposition to the measure; for, no matter how much money a nation may expend, no matter how many lives it may sacrifice, its defense cannot have an efficiency proportional to the effort if a considerable number of its citizens are permitted to oppose it.

In our own country there has been so much talking and writing recently about defense, that there is danger of the question coming to be considered academic; though no question is more practical, no question is more urgent.

Defense must defend.

BRADLEY A. FISKE.

THE PROBLEM AT SUEZ

BY CHARLES JOHNSTON

THE new year began with persistent threats of a huge Teutonic-Turkish drive against the Suez Canal and Egypt. The motive underlying this threat is complex. The more superficial element is the Kaiser's wish to make a magnificent present to the Turks, or at least to lead them to believe in his desire and power to make them such a gift, as the restoration to the Sultan of the ancient Turkish province of Egypt would be. For signs are not lacking that the Turks of Constantinople are growing more than a little restive under the masterful and galling domination of the Kaiser's minions, who, whatever their qualities, have not the gift to exercise authority gracefully.

But there is a much deeper motive. It is true that the Allied armies from Ostend to Switzerland are exercising a magnificent pressure upon the waning Teutonic forces. Where France ends Italy begins; and though the Italian armies may seem to have made little headway, they have really made a good deal, precisely because General Cadorna's all-dominating object has been to build a barbed wire entanglement in the path of the Teutonic armies, so strong that, under no conceivable circumstances, would it be possible for them to break through. The Montenegrin and Serbian forces practically begin where the Italian armies end, though there is a breach on the Dalmatian coast from Trieste southwards which the Italian fleet should have far more effectually closed—had it done so there might have been no *Ancona* disaster; but the leakage there is small and there is practically no possibility of supplies or munitions finding their way into the Teutonic area by way of the Adriatic.

The same thing is true of Greece. Even were Greece frankly pro-German, the little peninsular kingdom is far too completely dominated by the heavy guns of the Allied fleets

to constitute a practical break in the line of pressure. At Salonica, also, the path of the Teutons is barred, whether for egress or ingress. There remains the narrow and precarious back door at Stamboul and the Sea of Marmora, of which more will be said in a moment. Immediately north of the Bosphorus the picket fence begins stretching through Odessa to the Baltic, and the pressure there is daily increasing. All this is true and is of enormous strategic significance, yet it is none the less true that the really strangling pressure, the outermost binding power which holds the whole ring fence in place, is exercised by the Allied fleets; and of these fleets that of England is beyond question the mastering factor.

It is therefore quite logical that the really deadly purpose of Germany is directed against England. That was the motive of the whole Belgian campaign, predetermined years ago, as Bernhardt's book shows. The simile is not a new one, but it exactly describes the German purpose: to point a sword at the heart of England. But this Belgian campaign, this sword thrust at the heart of England, has failed absolutely, the great breach of faith has been fruitless. The German High Seas Fleet, the life work of Von Tirpitz is, so far as its effective military value is concerned, so much scrap iron in the huge junk shop of the Kiel Canal. The submarine attack typified by the abominable *Lusitania* murder has been equally vain, yet its iniquity, its infamy, remains, and this iniquity we must, as a nation, in no wise condone merely because a tithe of the murders are to be "paid for" under the recent German-American negotiations. There is a distinct danger that our national vanity may be salved in this way, a grave danger for the moral life of the American nation. That is, of course, a part of the trick in these negotiations, and it has been very adroitly played. At no point is our moral armor secure, whether in the Department of State, in Congress, or among the people.

But this is a question which concerns rather the moral life of America than the military problem of the Allies. To this, therefore, we return. The supreme need of Germany—for Austria and Bulgaria are now mere provinces of Germany—is to break the iron ring of which the British fleet is the strongest link. This might be done in two ways: by actual physical force, or by the exercise of such strong moral pressure upon England that the British nation itself would voluntarily sever the chain. This is an aim which

Germany steadily, and with growing anxiety, holds before her. This is the true purpose of all the submarine "concessions" to the American Administration. It has been ludicrously conspicuous that every "concession" has been immediately followed by a tart note to England, and the same thing is promised now. It is all a very transparent game, though it is making many dupes, and I allude to it only because it offers an analogy in motive and purpose to the menace against Egypt.

The real blow is aimed, not against the African province, but against the heart of England in a literal sense: against England's courage and determination to carry on the war; and it should be said here that Germany hoped to find a formidable and dangerous ally among the labor movements in England which seemed inclined, with a truly criminal folly, to place the question of their week's wages above the safety of the Empire, stupidly forgetting that if the Empire be impaired they themselves will be the first to go down to destruction. It is the old fable of the Belly and the Limbs which Menenius Agrippa recited to the enlightened and patriotic labor leaders of Rome. But the menace of Egypt is directed, not against the labor parties, who are far too myopic to see it, but against nobler elements, against those who cherish the high, imperial name of England. The hope is that the fear of losing first Egypt, and then India, will congeal the fighting blood of the leaders of England and compel them, not through force but through fear, to loosen their strangle-hold on the throat of Germany. It remains to be seen how far this long-sighted plan is based upon a true reading of English character and imperial tradition.

It may be the hope of Germany that the mere dread of this will accomplish its purpose. Then, of course, there would be no need at all to organize an actual attack upon the Suez Canal and Egypt. But to arouse that dread there must be at least the appearance of formidable military preparations, and the Kaiser's publicity bureau has been working strenuously and ably to create that appearance.

So far, and very wisely, the Allied General Staff has made no revelations at all of the extent to which it has checked the supposed facts sent out by the Kaiser's publicity bureau. To check these facts very thoroughly would be no great undertaking for an effective Intelligence Department, since the basis of the Teutonic-Turkish preparations is Aleppo, and

Aleppo is only about a hundred miles from the Syrian coast at Alexandretta or Antioch, and should therefore be easily within the range of the aeroplanes or hydroplanes of the Allied fleets. But unfortunately we have no right, after the recent experience of Serbia, to count very confidently on effective Intelligence work or prompt preparations based on it. Mackensen's drive southwards through Belgrade was announced weeks beforehand in the newspapers; the accumulation of men and munitions on the north bank of the Danube was early and correctly described. Merely by reading the papers the Allied War Council might have had the information and might have made formidable preparations to hold the line of the Danube. But, unhappily for Serbia, the reality was otherwise; we must not, therefore, hope for very much in the new situation.

The general outline of the Teutonic-Turkish plan as set forth by the Kaiser's publicity organs, and which, as we have said, we are as yet unable adequately to check, is as follows: the basis of the attack is at Aleppo where, it is said, a huge Turkish force of from a quarter of a million to half a million men is being prepared for the "descent into Egypt." Aleppo is probably chosen because of its railroad connections, as being within convenient reach of the recruiting fields of Asia Minor, whose rugged natives are counted on to make the attack. It will be driven home first along the railroad, recently built from north to south for the pilgrims to Mecca, which runs somewhat to the east of the Jordan valley. This Hejaz, or Pilgrims' Railroad, now links Aleppo with Damascus and from Damascus runs southward to Maan, not very far from the Mount Sinai peninsula. The weak point in the plan is that there is no branch railroad directly westward to Suez and the Canal, and the intervening country offers very formidable difficulties to a rapid campaign. To these we shall return.

Let us consider for a moment the earlier link in the chain, that which connects Constantinople with Aleppo, for the greater part of the way by the main line of the Bagdad railroad. A cablegram from Constantinople dated December 10, which evidently forms a part of the Kaiser's publicity campaign, gives what appears to be an entirely adequate account of this section of the railroad. We may sum it up as follows:

From Constantinople through Anatolia to the Taurus

Mountains is a railroad journey of forty-eight hours. The pass called the Cilician Gates, to Saint Paul's Tarsus, has been turned into a motor road by thousands of Armenian laborers working under German and Austrian engineers. From Bosanti, the end of the railroad section to Tarsus is a motor run of six or eight hours. From Tarsus a branch railroad extends to the Amanus Mountains. It is connected by a good road, with the terminus of the Bagdad railroad at Rodjo. From Rodjo the railroad runs to Aleppo.

From Aleppo to Damascus there is only a single narrow gauge track. This is formidable because it means transshipment and a second outfit of rolling stock. From Damascus the Pilgrims' Railroad runs south beyond the Jordan valley, not only past the Mount Sinai peninsula, but as far as the holy cities of Arabia. Now comes the question how an attacking force could reach the Suez Canal, using the Pilgrims' Railroad as a basis. The problem is not an easy one. The nearest part of the railroad is 225 miles distant from the Canal, and this space represents a difficult country to cross, largely because of the absence of water. It is not sand, however, but firm, sun-baked clay, almost as hard as brick, and therefore quite well adapted to motor traffic. Motors would here overcome a double difficulty: unlike draft animals, they do not require water; again, unlike animals, they could carry abundant supplies of water for the troops. If we grant an adequate supply of motor trucks and artillery at Maan on the Pilgrims' line, a supply, that is, holding the same proportion to the number of troops employed as did the supply of General Von Kluck's army, there is no reason why an advance on the Suez Canal might not be as rapid as was General Von Kluck's rush toward Paris. Yet it is difficult to see how such an adequate supply could be obtained.

We have tried to get a view of all the advantages and facilities for such a raid; let us now speak of some of its disadvantages. In the first place, there is the question of distance: from Constantinople by rail and caravan trail to the Suez Canal is over twelve hundred miles. Now, it is not enough to send an army from one end to the other of this line; the whole line must be held all the time. To do this adequately might require as many men as Germany has in France, and there is the preceding difficulty: that of sending your army along the line, a task rather more difficult than a transportation of a party of Cook's tourists. Here is an

illustration of that difficulty: In the Russo-Japanese War, ten years ago, Russia's problem was, of course, to transport troops to Manchuria along the single track of the Siberian railroad. The total actually carried was about one army corps, or forty thousand men, a month, or, say, thirteen hundred men a day. Now if, on the one hand, we are to suppose that a large corps of German railroad officers transferred to Syria might manage it very much better than the Russians did, on the other hand, the Russians had no difficulty of two gauges, and the only trans-shipment in their case, that across Lake Baikal, was carried out by running long trains of cars on floats, as is done in New York harbor, or in the ferry from Stralsund to Sweden. Exactly how much rolling stock the Aleppo-Damascus narrow gauge and the Pilgrims' Railroad dispose of it is difficult to say. The Intelligence Department of the Allies ought to know this accurately, though one is far from confident that they do. But there seems to be no reason why the Teutonic and Turkish authorities should do conspicuously better than the Siberian railroad did. Let us, for argument's sake, suppose they do just twice as well; this would mean the transfer of two army corps a month, which would, in its turn, mean that at least six months would be necessary to assemble the half million men predicated by the Kaiser's press bureau, and, for a large part of this time, it would be necessary to provide three meals a day for the enormous armies assembled by hypothesis at Maan. Where these three meals a day are to come from it would be difficult to say.

But the initial difficulty of transporting this army is really less than the problem of supporting it adequately along a slender, vulnerable line of communications: highly vulnerable at half a dozen points, which we shall not try to indicate, by precisely the kind of attack which the Allies are in a position to make. We have omitted wholly the initial difficulty of training and equipping so large a force, a difficulty on which Lord Kitchener could comment eloquently. Yet that difficulty remains. Yet even if we suppose it surmounted, there remains the vital question of munitions.

To turn now to the other side of the question: For the Allies, the defenders of the Suez Canal, the difficulties of transport and support simply do not exist. They can run their troop ships and supply ships into the canal itself at both ends. Munitions are now abundant, and it is safe to

suppose that a sufficient part of Kitchener's army is available, with troops from Australia, New Zealand, and India to supplement it. But there are other, and very valuable, bases of supply.

The nearest is Abyssinia. The reasons which bind Abyssinia to the Allies are these: In the first place, Abyssinia is one of the oldest Christian nations, dating from about the time of Constantine the Great and the Council of Nicaea (325 A. D.), though the native tradition carries it back to apostolic times, to the meeting of the "man of Ethiopia, a eunuch of great authority under Candace, queen of the Ethiopians, who had the charge of all her treasure and had come to Jerusalem for to worship" with Philip the apostle. The Christianity of the Abyssinians counts for much in this war, which, at least for the Mohammedans, is definitely a war against the followers of Christ. Further, Abyssinia has been from the beginning attached to the Eastern church, and has been for several generations in the closest ecclesiastical communion with Russia. The Christians of Abyssinia, like all Oriental Christians, passionately resent the present sacrilegious use of the plain of Golgotha by German drill-masters for the training of Turkish troops, destined to take part in an attack against Christian Powers. Again, the Abyssinians are bound to England by many ties besides that of geographical proximity to England's African possessions. Already, many times, English and Abyssinian troops have fought side by side against the Moslems of East Africa. The Negus of Abyssinia has some 300,000 fine troops, finely equipped with modern arms, resting, as did the armies of Japan, upon a strong feudal basis, and therefore naturally organized, which is something that could not be said of the Turkish hordes supposed to be gathered at Aleppo. And as against the precarious single track route beyond the Jordan, the Abyssinian army is within three days of Suez by transport, with all the Oriental merchant marine of England to carry them.

What has just been said suggests, perhaps, another invaluable source of supply: the armies of Japan. Under certain circumstances the Mikado's Empire is bound by treaty to help England in a war involving Asia, and we cannot suppose that the torpedoing of Japanese liners in the Mediterranean has rendered Japan less willing to fulfill this treaty obligation. On this head no more need be said.

There are, therefore, enormous and most formidable difficulties in the way of such a raid on the Suez Canal as the Kaiser's press bureau has predicted. But let us suppose these difficulties triumphantly circumvented. Let us further suppose that the Allies fail to cut the slender line of communications at any one of half a dozen vulnerable points, and that the projected expedition safely reaches and crosses the Suez Canal and enters into effective occupation of the whole of Egypt: would this be a vital injury to the British Empire? Would it of necessity be a blow so crushing as practically to compel England to make peace on Germany's terms?

The answer is quite simple: Egypt is no essential part of the British Empire—formerly not a part of the British Empire at all, but simply a protectorate under a native Sultan. Even that much it has been for a few months only, up to the time when Turkey entered the war. But in the years before that, in the centuries before that, England did very well without Egypt; should destiny so decree, she could do as well without Egypt again. The truth is that England has done infinitely more for Egypt than Egypt has done for England. Nor would the loss of the Suez Canal mean anything more formidable than a few days' delay in the mail service between London and Bombay. Therefore, in the strict sense, England might lose Egypt and the Canal to-morrow and not be seriously the worse for the purpose of the present conflict with Germany.

We come therefore to this: the Teutonic threat against Egypt involves an expedition subject to tremendous difficulties and perils, an expedition which, even if ideally successful, would be wholly futile for the real purpose which Germany has in view: the breaking of the chain of steel which is throttling her to death. That Germany should really contemplate such an undertaking, if she does contemplate it, shows one thing and one thing alone: a desperation which has no longer command of sane mental processes. It is a counsel of despair.

CHARLES JOHNSTON.

THE TRUTH ABOUT ANTWERP

BY DEMETRIUS C. BOULGER

WHEN the war is over an inquest will have to be held upon many matters that preceded it before its history can be set forth in true perspective. In regard to most of these the time has not arrived for dealing with them. The information is incomplete, too many reputations are involved in the search for responsibilities, the final issue has not been reached. One incident, one passage of history, is alone complete. Nothing that has yet to happen can alter the text in which this episode, so distinct and separate in itself, so pregnant with importance as giving a stamp and character to the course of the war, may be set forth today as a sort of preliminary guide to future historians. The episode relates to and centers in Antwerp. But it possesses much more than a local interest and significance. Its study will serve also as an object lesson of the ignorant optimism, the complete and boastful unpreparedness, with which all Europe, it might be said, confronted the outpouring of the German avalanche in the summer of 1914.

We have had lately a great deal of criticism and defense in regard to the British expedition to Antwerp in October of that year, but it will be seen as the sequence of events establishes itself that this formed a very small part in a succession of blunders which after three years culminated in the great tragedy of the fall of the bulwark of Belgium's independence. Mr. Winston Churchill's so-called blunder was only the last and very far from the greatest of the many sins of omission and commission with which the British Foreign Office must be charged in connection with Antwerp. Nor can the Belgium Government itself be wholly absolved from blame in the matter.

Before commencing the main narrative it is desirable to restate one fact that appears to have passed out of

memory. The obligation on Great Britain to come to the aid of Belgium against invasion seemed likely on more than one occasion during the reign of Leopold I, and again in 1870 and 1875 during that of his son and successor, Leopold II, to be translated into effective action. On each and all of these occasions the assumption was that the British co-operating force was to proceed to Antwerp up the Scheldt. It is necessary to retain that fact in mind when the very opposite course pursued in 1914 comes to be described and considered. A change had taken place in the views of both the British and the Belgian Governments. The causes of the change were not the same in each case. The former was too deferential to Holland, the latter had too blind a confidence in the strength of Antwerp as a fortress. Between these fundamental errors of judgment the precious principle of the open road by the Scheldt to Antwerp was compromised and left in abeyance. The fall of Antwerp was the direct and almost inevitable consequence of the refusal to uphold and make good the Belgian co-sovereignty of the Scheldt in 1911.

Of course it goes without saying that Holland would deny that a co-sovereignty existed, but that was the very point that should have been submitted to the arbitrament of the Guaranteeing Powers, or better still of the states which paid their quotas to the freeing of the Scheldt in 1863. Until such a decision has been formulated we accept the view of Charles Rogier, Belgium's greatest statesman, who declared that Belgium had an admitted and visible right in "the division of the sovereignty of the river." Such at least was the view in both London and Brussels when on more than one occasion the possibility of British troops being sent to Antwerp was discussed. No one had the temerity to suggest that the Scheldt was to be closed as a route when the Belgians called for troops and munitions of war instead of commercial articles. What is more, no one thought it possible to do so in official circles at the Hague, until the matter was brought up in an indirect manner at the end of the year 1910.

The pro-German party in Holland, led by General den Beer Poortugael, then put forward a demand for the fortification of Flushing, and after many debates this proposal was carried in the Dutch Chambers and eventually several cupola forts, armed with 28 c. m. guns purchased at Krupps, were established in the sand dunes west and north of Flushing. These guns completely command the mouth of the Scheldt,

which is about four and a half miles wide. A new factor thus came into force. Whatever paper rights Holland might or might not have to revive her old usurpation to monopolize the navigation of the Scheldt, she had forged for herself a fresh weapon giving her the control of the river whenever force superseded law. How this complete change in the established order of things was tolerated by either Great Britain or Belgium remains one of the most convincing proofs of the small part that real statecraft plays in the work of Foreign Departments. The very fact that Holland had a natural right to fortify Flushing or any other part of her territory made it all the more necessary to emphasize the point that it could in no way affect Belgium's co-sovereignty of the Scheldt or fetter the freedom of access to Antwerp, and if that protest failed to receive assent at the Hague, then was the moment to have referred the whole matter to a European Conference. I have good reason for believing that the Dutch Government expected a protest of that nature, and it waited nearly a year before the works were begun. As a matter of fact if war had broken out in September, 1911, as seemed probable, Flushing was not fortified and the Dutch would not, because they could not, have opposed a British Armada sailing up the Scheldt.

Why did neither Great Britain nor Belgium protest at the right moment? The reason in the British case was simply the inherent reluctance of the Foreign Office to grapple with any troublesome question until it became imperative to do so. In this way troublesome questions often become serious difficulties, but it is the method of Downing Street which is open to the reproach that it can attend to only one thing at a time. But it is never at a loss for a plausible excuse in neglecting the other things. In the case of the fortification of Flushing, and its effect on the unrestricted freedom of the Scheldt as an open waterway, it excused itself on the ground that any intervention on its part would have thrown the Dutch people into the arms of Germany. The attitude of the Dutch themselves refuted this argument. The Dutch Liberals were strongly opposed to the fortifications and the Catholic Government was so convinced that the British Government would protest that it put off the commencement of the works for more than a year. If the British Government had only hinted at the intention of summoning a Conference on the freedom of the Scheldt the scheme would have been aban-

done. This statement is not lightly made, and some day the historical proof of it will be published in Holland.

The reasons for the Belgian abstention from protesting or from an appeal to the guarantors were mixed. The Belgians too were fearful of alienating Dutch sympathies, but that was not their main reason for doing nothing. They were also in a sense not appreciated by any of their neighbors most desirous and most hopeful of maintaining a strict neutrality in the event of a European struggle. They believed that a mere show of preparedness would suffice to keep off intruders and to allow of their preserving the safe rôle of spectators of the storm raging round their frontiers. To justify that reward their neutrality had to be strict, loyal and even-handed. Their system of defense was directed to guard equally against either a French or a German encroachment. But German diplomatists insinuated that perhaps the greatest peril of all to Belgian neutrality would come from the side of England which under the Entente Cordiale had promised France her aid, and could find no other scope for rendering it than in the old battle-ground of Flanders. It was represented that the Belgian Government had an easy way of showing that its neutrality was impartial all round, even against England, by refraining from taking all ships in the way of protest against the fortification of Flushing. It fell in with the suggestion and ignoring "the changed circumstances thus imported into the question of the free navigation of the Scheldt" recognized the principle that Holland was free to do what she liked in her own territory—an unanswerable proposition in itself which evaded the main point at issue.

Although that was the moment of Belgium's greatest faith in the honorable intentions of Germany, the desire to strengthen them by what may be called a deferential and conciliatory attitude towards Berlin was not the sole or even the chief motive that guided Belgian policy in 1911 on the Flushing question. The Belgian Government had come to the momentous decision that, whatever aid it might accept in the event of invasion from its friendly guarantors, in other directions it would itself defend alone its fortresses. This decision was most unqualified and emphatic in regard to Antwerp. The old understanding, one might even say, the fundamental axiom of Anglo-Belgian co-operation, was thus abandoned. Whereon a British expedition might be landed on the

Belgian coast at the invitation of the Belgian Government, notice was given three years before the event that it was not to come to Antwerp. With that idea in their mind there is not much difficulty in understanding the tolerance displayed by the Belgian authorities to the proposed fortification of Flushing. It promised to place an obstacle in the way of a demand being made to which they had decided to give a negative answer, and thus to obviate the disagreeable necessity of saying no to a friend. To put the point briefly, the British Government did not protest against the fortification of Flushing lest it should irritate and alienate Dutch opinion; the Belgian Government followed in the same path because it seemed to obviate the possibility, or at least to reduce the chance, of a request being made to which it had decided not to accede.

The reasons which led the Belgians to decide that they would defend their own fortresses are not difficult to discover, nor could they be termed by the light of all the information before the war unintelligible or without justification. They had every reason to believe that, when the outer ring of the forts were completed as was done in 1913, Antwerp could put up a very good defense and stand a long siege. No one imagined that monster guns up to those of 16.8 caliber could be conveyed across country or transported on any railway trucks that could be conceived. The 6-inch guns in the Antwerp forts were considered to be quite good enough to deal with any guns the Germans were likely to be able to bring against them. The first reason thus was belief in the strength of the fortified position of Antwerp. The second was a neutral and commendable patriotic pride which prompted the desire to make Antwerp the place of a final national stand. At Antwerp the Belgians were convinced that they could make a very protracted resistance, and best prolong the defense of their country. That part they attributed to themselves. Their allies and friends could operate elsewhere in Belgium, but Antwerp was to be reserved for the national forces.

It must also be remembered that in the Belgian scheme of national defense Antwerp was to be the shelter of the Government, including the Sovereign, the Legislation, the Treasury and the national archives, and of a large part of the fugitive population. In other words it was anticipated that there would be very little available space within the

fortified position of Antwerp, and consequently a large British force could not be easily provided for. In old days the assumption had always been that Britain would send in the first place an expeditionary force of very limited dimensions, but the development of Continental armies had suspended that view, and the Belgian Government had to envisage the arrival not of a merely supporting but of a completely overshadowing British army. Looking at the situation before the terrible experiences of the present war had opened everybody's eyes, it was very natural that the Belgians did not like to think of being effaced in the defense of their great national fortress, in which their faith and confidence were then complete.

This was the exact situation on August 4, when the German armies broke into Belgium and King Albert addressed his request for help to France and England. In that document the King, while inviting and suggesting the co-operation of their armies with his own, expressly reserved the defense of the Belgian fortresses for the national forces, thus confirming on the eve of the struggle the views which, as has been explained in this article, had become part of Belgian military policy for some years previously. Nor, it may be remarked, was there anything in the opening passages of the war to show that their views were utterly mistaken. The first German attacks, unsupported by siege guns, on the Liège forts were repulsed, and until they were brought up there seemed every probability that at least the left bank forts might hold out for a long period. The smashing effect of the German siege guns was not fully realized until the attack on Namur, when it was altogether too late to make any fresh disposition, but the fate of its forts reduced to ruins without any chance of their guns making an adequate reply carried a mournful foreboding, to every intelligent Belgian acquainted with the true situation, as to what must happen at Antwerp if attacked in a similar manner.

The Antwerp door being thus closed to the British expedition, that through Ostend was held wide open, the Belgian Government made all the necessary arrangements for its reception at that port, and the military programme was drawn up on this assumption. It soon became clear that Ostend, even with the supplementary aid of Zeebrugge, would not do as the place of debarkation. Not merely is the entrance of such an intricate and restricted character that the neces-

sary rapidity could not be attained, but the port could not be used by the large liners in which the bulk of the British forces and their supplies were sent across the Channel. The Belgian Government was informed, on or about the 9th of August, that the British expedition could not be landed at Ostend or on the Belgian coast at all, and that it was coming through France. The first British soldiers to enter Belgium only crossed the frontier near Mons on August 21st! If Antwerp had been its landing place, as contemplated in the earlier plans, the British army would have occupied by that date a commanding strategical position on the flank and rear of the German armies advancing to attack the northern frontier of France, and many favorable opportunities must have presented themselves for attacking their narrow and exposed line of communications.

The Belgian Government transferred its seat from Brussels to Antwerp between the 15th and 17th of August. On the 19th the Belgian main army under King Albert retired to Antwerp before the overwhelming masses of the German armies (eleven army corps), and after one severe combat at Aerschot it was completely under the shelter of the forts on the next day. The Germans marched on to attack the Allied armies in the south, leaving a comparatively small force to hold the Belgian army in Antwerp. There were several sorties and many skirmishes, but for more than five weeks Antwerp enjoyed a respite. Some even hoped that the Germans would be content to mask it. It was not until September 25th that the arrival of considerable bodies of troops with a train of formidable sized guns including 16.8 howitzers warned the Belgian authorities in Antwerp that the crisis had arrived. It took forty-eight hours to place the howitzers in position, and on September 28th they began the bombardment of the two principal forts on the south side, Waelhern and Waure St. Catherine. These forts were much damaged on the first day, and more or less destroyed on the second. It became clear that the defense of Antwerp could not be protracted any more than had proved to be the case at Namur, Maubeuge, and other French fortresses.

The immediate object to be attained under these circumstances was to save the Belgian field army from sharing the fate of the fortress, and steps to this end were begun on September 29th, the very day it was discovered that two of the principal forts could not withstand the fire of the

German howitzers. The transfer of the base to Ostend with all movable stores was carried on at night and completed in the course of a week. During the nights of October 6th and 7th the army was moved to the left or west bank of the Scheldt, and began its retreat to Ghent and the coast. It was only just in time, as the enveloping German troops forced the Scheldt at Schoonaerde the same day and began to march northwards. The Belgian army was thus saved from being involved in the loss of Antwerp, and survived to become famous on the banks of the Yser.

The fortress of Antwerp or what remained of it was left to the defense of the permanent fortress garrison, a Belgian infantry division and three British naval brigades. Of the last named force one brigade arrived on October 3rd, and the two others on the 5th. They came by train from Ostend via Ghent and St. Nicolas, and their total strength was about six thousand men.

Before dealing with the British expedition to Antwerp a few essential dates and facts may be given. On September 29th it had become so evident that Antwerp could not be held that preparations for the extrication of the field army were begun. On October 2nd the Belgians retired behind the Nethè, all the forts south of it having been destroyed. On October 6th the Germans forced the extemporized position north of the Nethè, and between them and the city remained only the eight forts of the first or inner line. Immediately after this incident the army as described was withdrawn. More forts having been captured or silenced and the city itself suffering from the bombardment, the Military Governor decided to extricate a further portion of the garrison, and the Belgian infantry division together with the British brigades were withdrawn to the left bank late in the evening of October 8th. On the 9th the remaining troops were also removed, the pontoons were destroyed behind them, and the Governor retired to Fort Ste. Marie on the Scheldt below Antwerp. The formal capitulation took place the next day, October 10th. The troops that left on the 9th included the British brigades. On that day the Germans were coming up fast on the left bank of the Scheldt to complete the envelopment of the city, and for a certain distance the retreating troops were under fire. On their way to Selzaete the British hugged the Dutch frontier very closely, and whether by ignorance of the roads or by some blunder which has still to be

explained, some fifteen hundred of the British sailors and marines outstepped the frontier, were disarmed by the Dutch troops, and subsequently interned. This minor incident remains *sub judice* until a Court of Inquiry eventually establishes the different responsibilities.

Something must now be said about the British Antwerp expedition. On September 28th the Belgian High Command recognized that the defense of the Antwerp position was dubious; the next day they knew it to be impossible unless an Allied army could come up in sufficient force and drive off the besiegers. The Belgian official view of the situation at that moment is given in the following extract from the Report of the Belgian Commander in Chief:

At the same time the Antwerp position had to be held up to the last possible moment, since by doing so the invasion of the country would be impeded and a junction with the French and British forces would be rendered possible, it was hoped, in time to enable the latter to prolong the Belgian line southward along the Dender. The situation was similar, it will be seen, to that in which the army had found itself when it was in position on the Gette; then also it had to hold on as long as possible with a view to a junction with the Franco-British forces, and there also it had in the end to retreat, owing to the junction not having been effected up to the moment when the danger became imminent.

The exact situation was accurately gauged in Antwerp, and inaccurately in London. The Belgian authorities, with the forts being smashed to pieces around them, knew that the fortress was doomed and that the only thing to be done was to save the army. The view in London was that the army should be sacrificed in order to hold the city a brief space longer. There can be no question where lay the greater wisdom. The aid contemplated to be sent from London was wholly inadequate for the work to be done. No one could have realized at the British War Office that the Germans had collected around Antwerp and on the Dender armies of not less than 200,000 men, or they would not have believed that a single division (the 7th) with some extra cavalry could have effected anything of importance outside Antwerp. Be the persons responsible for the so-called Antwerp Relief Expedition who they may, the war has not presented a more striking instance of the complete failure in London to grasp the real magnitude of the struggle in which the Allies were and still are involved. King Albert and his staff realized

the truth. They realized it all the more when they saw the so-called naval brigade sent to their aid—a plucky and enthusiastic collection of volunteers hastily got together, ill-organized, inadequately equipped, men so untrained in many cases that the operation of loading magazine rifles had to be explained to them during the sea voyage to Ostend. This was the unfortunate force sent to make good Mr. Winston Churchill's promise that effective aid was on the way from England. King Albert was wisely advised when he made it his first care not to hold on uselessly to a lost city, but to save his army. That army immediately after its escape contributed materially to the arrest of the German advance by holding the line of the Yser where 14,000 Belgian soldiers shed their blood. Shut up in Antwerp it could only have incurred the fate of Bazain at Metz, and much more speedily.

The question of Antwerp is far too serious a one to convert it into a controversy about personal responsibilities and reputations. The fact has been stated, and can be established by documentary proof, that long before the war the position of the fortress was compromised and undermined by subservience to Holland. That carried with it as a consequence the abandonment of all idea of sending succour to Antwerp by water. But the mischief was not restricted to the question of the defense of Antwerp. It extended to the whole problem of British intervention by land in support of Belgium. On the outbreak of the war the British Government had to go elsewhere to land its armies, and the consequence was that two months elapsed before the junction of the Belgian army with that of the British was effected in the last little corner of Belgian soil to escape the tread of the invaders. The Belgians at least had expected it to take place on the Gette by the middle of August!

Whether for good or ill the closing of the Scheldt, for that is what the tacit concession of Dutch claims implied, altered the whole character of the war from the British point of view. The deep water route open to ships of the largest tonnage not merely to Antwerp itself, but thereby reducing the distance from the Channel to the German frontier by one half, was thus placed outside bounds. The British Government went into the war with one of its hands tied behind its back. But it will be objected that we could not have used the Scheldt without offending the Dutch. I denied it at the time when the Flushing question was first raised in 1910, and I

had special reasons for knowing that at that time the Dutch expected an Anglo-Belgian protest and would have yielded to it. I denied it in September 1914, when the true state of things at Antwerp was exposed to me, and if a fresh British expedition to expel the Germans from Antwerp by naval attack were to become feasible I would deny then that the Dutch forts at Flushing would fire on the Union Jack. The Scheldt question neglected in 1910-11 will have to be regulated after the war is over; the Dutch people are far too prudent to take action that would entail its being regulated to their disadvantage. But even if against all provision the Dutch did oppose our steaming up the Scheldt, then I say, with personal regret, that the open hostility of Holland would be less injurious to our chances of success in this war than her sustained neutrality.

Lost opportunities do not recur, and the war has proceeded so far on other lines that it is not likely that Antwerp will assume during the present struggle the commanding rôle for which in other days she was supposed to be reserved. If we Britishers have never been in possession of that advantageous base there is a modified feeling of satisfaction in our knowing that it has not been of much use to the Germans. Time will show whether it affords any great support to their second line of defense in Belgium, for the great natural advantage of Antwerp was in lying open to the sea, and the sea is closed to Germany. It may also be stated that while Antwerp's position requires an immense garrison far larger than was allowed by the Belgians, there is no fortress in which the garrison could be more effectually bottled up unless it controlled the navigation of the Scheldt. It is for this reason that it may be said with some confidence that however the present struggle may go, the rôle of Antwerp for the moment is finished. It must be ranked with the "might have beens," and a future Tomini or Mahan may cite the events that rolled round its forts in 1914 as furnishing fresh proof of the acumen reached in Napoleon's aphorism, "the English like to make war in small parcels."

DEMETRIUS C. BOULGER.

THE WAR AND THE BACK-TO-THE LAND MOVEMENT

BY E. G. NOURSE

"BACK to the land" is an attractive slogan, and the clever phrase-maker who amended it to read "forward to the land" made it all the more appealing. Real estate brokers, colonization agents, commercial club secretaries, have all played their variations on the theme, and each in words that glowed with beauty, throbbed with hope. From their pages a new dawn glows across the dusk of proletarian wistfulness. "Three acres and liberty"!—the very phrase pictures nothing less than the hope of heaven to the toiler in factory, mill, or shop. Little wonder that the Man in Overalls or the modern Bob Cratchett who slaves under a green-shaded electric bulb should yield to its seductions.

It had seemed of late that we heard less of this exhortation. But the war in Europe puts all the old problems in new postures, and several recent utterances give promise that we are to hear again the preaching of a landward crusade. Far be it from me to predict how rapid or how great a mobilization will take place when such a call to the colors shall be made. But one thing is evident: the sons of the city are not mere reservists of the army of the land. They may debate the summons, and are free to stay in their present callings unless persuaded that to enlist and serve would be to their advantage.

A glance back over the period of the earlier agitation reveals the fact that, outside of violent personal enthusiasms (and everybody knows at least one farm "fan"), the summons was pretty generally refused. In spite of the high and rising cost of living, and in the face of a mighty exhortation to forsake the city and make their fortunes on the farm, men persistently stayed in town. Those who engaged in painting

the lily may have derived profit or satisfaction from the task, but the census enumerators have not been able to discover tangible results of their endeavor.

To get at the facts of the matter we must go beneath its superficial manifestations. Of all the host who felt or feel the gnawings of land hunger, four classes are to be distinguished: those who yearn but do not go, those who move to the suburbs, those who go and return, and those who go and stay. The first class—the fireside farmers—do not swell the output of farm products. They increase the gate receipts at the land-show, the poultry-show, the dairy-show and the stock-show, and levy toll upon the seed-houses, poultrymen, and implement manufacturers, to whom they write for catalogues and information.

The second class limit their operations to a kitchen garden and a chicken coop. Their hand-raised radishes do not demoralize the truck-growing industry, nor do the disappointing performances of their costly Orpington pullets seriously upset the egg market. The cost of the suburbanite's living may be a little lessened, but it entails extra work. For those who are willing to make the effort, there are more fresh vegetables, eggs, and spring chickens on the bill-of-fare and more fresh air and exercise for the family.

Even from the other two classes of rural emigrants, the net additions to our agricultural population are much less than at first might appear. They create the illusion of progress by moving in a circle. The first group go to the country full of large hopes, only to find that profits do not come as easily with a hoe as with a pencil. Perchance the tyro farmer loses money alarmingly on his first experiments, or even if he makes some actual profit, it comes so much harder than the accustomed salary or pay-check that the game seems no longer to be worth the candle. Either nerve or resources may fail; there are even cases on record where the issue was settled by a strike of the women or the children. The sweet and simple joys of the country sour into mere loneliness, and an unimagined barrenness of days and nights—particularly nights. Many are the converts of the early exhortation who have already completed that enlightening but impoverishing round-trip from the shop or office to the farm, and back again.

But not even all those who persist in their intention of becoming farmers, and who actually remain in the business,

constitute a real addition to our farm population. Though a thousand city men become farmers there is no gain to the country nor loss to the city, if they merely replace a thousand farmers who sell or rent their farms and move to town.—filling the jobs abandoned by the rural emigrants and living in the houses they vacated. Some expansion into new regions has been going on, of course, as growth of transportation or development of irrigation systems, drainage projects, and dry-farming methods have made other areas productive. Sometimes a larger farm has been broken up into smaller tracts, so that two or several men farm where one man farmed before. Absolute growth in both area and numbers has gone steadily on, but it is in the figures showing relative growth that the really significant facts are revealed. The Thirteenth Census shows an increase of farm land of not quite five per cent, and improved land in farms of less than fifteen and a half per cent, while population increased twenty-one per cent. Cities grew three times as fast as rural districts. The percentage of our population to be found outside incorporated places of twenty-five hundred people or more, fell from 58.4 per cent in 1900 to 53.7 per cent in 1910.

If the men of 1908 and 1910 and 1912 could not be persuaded to volunteer for rural service, we may well ask ourselves whether the great events set in motion by the murder at Sarajevo justify a change in that determination. First we should examine the reasons for that earlier reluctance, before proceeding to the query whether the issue is altered in its fundamental aspects by the war in Europe. The preaching of a "gospel of the land" did not stampede men from trades and industrial callings into agriculture simply because they could not be persuaded that personal advantage lay that way. Let us examine the choice presented to them.

It goes without saying that the countryward movement could not gain even discernible proportions if its plea were that wage-earners of the town should go and become wage-earners in the country. Few indeed are the opportunities for hire in the country that offer more than thirty dollars a month, and the average is even lower. The three dollars or three dollars and a half a day in the harvest field, which the newspapers delight to play up, is but a short seasonal demand for itinerant workers at a hard task.

How much should be added to these figures to cover the item of board, it is hard to say. "Board" is an elastic term

and, while dreams of thick cream and tender fried chicken may materialize, the salt-pork diet and the bed in the hay are by no means unknown or even infrequent. On the whole, the allurements of country living cannot be expected to draw city wage-workers away from the union pay and the union hours, the food and drink with their accompaniment of sociability, amusement, excitement of the town, to work at wages in the country.

No, the prophet of rural salvation does not generally urge men to be born again as hired men, but as farmers, that is, farm proprietors. They are to exchange their wage-slavery, their servile punching of time-clocks and carrying out of orders, for the economic independence, the personal initiative, and the generous financial returns that are the natural and unfailing portion of whoever tills the soil. Since their work in mill, shop, store, or factory has been coming year by year to command less of the things that support life and make it enjoyable, it is urged that their problem of prosperity is to be solved quickly and easily by their becoming themselves producers of these things. Let them raise their own food-supplies, live better and more easily, and sell their surplus product at a fat price—and with the proceeds buy an automobile. For all farmers have automobiles and retire at the age of fifty, always with as much as \$25,000 and generally about \$100,000!

The logic is impressive. If only the facts were so! But the financial lure of the land has been exaggerated in two particulars. The ill-informed have magnified the farmer's earnings, first by counting in the profits derived from increase of land values, and second by ignoring the fact that gross income includes rent for land and interest on capital invested (besides upkeep and depreciation). When the best farm land could be homesteaded, the prospective farmer got one hundred and sixty acres of virgin fertility gratis, and anyone could embark in farming. And when such lands are sold to-day at two hundred dollars an acre, the owner naturally has a nice little fortune on which to retire. But how meagre were his earnings, how pinched was the living he was able to make from that land, during the 'eighties and 'nineties when corn went down to thirteen cents a bushel and wheat to thirty-eight cents, is another matter, but one which should not be forgotten at this time. Even though two hundred dollars be only a fair capitalization of the earning

power of that land now, the new buyer should take counsel with himself whether he can reasonably hope to duplicate the performance of the early settler so far as increase in land value is concerned. And if the promised lowering of the prices of farm products shall actually be brought about, will he be able or willing to labor on at nothing a year as that earlier army of the land were obliged to do? In any event, it is clear that the homesteader was, so to speak, speculating on a margin with little to lose, whereas the man who adventures into farming today must risk a considerable sum as purchase price—an amount which is generally full value of the land and too often more than a fair capitalization of its productivity, because the estimate is inflated by his great expectations of profit. Even if a man locates on one of the few areas of cheap land still to be secured from the Government, the railroads, or lumber companies, he must capitalize such land with ditches, drains, labor and waiting till their cost is little or no less in proportion to their financial productivity than that of the higher-priced tracts. Since the whole landward movement is, in effect, a bear raid on prices, it is hard to find a logical justification for large hopes of profit from increase in land values. That either returns from operation or speculative gains from land purchase are to be secured by so flooding the business as to depress prices of the product, passes belief.

As to the present standing of agriculture with regard to the rate of earnings from operation, our information has been enlarged and made much more definite and trustworthy in recent years as a result of numerous careful surveys undertaken under the auspices of our Department of Agriculture and our agricultural colleges, notably in New York and Minnesota. Their results fail to bear out the claims of those who rhapsodize about the financial opportunities in agriculture today. Of six hundred and fifteen farmers in one New York county one-third "failed to make hired-man's wages, one-third made wages, and one-third made more than wages." Nor was this in a county chosen because of the inferior character of its agriculture. A New Hampshire county showed more than half of the farmers making less than two hundred dollars per year as wages and profits. A well-known authority sums up the situation for the whole United States by saying that the average is probably "less than three hundred dollars, or about one dollar per day for the

farmer's labor. Besides this, the farmer makes interest on his capital and has a house and some farm products."

Yes, an income from his capital, to be sure, but one does not have to go into farming in order to realize an income from capital. The important aspect of the part played by capital in agriculture is not that it has exceptional merit as a source of income, but that without such an accumulation of capital, one is hindered from embarking in agriculture at all. Little the use of dreaming of that three-hundred-dollar labor-income unless one can scrape together the funds needed for the initial investment in some sort of farm plant. Again speaking in averages, the amount needed is a tidy sum, and one that grows apace with the development of the country. The value of farm property per farm in 1910 was \$6,444, practically eighty-one per cent more than it was ten years before.

Even to become a tenant farmer, there are tools, stock, and working-capital to be provided, and though the prospective farmer can buy on part credit, he finds it a less easy matter to bring the farm enterprise to the stage of steady income than it is to go bare handed to the factory or to the high-stool position where the boss even buys the pens. The chafed wage-earner learns that there is a price-mark upon the farmer's seeming independence, and that he who embarks in business on his own responsibility must supply capital and assume risk.

The more one discounts the future by leasing land or mortgaging it to the limit, and by buying equipment on credit, the more inexorable is the demand for profits in the near future, for rent and interest must be met, and the note given to the implement dealer will be presented by the bank for payment. Contract obligations, so blithely assumed, arrive at their maturity without regard to the character of the season or the outcome of the crops. Likewise the family must be fed and clothed, seed and feed provided, until a flow of income is established. The weather is the farmer's bane as well as blessing; flood, drought, unseasonable frost, even a hail-storm on the eve of harvest, may spoil a season's work. These are facts not to be ignored in favor of the more pleasing fictions of the real estate agent. Of course we all believe in fairies—we even pride ourselves upon that belief, now that Peter Pan has called the matter to our attention. But to take one's wife and children down to Florida,

or even to that farm a hundred miles "up-state," may still be classed as an extra-hazardous venture for any man who has not a record of actual success in farming and a generous reserve of cash or dependable credit against possible emergencies.

There are individual cases, plenty of them no doubt, where a man who ought to be in the country finds himself immured in town. There are country-minded folk, and there are people with persistently city types of mind, and nothing is more distressing and destructive than for a man to be kept away from his natural element. Whatever removes the artificial barriers of habit, of unfamiliarity, false allurements, or social disesteem, is to be applauded. Such enlightenment makes for economic flexibility and fitness, by increasing the mobility of occupational groups and making movement easy from one to another. Some service of this sort the back-to-the-land propaganda has undoubtedly rendered, but its blunders are not less conspicuous than its successes, and its preachment stands much in need of being brought into line with the facts.

In the later history of free land, when men raised crops merely as an incident in the process of acquiring a farm, we may read plainly the evils of agricultural over-production. The abandoned farms of the East and the foreclosed mortgages of the Middle West were the natural but melancholy results of the greatest landward movement of our history. It achieved the low prices for which we clamor today, but made farming unprofitable, a hateful thing from which men and women, boys and girls, fled to the city. There trade, commerce, and industry flourished on cheap products, the cost of living was low and work plentiful.

But the present situation challenges further progress. Today's pessimism wails that that development has gone too far, that we have built beyond our powers to maintain. But can we accept such a judgment? Must we indeed abandon the outworks of civilization to mass our efforts at a central point where danger threatens? Are the yeomen unable to hold their own position?—and now, of all times, at the moment when more powerful weapons have been put in their hands and they have been better equipped than ever before for their conquest of the earth! For our agriculture to confess defeat just when large re-enforcements are in sight, when all the cohorts of science and invention are rushing to

its aid, would be not less weak than stupid nor less stupid than unnecessary.

Admitting that rising prices are a menace to our further achievement, we should yet spurn the humiliating proposal that we recall more of our population from the pursuits of commerce, manufacture, education, research—all the complete array of sophisticated callings, to go back and wrestle with Nature for the materials of subsistence. Such a movement would draft both men and money from places where they could ill be spared, and curtail our civilization to the dimensions of a mere pastoral existence.

To avoid this fate we need but to use what we have, to practice what we know. Thus equipped, we can surely solve this problem of our national life.

The one fructifying factor which has hitherto been lacking is economic organization. The remedy indicated is, therefore, the carrying over into agriculture of those very principles of organization which have made our industrial life what it is. Not a panicky rush of population, untrained, unequipped, unfit, from industrial to agricultural pursuits; but rather an application of those same principles of concerted and foresighted action, of regimentation of labor to put special fitness in its due place of opportunity, co-ordination of allied enterprises, careful cost-keeping and the consequent elimination of needless expense and wasteful methods, utilization of by-products, open-mindedness toward change and possible improvement. This is not to paint our industrial life as a picture of perfection, yet, admitting its failings, it cannot be denied that, by any reasonable standard of productive efficiency, American industrial life is at least an era ahead of American agriculture. Now, when the ratio of exchange between the products of agricultural and non-agricultural producers is becoming yearly more and more disadvantageous to the latter, it is time to inquire seriously how to turn to account in agriculture any lessons that have been learned in industry.

To urge the present war as a reason for a movement back to the land is to argue either that agricultural profits are enlarged and the prospects in farming made more alluring by reason of the fighting overseas, or that the disturbances abroad have an adverse effect upon our non-agricultural pursuits. Either one of these influences or a combination of both would tend to alter the ratio of economic ad-

vantage between farming and industrial enterprises. Every carload of eggs or flour or bacon bought in the United States to provision the armies lends color to the first of these hypotheses, and the European purchasing agent becomes an unconscious ally of the farm crusader.

Now as to the advance of certain farm prices, there can be no doubt that this means a substantial increase in farming profits; that it justifies an exodus from trade and industrial pursuits is much less evident. There is ground for reasonable doubt whether prices will maintain an upward trend commensurate with the first increase attendant upon the outbreak of hostilities. The pressure of immediate demand upon a wheat crop already harvested is one matter, and the price equation of the following year, after expected demand has been a factor in determining acreage, care, and so forth, is quite another matter. Likewise we must remember that Europe has dropped from one standard of living to another, much more abstemious, with a consequent curtailment in her demand. The self-denials of a nation fighting for existence may well include a substitution of black bread and potatoes for wheat bread, beef, beet sugar, and the like. The labor of women, children, old men, prisoners, and slightly disabled soldiers will very likely produce a sizeable crop this year upon the battle-free territory of even the warring nations. Certain goods not so readily reproducible must, of course, be imported, and those lucky enough to have such wares at a marketable stage will reap a handsome profit. Horses and mules, hides, and a few other goods of like sort may be taken as examples, but few persons indeed could be persuaded that they can make their fortunes by going back to the land to produce horses or leather for the armies of the present war. The new farmer will be affected rather by having to pay high prices for his teams, his harness, his fertilizer, some of his seeds, and his own living expenses.

Obviously an attempt to be very far-sighted in this matter reduces itself to heroic guessing, but the probable duration of the war will not be long enough to offer permanent inducements to the enlargement of American husbandry at the expense of other industries. And the immediate effect of peace will be to prune away the European demands to a minimum. For agriculture will be the first to feel the resurrecting touch of peace. Long before factories can be

rebuilt, equipped, and organized, long before trade can be re-established and commerce rehabilitated, the disbanded armies will have put their hands to the plough and made the earth to yield them sustenance. Of necessity these nations will apply themselves first of all to producing their own subsistence, and at once the boom of outside agriculture collapses.

The only reason which could justify a scramble after such temporary advantages as appear in American agricultural prices to-day would have to be found in a present severe depression in industrial callings and a gloomy prospect for their future. This, in spite of abundant local difficulties of readjustment, does not seem to be the case. Economically the United States is in the period of adolescence, in which it is passing from youthful extractive enterprises to the grown-up pursuits of industrial life. The European war brings the necessity for a momentous decision. Shall we turn back toward the ambitions of our national childhood, or press forward toward the settled vocations of a maturer future? The present moment presents both dangers and opportunities, and we must keep a steady regard upon the ultimate goals of national endeavor, if we are to escape the one and realize the full measure of the other.

The war problems of even a neutral nation demand not only wisdom but a strong infusion of "nerve" for their solution. When farm prices soar, and the readjustment of industry throws men of certain business and factory employments out of work for the moment, the call of the land can be made to sound very enticing. But the fundamental issues remain unaltered. If America is to realize the largest measure of her economic powers, it must be by concerted effort to upbuild our trade and industry and by an increase of economic organization and industrial efficiency in agriculture, not by a debouch upon the land.

E. G. NOURSE.

ECONOMICS OF PROHIBITION

BY L. AMES BROWN

THE study of the prohibition movement in its historical and political phases in the United States having been discussed in other issues of the REVIEW, it is now advisable that we concentrate for a space upon the economic questions which are involved in the possible success of the Hobson propaganda for national prohibition.

It is well to emphasize at this stage, too, that the present study relates the prohibition movement as it emerges in our politics today, not to theoretical prohibition, and most certainly not to *temperance*, but solely to the propaganda directed by ex-Congressman Hobson and the Anti-Saloon League for the adoption of a definite programme. The faulty side of the Hobson propaganda is made readily apparent in a study of its economic effects. Other prohibition movements have not sought to establish the proposed reform at the cost of confiscation of a large body of invested capital. The Hobson movement, however, makes no provision for compensating those who have invested money in the liquor industry. On the other hand, the moral legitimists responsible for its leadership have repeatedly gone on record as opposing compensation in any form.

The Hobson resolution which was voted on at the last session of Congress, and is to be pressed anew at this session, makes no mention of any step to be taken to meet the responsibilities of the Government to an industry whose profits it has shared for more than fifty years. The prohibition "rider" in the District of Columbia Appropriation Bill, which was defeated only by a narrow margin in the Senate a year ago, made no provision for compensating the men in the national capital whose business it proposed to destroy, and whose invested capital it proposed seriously to impair. Recently, in response to an inquiry, I was informed by the editor-in-chief of the official publications of the Anti-

Saloon League, the chief instrumentality through which the political power of the Hobson movement is exerted, that that organization is and always has been unalterably opposed to compensation.

It is quite apparent, therefore, that the Hobson movement is a movement without a programme for the solution of one of the outstanding economic problems to be created when its success is achieved. So one tangible fact which we must face in deliberating upon the effect of national prohibition of the Hobson brand is the partial destruction of invested capital in breweries and distilleries amounting to \$771,000,000, together with the serious depreciation of capital, estimated at \$421,000,000, which is invested in wholesale and retail distributing establishments.

Senator John Sharp Williams, of Mississippi, a recent prohibition convert, who made the best speech during the debate on the prohibition amendment to the District of Columbia bill in the Senate a year ago, said in that debate:

I think now and then that men in their desire to do good by law are dishonest. Some time ago one of the States of this Union—overnight you might say—passed a prohibition law forbidding the sale and manufacture of malt, or vinous, or distilled liquors within its boundary. Men in that State had hundreds of thousands of dollars invested in breweries and distilleries. Men in that State had just finished paying the State for their annual license, which was permission to sell for the next succeeding twelve months, and that State, which shall be nameless here, did not compensate the men for putting their distilleries and breweries on the junk pile; it did not even return to the men from whom they had collected the year's license the day before the law was passed the money which they had paid them.

"The highest form of morality cannot afford to steal, and it ought not to steal; it ought not to take money under false pretenses. If it does not take it under false pretense, if it takes it under a legitimate pretense, if by its own action it does away with the consideration for which the money was given, then it ought to restore it.

Senator Williams' utterance creates a wholesome atmosphere in which to begin a discussion of the merits of a proposal for compensation. It is well worth while to consider at the start that a moral question is involved in the Government's duty in the matter, and to note also the instances in which the American people have revealed a temper opposite to that which characterizes the prohibition leaders.

Perhaps the most admirable step of the sort was that taken by Sacramento, California, several years ago, in placing in operation a plan for the purchase and closing of objectionable saloons. This plan, which is prescribed by a city ordinance adopted in 1912, is outlined in the following letter I have received from G. C. Simmons, Commissioner of Public Health and Safety of Sacramento:

Ten per cent of the moneys put in the City Treasury as license fees, by the saloons, is set aside as a Saloon Reduction Fund. This money is used solely for the purchase of saloons and we have before us at present four saloons offered for sale to the city. Under this plan the city appoints one man as appraiser, the saloon keeper appoints a man as appraiser, and these two appoint a third to act with them as appraisers. A report is made to the City Commission as to the value of the license and the fixtures and the report, when adopted, carries with it the right to purchase the saloon. Our fund for that purpose amounts at present to \$10,527, which will probably be sufficient to purchase the four saloons offered. Our population in this city is above 75,000 people, and the number of saloons in the last three years has been reduced by purchases and otherwise to nearly forty.

The same principle was applied by a temperance organization at Middleburg, Pennsylvania, in subscribing a fund of \$5,000 with which to purchase the only licensed saloon in that town.

The Virginia Legislature, while making no provision for compensating the owners of capital invested in the liquor industry preliminary to the operation of the State-wide prohibition law adopted in 1914, did recognize in some measure the validity of the principle involved, as well as the extent to which public opinion in the State was aroused against the outright confiscation of the saloon properties. This was done by postponing the operation of the State-wide law until November, 1916. By this postponement opportunity was rendered not only for the licensed liquor dealers to conduct their business through the period for which they had already been licensed, but to shift their capital, in so far as might be practicable in a short space of time, from investments in liquor-producing establishments and saloons. Practically all of the prohibition States have postponed the operation of their laws for a period of several months after enactment. This partial recognition of the obligation not to destroy the value of legitimate property outright has been characterized as hypocrisy by some of the most care-

ful students of compensation in the country. The view has been advanced that the attempt to escape responsibility by such a subterfuge as postponement is worse than a flat refusal to recognize that any such responsibility exists.

Not long ago in a conversation with one of the prohibition leaders in Congress I ventured the suggestion that his propaganda might be strengthened by a more careful consideration of the compensation problem. His reply was typical of many prohibition arguments on that subject. He insisted that no compensation had been provided for the Southern slave owners whose property rights in their slaves were destroyed by President Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation. Is not the suggestion tenable, however, that the genius of the American people was best represented not in the Emancipation Proclamation itself, but in the following joint resolution adopted April 10, 1862, by the Congress of the United States, at the suggestion of President Lincoln?—

Be it Resolved by the Senate and the House of Representatives of the United States in Congress assembled, that the United States ought to co-operate with any State which may adopt the gradual abolition of slavery, giving such State pecuniary aid, to be used by such State in its discretion, to compensate for the inconveniences, public and private, produced by such a change of system.

In Europe, at any rate, it has been an axiom that compensation be made to persons who suffer directly by a change of legislation. Mr. D. Clarence Gibboney, in a thoughtful address to the Pennsylvania Legislature in 1915, when a local option measure was under consideration, discussed illuminatingly the compensation plans adopted in the nations of the Old World which have sought, through prohibition or other measures, to suppress the liquor traffic. Attention was called by him to the fact that one of the most important provisions of the Consolidation Act of 1910, embodying improved liquor legislation for Great Britain, assured to every saloon owner who had conformed to the laws, compensation for the difference between the value of his property with a license and its value without a license. This act also provided that "in the case of the holder of the license, regard shall be had not only to his liquor interest in the premises or trade fixtures, but also to his conduct and to the length of time during which he has been holder of the license; and the holder of a license, if a

tenant (notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary), shall in no case receive a less amount than he would be entitled to as tenant from year to year of the licensed premises."

Mr. Gibboney describes as a "square deal plan" the provision for compensation made by the General Assembly of the Swiss Confederacy when the abolition of the manufacture and sale of absinthe was decreed. This provision extended not only to owners and tenants of land on which absinthe was grown for distillation, but to the owners and leaseholders of absinthe factories, the paid hands on the farms where the product was grown, and the employees of the factories in which it was distilled. Russia in the present century established an imperial liquor monopoly by purchasing vodka distilleries and saloons in the Empire and prohibiting the manufacture and sale of liquor by private concerns. Thus, no problem of confiscation was involved in the issuance of the Imperial *ukase* by which the Czar established prohibition in 1915. The French Deputies in February, 1915, passed a measure appropriating \$2,960,000 as reimbursement for taxes paid by the liquor dealers on absinthe in their possession and for the purchase of their stocks of absinthe, as a companion measure to the bill limiting the number of saloons and abolishing the sale of absinthe.

A basic consideration in the debate as to the obligation of the Government to consider the confiscation of property involved in its assumption of the power to prohibit the sale and manufacture of liquor, is the long dependence of the Government upon the liquor traffic for an important part of its revenues.

The first internal revenue act of the United States, which was approved March 3, 1791, levied duties on all spirits distilled thereafter. The tax was unpopular, however, for the States regarded it as an encroachment upon their prerogatives, and practically all duties were removed December, 1817. From 1818 to the outbreak of the Civil War internal traffic in intoxicants was wholly unrestricted and untaxed by the Federal Government. During this period a customs duty was levied on imported liquors, sometimes a small and sometimes a heavy one, but always sufficient to protect the internal liquor traffic from serious foreign competition. Since the enactment of the War Revenue Tax in 1862 and the early subsequent levy on liquors, the Government has

derived an increasingly great volume of revenue from the liquor industry. Aggregate collections in 1863 were \$3,229,000. They jumped to \$28,000,000 the next year. In the fiscal year 1914 the internal taxes produced \$226,000,000 and customs taxes \$19,500,000. The records of the Internal Revenue Bureau show that since 1865 the Federal Government has collected more than \$5,000,000,000 revenue from the liquor business.

From the Government's long recognition of the legitimate existence of the liquor industry, it seems arguable that, if the people decide to abolish the liquor traffic as a means of promoting their general welfare, they should in fairness turn back to the industry a small proportion of the funds it has contributed to the support of the Government. In other words, the cost of establishing an institution for the improvement of the general condition of the people should be borne share and share alike, and not be saddled entirely upon the shoulders of a set of men who have invested their capital in a legitimate field of industrial activity.

It should be pointed out, however, that the problem of compensation, if a solution is decided upon, will turn out to be by no means a simple one. The fullest measure of fairness to the liquor industry does not require that the Government "buy it out," a procedure advocated by Senator Owen of Oklahoma, a prohibitionist, as the easiest means of settling the controversy. The rapid development of the industrial alcohol industry in the country since the outbreak of the European war has shown that distilleries may be used quite profitably in the production of other things than intoxicants. It is very probably true, also, that a considerable part of the machinery now used in breweries as well as distilleries could be used in other industries. Certainly the buildings themselves would still have some value. It appears, therefore, that the effect of national prohibition would be a serious impairment of the capital invested in the liquor industry and not, as many representatives of the industry have charged, an out and out violation of the Constitutional protection of a citizen against having his property confiscated without compensation. A Congressional commission would be able to determine the extent of this depreciation. The compensation of owners of retail establishments would involve a more extensive Federal inquiry, but the experience of the British Government has shown that it is practicable to

determine the extent of the damage done to a saloon keeper by the revocation of his license, and there is no reason to believe that the American Government would find the task more difficult.

Two economic problems of exaggerated importance which grow out of the establishment of the Hobson reform are the removal of a market for a very considerable volume of agricultural products and the deprivation of a number of more or less specialized workmen of their means of livelihood. Representative Goeke, who has made an original investigation of the economic effects of prohibition, furnished information on the first point in the following excerpt from a speech in the House of Representatives a year ago:

In the course of 1913, corn and other farm products of the value of \$113,884,568 were used in the manufacture of liquors. This amount does not represent the value of the products so used in the Chicago and other markets, but the actual sum received by the growers, based upon the carefully compiled reports of the Department of Agriculture published from time to time. The full significance of this amount can be best appreciated when it is stated that it exceeded the total combined crop values of the census year of Vermont, Maryland, and West Virginia; of Massachusetts, Rhode Island, New Jersey and Florida; of Louisiana, with its great cotton and sugar interests; of New York, New Hampshire and Utah; or of Maine, Connecticut, Delaware, Nevada, Arizona, New Mexico and the two Dakotas.

The amount is made up of barley to the value of \$55,236,641; corn, \$30,924,335; hops, \$11,155,215; rice, \$7,288,786; rye, \$4,604,476; wheat, \$869,938; oats, \$3,382; molasses, \$2,056,626; fruit, \$751,835; and secondary products of agriculture not included under the head of corn, \$626,119. It is computed that in raising these products the farmers paid for labor a total of \$13,485,460, a sum sufficient to employ 74,919 persons for six months, at an average wage of \$30 per month.

One does not need to question these figures in order to differ with the opinion of many prohibition opponents that the withdrawal of this agricultural market would fall as a calamity upon farmers in certain sections. Indeed, the amount referred to is such a small portion of the annual value of our agricultural crop as to make it an unimportant factor. The European market for American agricultural products has been so greatly expanded recently, and it bids fair to remain open for such a long time to come—even after the war ends—that the farmer need have little

fear of any calamitous effect of prohibition in so far as the selling price of his crops is concerned. The indifference of the farmers to the economic loss involved for them in the establishment of prohibition is indicated by the fact that in nearly every rural section where local or State prohibition has been voted upon the farmer has supported the reform.

The labor problem connected with the withdrawal of the liquor industry from the American labor market also is unimportant compared with the other labor problems with which we have to deal. The United States Census figures for 1913 show that the liquor manufacturers employed 62,920 wage earners, to whom \$45,252,000 was paid in wages. The prohibition advocates have not failed to harp upon the fact that the number of wage earners employed and the volume of wages paid by the liquor industry is exceedingly small when the value of its output is taken into consideration as compared with similar items for other important industries. It is pointed out in addition that by no means all of the 62,920 wage earners employed by the liquor industry are specialized laborers who might not expect to secure profitable employment in other industries. A recent investigator pointed out, in a magazine article, that the census returns show that there are fewer than 15,000 brewers, distillers, malsters and rectifiers in the United States. This figure is offered as comprehending all of those who would be deprived of employment in the event of prohibition. The other employees, the writer points out, are of a class of labor which is suitable for engagement in other industries, while the 15,000 who would have to find a new special line of employment compose a number only a little larger than the 10,000 artisans of various kinds in this country who are compelled annually to change one occupation for another. The writer very properly refuses to regard the shifting of so small a number of specialists as a serious labor problem. Perhaps the worst sufferers from the effect of prohibition upon employment would be the bartenders, of whom there are 100,000 in the United States, according to the census for 1910.

There remains the subject of taxation, which must be dealt with by the Government as a companion measure to prohibition. The present dependence of the Government upon the liquor industry for an important part of its revenue certainly justifies the demand, in behalf of all those whose at-

titude toward prohibition is unbiased, that the propaganda embody some adequate scheme of taxation to offset the depletion of the National Treasury which prohibition would bring about. The internal revenue from liquor in the fiscal year 1914, the year before the war came along to upset our taxation system, was \$226,000,000, and the customs revenue from this source was \$19,500,000, a total of \$245,500,000. The importance of the ultimate effect of national prohibition upon our taxation system can best be realized when it is pointed out that the last annual report of the Secretary of the Treasury shows that the total annual income of the Government from taxation was approximately \$700,000,000. Thus it appears that the Government relies upon the liquor business for about 35 per cent. of its taxation revenue. It is evident, then, that the establishment of nation-wide prohibition would compel a complete reorganization of our taxation system. The many perplexities of the present Administration and the Democratic leaders of Congress in their efforts to devise new sources for \$112,000,000 of revenue, which the Secretary of the Treasury declares will suffice for the additional national defense expenditures, suggest but a mild picture of the woes that will fall upon the legislative branch of the Government with the advent of prohibition. The task of this Congress would be more arduous still if it were decided to reimburse the owners of liquor manufactories for the losses entailed by prohibition.

The State Governments would face a taxation problem of their own. The annual revenue of the States and smaller governmental units from liquor imports and taxes in 1914 was \$79,000,000. Recent experiences of a number of prohibition States in raising revenues to meet the sums lost through the abolition of liquor taxes, notably the cases of West Virginia and Tennessee, furnish excellent object lessons for the other States, particularly the larger ones such as New York, which would lose \$17,000,000 of annual revenue.

The difficulties heretofore outlined are put forward not as reasons entirely adequate for rejecting a proposal which holds out a definite promise that the nation shall be absolutely free of liquor consumption, but as practical questions which merit the consideration of all thoughtful citizens who now are seeking to reach a proper determination of the attitude they ought to take toward the Hobson movement.

L. AMES BROWN.

WAR AND HUMAN NATURE

BY HENRY RUTGERS MARSHALL

If courage is required in the warrior, it surely is needed in the advocate of peace.

We all, naturally, tend to resent attempts to inhibit or discredit such of our modes of action as are due to inherited traits; and as men inherit from a long line of ancestry the instinctive tendencies that result in war, it is not at all surprising to find the vigorous among them taking a hostile attitude toward the apostles of peace. Suggestions that are made looking to the abolition of war are thus instantly met by scores of objections based upon their assumed impracticability; and it must be conceded that the pacifists have themselves not infrequently forged weapons to their own discomfiture by their unwillingness to face existing facts.

The courage of the thoughtful among them is sustained, however, when they read the histories of reforms. The idealist has ever found himself handicapped by the well-meant support of a mob of thoughtless enthusiasts. He has always found the practical objections to his propositions presented with exaggerated emphasis; but where his efforts have met with success the world has been surprised to find how suddenly the expected difficulties have dissolved away.

As the life of man is counted, it is but yesterday that war was the fully accredited pastime of men of ability and culture. As Zimmern says in his *Greek Commonwealth*, "it is hard to realize in these days, when fighting taxes the nerves and tires the limbs, but has lost most of its thrills, and all its animal excitement, what a fine sport it was in the days when men regarded it as the great and only game."

Fortunately for us this day is past, we may hope forever. Even those who ask us to relinquish our ideal of enduring peace join with us in agreeing that war is an evil; but they tell us that if we will but face the facts we cannot fail to see that it is a necessary evil. This position I think untenable.

The argument in favor of this view that is most often heard in our day is a biological argument. We are told that man's advance has been gained because he has been a fighting animal; and that having inherited certain instincts which lead to war we cannot look forward to its disappearance.

I have already examined the fallacies involved in this contention in my *War and the Ideal of Peace*, and shall not repeat myself here. There is, however, another argument aiming to show that war is a necessity to the existence of our civilization which is more serious, because it bases its contentions upon the analysis of the moral order. This position we find stated clearly by an influential writer in a late magazine article, as follows:

We live in a continuous state of war. Our civilization cannot be understood save by recognizing that the appeal to force is something quite fundamental to it. . . . Beyond brute force lie, of course, the instruments of moral coercion, public or international opinion, religious influences, and the like. These are superior in moral value, and ultimately are creative and regulative even of the instruments of brute force. But, as I should maintain, they require for their development the favoring environment supplied by a political order that, when challenged, is found to be capable of securing itself by the successful employment of armed force.

The article from which I quote is, in the main, concerned with other contentions to which the criticism to follow is not intended to apply. I use it merely because it is a clear statement of the view I wish to consider, which is seldom put in a form that makes it worthy of analysis and criticism.

It appears to me that we are dealing here with a peculiarly subtle fallacy, which must be considered before we can discuss the argument satisfactorily. The child naturally assumes the existence of a human-like personality in connection with each object that attracts its attention; only by experience does it learn to make the distinction between the animate and inanimate; between the conscious and the so-called unconscious. The early man in like manner not only found difficulty in throwing off his attribution of human traits to objects about him, but habitually assumed the existence of personalities in connection with his objectified conceptions. Thus his tribe or clan came to be looked upon as a pretty definite personality to which he owed allegiance.

Nothing goes farther to show our close relation to this early man than the persistence of this notion of the tribe,

or state, or nation as a personality. It is evident that it is involved with our common conceptions of patriotism, and that it is tacitly assumed in many current discussions of the moral aspects of war. Had not Bismarck assumed the existence of such a national personality he could not have said with full conviction that "the right of the German nation to live and to breathe in unison undivided must not be judged accordingly to the principles of civil law." Did President Runge of Göttingen not make the same assumption he could not tell us that "there is a higher standard of justice for nations than for individuals." In both these cases the state is spoken of as a personality having moral standards of the same general nature as, although more authoritative than, those of individual men.

This notion, frankly accepted, has been developed by a certain group of philosophers, and has led to the Germanic conception of the state as a "superman" of which we hear so much today. This conception has, however, been subjected to such effective destructive criticism that I shall not consider it here. I wish rather to call attention to certain positions which are based upon an unrecognized acceptance of this notion of the personality of the state.

It may be well to note at the start that few, if any, psychologically trained thinkers of importance now-a-days will accept such a notion when it is clearly stated. They see that the existence of a moral consciousness of the form known to man is bound up with a very high grade of organization such as is altogether lacking in the state or nation considered as an organism. In other words, we have come to see that we must look upon states, not as personal existences, but as mere aggregates of individual personalities who have common traits and common aspirations; and among whom "governments" have arisen, and have become persistent, as agencies looking to the realization of these aspirations.

This of course means that what is moral for the individuals composing a state is in a general way moral for these individuals acting collectively; and our great difficulty lies in the fact that we have failed to moralize the collective action of states as we have moralized that of the individuals composing them. We all hold it to be immoral for the individual to encourage suspicion and hate, and covetousness and murder; but the average man does not hold it to be immoral to indulge in nationalized suspicion and hate, in na-

tionalized covetousness which leads to the commercial exploitation of the weaker peoples, in nationalized murder, which is war.

Now in my view this tacit assumption that the state is a personality, rather than a collection of personalities, is involved in the argument here considered. Only by making this assumption can we hold that we must look forward to the continuance of war because moral values "require for their development the favoring environment supplied by a political order that, when challenged, is found to be capable of securing itself by the successful employment of armed force." For this statement implies that, just as the average moral codes of the community must be impressed upon the immoral individual by the force represented in our judicial systems and police control, so the action of immoral personified states can only be controlled by brute force.

It is then noted that the restraint of immoral individual men is effected by national judicial systems which are super-individual, and that until these super-individual judicial systems were established the moral codes of the majority had to be forced upon the minority by brute force. And from this it is argued that as there can never be a *super-national* power capable of exerting control over the immoral personified states, whose ideals differ from those of the majority of states, war must necessarily occur, just as violent coercion of the immoral individual personality would exist today if no super-individual states had come into existence to establish the moral codes of the community.

If we attempt to avoid this unwarranted assumption, and think of the state merely as a collection of individuals having common traits and aspirations, it seems clear that, in general, what an individual may, or may not, do to another individual, a collection of individuals constituting a state may, or may not, do to another collection of individuals constituting another state. Thus it should be our aim to moralize the activities of the State on the same lines on which we have moralized the activities of individuals.

It would then appear that we are without warrant for the assumption that the possibility of war is a necessary factor of man's moral advance; for we may certainly look forward to a time when states will settle their differences without war, just as civilized individuals have learned to settle their differences without recourse to personal violence,—to a time

when a majority of the great Powers will have become what we may call "gentlemanly nations," who will act as individual gentlemen would. Let us see what might be expected to happen in such a case.

If some member of my Club should commit some act which annoyed me I should merely avoid him, unless his act appeared to me to involve a violation of his Club rights. In this case I should tell him so; and if he persisted in his act should refer the matter to the House Committee.

This Committee might decide that I was unwarranted in my complaint, in which case I might be disgruntled, but should again merely avoid meeting the offensive member.

If the Committee decided that my complaint was justified it would so notify the offending member, and in most cases he would at once mend his ways.

But if by chance we had admitted to the Club, in the person of this offending member, a man who was not a gentleman, he might refuse to obey the order of the House Committee, and might continue his offense. What would happen then? It is certain that no one would consider that I, or the Committee, would be warranted in belaboring him, or in putting him forcibly out of the Club. He would merely be *ostracised*; and this so completely that he would either mend his ways, or would leave the Club.

Now let us assume that a large proportion of the "great Powers" had become gentlemanly nations, and had formed an international organization for their mutual benefit which we may call the National Club. Suppose then that some one of its members—we may without offense take it to be Germany—decided that it was to its advantage to establish a colony in South America.

The United States would at once call Germany's attention to the fact, formulated in the Munroe Doctrine, that such a project was distasteful to it.

If Germany were a thoroughly gentlemanly nation he would at once abandon his project; unless he came to the conclusion that Uncle Sam was a fussy old gentleman who was unreasonable in his request; and he might say that, as he had never thought Uncle Sam justified in the maintenance of this Monroe Doctrine, he proposed to continue the development of his colony. Under these conditions Uncle Sam would at once refer the matter of dispute to the National Club's House Committee:—the National Council.

That Council might decide that Uncle Sam was unreasonable, and might uphold Germany's contention. In that case Uncle Sam might take great umbrage; but he would not take steps to obstruct Germany in her scheme of colonization, for if he did so all the nations composing the National Club would ostracise him absolutely, politically and economically. He certainly would not attempt to fight the whole National Club as a body, nor Germany, who would be supported by the whole Club. He might resign from the National Club; but he would soon find such action to have been a mistake, and would speedily sue for re-election.

But on the other hand suppose that the National Council decided that Uncle Sam was justified in his contentions, and that Germany must give up his colonization scheme. What would happen? If Germany had become a completely gentlemanly nation he would acquiesce in the decision of the Council, doubtless with grumbling, and perhaps with more or less change of commercial attitude toward Uncle Sam, and possibly toward other members of the National Club. He certainly would not fight to maintain his position. He might resign from the National Club; but when the generation that had dictated such action had been replaced by a new one, he would soon find it desirable to apply for re-admission.

But suppose that the National Club, having made a false judgment as to the character of Germany, had admitted him as a member, he—*quod avertat Deus*—turning out to be not a gentlemanly nation. And, as such, let us suppose that Germany decided that he would proceed with his colonization scheme, notwithstanding the action of the National Council. Would it even then be necessary for Uncle Sam, or for the National Club, to fight Germany? Not at all. The nations forming the Club would one and all merely ostracise him utterly and completely, politically, economically and in every other way; and that would surely speedily bring him to terms without any resort to armed conflict. He would grumble mightily; he might even resign from the National Club, and proceed with his colonization scheme; and to this neither the Club nor Uncle Sam would raise warlike opposition. For his colony would surely be a failure if it were internationally ostracised; and when a new generation appeared upon the scene he would certainly abandon his colony and apply for re-admission to the National Club, a chastened but a better member.

It is easy to exaggerate the difficulties of instituting this international ostracism, but I believe (*pace* President Lowell) that they would all disappear in practice.

It may appear, at first sight, that I am here making use of a highly strained analogy. A gentlemen's club, it may be said, is necessarily constituted of specially selected individuals, and governed by the recognized and established rules of current social gentlemanly behavior; thus its problems are simplified to the greatest possible extent; while the problems raised by international relations are inextricably complex.

In answer to this it may be said, in the first place, that the National Club would itself be constituted by the voluntary association of the great Powers which had recognized their community of interest, and would thus constitute a specially selected group of individual nations. And the agreement to form such an association would of course imply that the peoples who allow their Governments to enter such a National Club had come to the recognition, on broad lines, of established principles of gentlemanly behavior, and had attained an appreciation of the fact that they must demand of their governmental agents international action in accord with these principles. Under such conditions the matters with which the governing body of the National Club would have to deal would without question gain greatly in simplicity; for they would be concerned only with problems raised by the action of national members, and not at all with the intricate questions of party politics within these nations which may have led to any nation's special act.

Again it may be held that in employing this analogy the assumption is made that there would always be a practically unanimous verdict by all but one of the national members against this one; and that such a situation would seldom occur; that on the contrary international party groups would more probably be formed within the National Club which would speedily lead to its disruption. The possibility of such a contingency must of course be granted. Similar situations have arisen in social clubs of gentlemen, and have resulted in their dissolution: but on the whole they have been so rare that no groups of men are led to hold that the formation of a club is absurd because in the nature of the case it would be short lived, and its activities without significance.

I do not wish for a moment to minimize in any way the

difficulties necessarily connected with the formation of such a National Club; nor to assume that no new and unforeseen difficulties would arise if once it were formed. But, on the other hand, I protest against the pessimism of those who magnify these difficulties so far as to reject altogether the suggestion that it is worth while to make the attempt to form such an international organization with the hope that it may reduce the chances of war.

It is the trend of such arguments to which I object; the belief they foster that if we consider the nature of man as he exists we are bound to join with those who hold that war is necessary to human advance, and therefore that we must look forward to the recurrence of wars in the future as they have recurred in the past. I see no reason to abandon the hope that the collective will of the people making up the great Powers may become a gentlemanly will; the hope that the great nations may become gentlemanly nations; and this perhaps at no very distant era as the life of the human race is counted. And I see no reason why then the great nations should not join together to form an international organization that would deal with national concerns in much the same manner that individual gentlemen in organizations of narrower scope deal with individual interests.

There would still exist lesser Powers that had not yet become gentlemanly nations, and these might need to be coerced from time to time to keep them from disturbing the peaceful progress of the people composing one or another of these gentlemanly nations; and to this end it might be necessary to maintain some relatively small military and naval organization. But as the orderly people of our great cities maintain a police force to restrain the disorderly, but do not commonly use it to adjudicate differences between individuals of the orderly class, so it appears to me not too much to hope that eventually the great nations bound together in a National League may find means to establish an international police which would be maintained to keep the disorderly nations from doing injury; and that without danger that this police will be employed to induce a conflict between members of the National League themselves.

The difficulty found in avoiding this assumption of the personal nature of the state is seen in another form of argument which aims to give a *quasi* moral status to war; claiming that valuable changes which have followed special wars

have been due to the wars themselves; and tacitly assuming, with no warrant whatsoever, that these results could not have been gained by any other instrumentality than war. Thus, we read in a late review in the *New York Nation*:

It is unfortunate that praiseworthy desire for peace should be so blended in the minds of certain emotional advocates with hatred of abstract war, that they fail to admit that any desirable results may be attainable by force. Filled with zeal, itself a form of contention, they seem blind and deaf to example and argument. Nevertheless, our own country owes its independent existence, and its unimpaired unity, to two *righteous* wars.

We have here the assumption that we are justified in welcoming the coming into existence of an independent state as in itself an unquestionable advantage; much as we might rejoice in the birth of an individual man-child. The advantage connected with this independence would thus seem to lie in the fact that the new born state is a *quasi* personal state.

But if we look at the state merely as a collection of individuals the matter appears in a quite different light. I imagine all will agree that independence is an advantage to groups of individuals whose aspirations and aims are not represented in the existing state in which they are incorporated. But we surely may question whether independence in itself is an aim that can be urged on moral grounds.

Furthermore the instance of the United States, here given as an indisputable proof of the position maintained, is not altogether a happy one. For although we, who glory in the heroism of the founders of our republic, may be distressed in making the acknowledgment, nevertheless, as philosophically minded men, we certainly must find it difficult to maintain that the collection of individuals making up the state of Canada is less advantageously placed today than that collection of individuals which threw off the "yoke of England" and thus, gaining its independence, constituted the Federal Union of which I am a citizen.

So again, in the statement above quoted, we have the assumption that the unimpaired unity of a state—its mere size and strength—is in itself an unquestionable advantage; much as we might rejoice in the growth of an individual youth in stature and muscular vigor. It would thus seem to be held that the value of this unimpaired unity of the United States, which was gained at the awful price of the bloodshed of the great Civil War of 1861 to 1865, lay in the fact that the

quasi personal state gained unquestionable advantage by maintaining its bigness and power.

But if we think of the state merely as a collection of individuals having common aims and aspirations; and agree, as we have above, that national independence is properly desired by groups of individuals whose aspirations are not represented in the state in which they find themselves born; then it seems difficult to defend the use made of the strength of the North to compel the weaker South to remain part of a state which did not express the ideals of its people.

That the inestimable boon of the abolition of slavery was one result of this war is to be conceded. But it seems highly probable that, if the right of secession had been granted, the abolition of slavery would not have long been delayed; for the new Southern Confederacy would have been subjected to the same moral and economic pressure that has led to the abandonment of slavery by all civilized races.

I realize that I am here making statements that must be unpalatable to many readers. The defenders of war are constantly asking us who are pacifists to face the facts; and this I am here attempting to do, and asking them to do.

And finally let me say that, as a pacifist, I do not find that this facing of the facts leads me to abandon hope of the eventual advent of an era of enduring world peace.

The dawn of this era may not be as near as one might wish; but I protest against any view suggesting that the nature of man precludes the hope that such an enduring peace can ever be attained; or that places its consummation in a distant future, when man shall have been so thoroughly changed in his physical and moral nature as to have lost the characteristics we now hold to be noble and ennobling.

It disturbs me greatly to read from the pens of influential men such words as "no sensible man expects to abolish wars altogether," which we find in the otherwise thoroughly admirable article by President Lowell of Harvard in the *Atlantic* for September, 1915. I do not feel that it is just to say that I am not a sensible man, yet I fully believe that we may expect the eventual utter abolition of war; and that, if we adopt certain modes of international action, among them the course of procedure which President Lowell himself so forcibly defends, the ideal of enduring peace may perhaps be realized sooner than now appears probable.

HENRY RUTGERS MARSHALL.

THE PLOUGH

WILFRID WILSON GIBSON

HE sniffed the clean and eager smell
Of crushed wild garlic, as he thrust
Beneath the salallows: and a spell
He stood there munching a thick crust—
The fresh tang giving keener zest
To bread and cheese—and watched a pair
Of wagtails preening wing and breast,
Then running—flirting tails in air,
And pied plumes sleeked to silky sheen—
Chasing each other in and out
The wet wild garlic's white and green.

And then remembering, with a shout,
And rattle whirring, he ran back
Again into the Fair Maid's Mead,
To scare the rascal thieves and black
That flocked from afar and near to feed
Upon the sprouting grain. As one
They rose with clapping rustling wings—
Rooks, starlings, pigeons, in the sun
Circling about him in wide rings,
And plovers hovering over him
In mazy, interweaving flight—
Until it made his young wits swim
To see them up against the light,
A dazzling maze of black and white
Against the clear blue April sky—
Wings on wings in flashing flight
Swooping low and soaring high—
Swooping, soaring, fluttering, flapping,
Tossing, tumbling, swerving, dipping,
Chattering, cawing, creaking, clapping,
Till he felt his senses slipping—
And gripped his cornerake rattle tight,
And flourished it above his head

Till every bird was out of sight:
And laughed, when all had flown and fled,
To think that he, and all alone,
Could put so many thieves to rout.

Then sitting down upon a stone
He wondered if the school were out—
The school where, only yesterday,
He'd sat at work among his mates—
At work that now seemed children's play,
With pens and pencils, books and slates—
Although he'd liked it well enough,
The hum and scuffling of the school,
And hadn't cared when Grim-and-Gruff
Would call him dunderhead and fool.

And he could see them sitting there—
His classmates, in the lime-washed room,
With fingers inked and tousled hair—
Bill Baxter with red cheeks abloom,
And bright black eyes; and Ginger Jim
With frecked face and solemn look,
Who'd wink a pale blue eye at him,
Then sit intent upon his book,
While, caught a-giggle, he was caned.

He'd liked that room, he'd liked it all—
The window steaming when it rained;
The sunlight dancing on the wall
Among the glossy charts and maps;
The blotchy stain beside the clock
That only he of all the chaps
Knew for a chart of Dead Man's Rock
That lies in Tiger Island Bay—
The reef on which the schooners split
And founder, that would bear away
The treasure-chest of Cut-Throat-Kit,
That's buried under Black Bill's bones
Beneath the purple pepper-tree . . .
A trail of clean-sucked cherry-stones,
Which you must follow carefully,
Across the dunes of yellow sand,
Leads winding upward from the beach
Till, with a pistol in each hand,
And cutlass 'twixt your teeth, you reach. . .

Plumping their fat crops peacefully

Were plovers, pigeons, starlings, rooks,
Feeding on every side while he
Was in the land of storybooks.
He raised his rattle with a shout
And scattered them with yell and crake . . .
A man must mind what he's about
And keep his silly wits awake,
Not go woolgathering, if he'd earn
His wage. And soon, no schoolboy now,
He'd take on a man's job, and learn
To build a rick, and drive the plough,
Like father . . . Up against the sky
Beyond the spinney and the stream,
With easy stride and steady eye
He saw his father drive his team,
Turning the red marl gleaming wet
Into long furrows clean and true.
And dreaming there, he longed to set
His young hand to the ploughshare too.

WILFRID WILSON GIBSON

STEPHEN PHILLIPS

BY EDITH WYATT

IN *Real Conversations*, Stephen Phillips is reported as saying to Mr. William Archer:

“The English nation is suspicious of anything in which the effort is not rendered obvious by partial failure.”

The saying might apply as truthfully to that jealous American dislike of all counsels of perfection which is one of the meanest characteristics of democracy.

In this country the fame of Stephen Phillips has had a singular history—the history of a repute which may be said to have been hung for its good name. An observant American publisher once remarked that in his view prestige in letters followed somewhat indiscriminately the way of the Sun-Worshippers, from East to West. In this well-known course, the poetry of Stephen Phillips was admired in New York mainly because of its London vogue: and admired in Chicago mainly because of its metropolitan celebrity. Received here in this fashion less from an informed taste for the separate works of the poet than from a mere pastoral gregariousness, his several poetic productions were, at least so far as this observer has known them and their reputation, very widely praised for certain elements they never possessed—as, for instance, the power of creating character.

On the other hand, their extraordinary faculty in the use of fresh lyric form and rhymeless verse, passed unnoticed. The poet's most standardized and lifeless performance, *Paolo and Francesca*, has always been his best-known composition here. It is not surprising, then, that work which had never been really considered for itself should have been rapidly disparaged for us without reference to its actual quality by a London reaction apparently akin to that of the voter against the candidate ceaselessly known as the just.

“The complacency of the critics is so universal as to be

almost alarming," Edmund Gosse wrote of the English reception of *Paolo and Francesca* nineteen years ago. Undoubtedly the "universality" had already begun to alarm; and shortly afterward, when *Herod* had filled the largest theatre in London for nearly three months, paragraphers, it seems, according to the counsels of Mr. Archer and Mr. Phillips, had already begun to prophesy the speedy downfall of "the poetic drama" for no discernible reason whatsoever except the extensive success of the contemporary instance.

It is idle to assume that the world left its praise of *Paolo and Francesca* because the drama is a hollow, handsome thing, empty of realities. The world left in the same way its praise of *Herod*, also handsome, and not hollow—left it, in its characteristic, ridiculous, sun-worshiping and band-waggoning manner, chiefly from a reaction against too much giving of praise.

Such has been Stephen Phillips' history with the Sun-Worshipers—a phenomenon so striking that it must preface the only consideration of his contribution which concerns readers of poetry. What has the poet tried to do in his contribution? How far has he succeeded?

I

Obviously, one of the things Stephen Phillips tried to do was to create characteristic and expressive lyric forms—whether rhymed or rhymeless. In *But Yet*, in *Cities of Hell*, in *Thoughts in a Meadow*, in *Midnight, 31st of December*, he has spoken with an expressive, singing tone, his own and underived; in beautiful notes and silences, conceptions more intimate, more individual, than those of his better-known poetic dramas.

Such is the expression and conception of *A Gleam*—lines spoken by a husband to a wife concerning a daughter dead:

I shall know ere the sun arises
By a sudden stirring of thee,
Or blind, slight touch in the dark,
Or face upturned in quivering dream,
That your heart like mine has gone home in the hush to its dead,
Through dew and beginning birds.

Apart from the transcendental thought permeating his work—the thought that behind the visible world is the reality made by the mind—most of these conceptions have the ap-

peal of a very clearer simplicity. This is the appeal of *The Wound*—the speech of a bereaved human father in heaven who is uncomfortable among the happy, hymning souls about him and finds no pain to companion his, not even the suffering of Christ, who had never lost a child.

Brief, and finely unexplanatory, several of these poems concerning human fortunes have a plainness, a quiet air akin to Chaucer's, an English sympathy, very still and brave, very unsobbing and thoughtful before all pain in mortal fates. *The Wife*, by this distinguished touch of Saxon chronicle, tells wonderfully a hard tale,—one note of melodrama would have ruined the story of a woman starving in London with a little hungry boy and an ill husband. In desperation she goes out into the evening to seek money as a street-walker. Returned in the night with the bread her wage has brought, she finds her husband dead.

A striking charm in Stephen Phillips' more personal poetry is his mastery of the peculiar values of the sound of English. In the work of many makers of recent free verse there has been to my ear a somewhat static pose, an air as of rather literal translation into prose of verse originally rhymeless, no doubt, but plentifully melodious and active in the idiom and accent of other tongues. The English poet's admirable use of inter-line rhyme and of assonance, his ability to skip a stone, so-to-speak, along the widening ripples of open vowel-notes up to a poem's horizon-line, his sense of subtle changes in tone, must always be a keen pleasure to those readers for whom reading poetry is the imagination of living sound.

O, why in this breathing field, the meadow of Maytime,
A-flurry with silverous gusts;
Why, O my soul must thou still with a sadness behold it;
Strangely disturbed from far?

* * * * *

If thou were the first that had breathed;
Then this brooding arch of the blue were beautiful merely,
Perfect the greenness of grass.
But, through thine eyes unnumbered dead ones are peering;

* * * * *

And by ghosts is the blowing meadow-land forgotten;
Memories deepen the blue.

And a child will sorrow at evening bells over meadows,
And grieve by the breaking sea.
O, never alone can we gaze on the blue and the greenness;
Others are gazing and sigh;
And never alone can we listen to twilight music;
Others listen and weep,
And the woman that sings in the dimness to millions is singing;
Not to thee, O my soul, alone.

This was a Stephen Phillips too little known in America. We heard rather the drums and trappings of the conquests of his poetic dramas. His fame has received another odd twist, in the queer fashions of our land.

Never a writer of programme-music, Stephen Phillips printed his verse without explanation of its form. No explanation was needed. The form explained itself. In late years in America the most conspicuous use of free verse has been the use of the "Imagists," writers highly programmatic and controversial, who have produced a great number of compositions intended to appeal primarily not to the ear but to the eye of the imagination.

In France, in the hands of M. Charles Vildrac, free verse has been developed with a quickened sense and skilled practice of the graphic power of irregular melody and suggestive rhyme, developed with that distinct air of musical accomplishment so feared and so very groundlessly feared by numbers of American Imagists. But in America, always filled with readers extraordinarily "papery" in taste, and tone-deaf to the imagined sound of the words before their eyes, the leading development of free verse has been not at all a wider appreciation of the expressive power of words through their quick and living value as spoken language, not at all the development one would have expected from the countrymen of Poe and Whitman, but a species of omission from poetry of a keen and clear sense of the melodies, the harmonies and tonal values of imagined sound. Thus it has come about that because his work is remembered as musical, it is unconsciously assumed here—by almost everyone except some fair-minded visiting Gael, like Mr. Padraic Colum—that all Stephen Phillips' production is entirely conventional; and it is not and never could be generally admitted in our land that he composed numbers of excellent poems in verse original and free.

II

Of course one reason for this assumption is that the drumming and trampling was all done in iambic pentameter. Like the Imagists, Stephen Phillips has devoted a large portion of his effort to the classic return. Unlike them, he has chosen to return by the familiar road of blank verse. Ulysses, Nero, Nero's Mother, Iole—there is no need to catalogue instances.

In so far as pseudo-classic returns intend to attempt the art of human portraiture by imitating antique casts, it has always seemed to me that they fail, by the very nature of their effort. No one can draw from a cast and from a life-model at the same minute. To tell a new fable with familiar figures realistically treated under classic titles, as Bernard Shaw has done in *Androcles and the Lion*, is one thing. To make a copy of some of the persons—though not the acts—of the Odyssey, as Stephen Phillips did in peopling the action of his *Ulysses*, is another. In fictive power Stephen Phillips' poetic dramas have for me no value, and possess no living creature. A single talkative Newgate prisoner in De Foe's *Moll Flanders*, a single Sea Captain of Sarah Orne Jewett's, embodies a more solid human vitality for me than any figure I have ever encountered in the pages of the English poet's plays or pseudo-classic poems.

As a medium for the expression of ideas, rather than of character, the text of the plays and pseudo-classic poems often evinces a very skilful and beautiful use of the tonal materials of English.

Communicative and haunting are the echoes of a mortal's reasons for his love of a mortal woman, in *Marpessa*:

Because Infinity upon thee broods;
And thou art full of whispers and of shadows.
Thou meanest what the sea has striven to say
So long, and yearned up the cliffs to tell;
Thou art what all the winds have uttered not,
What the still night suggesteth to the heart.

Memorable in *Ulysses* is:

Here would I be, at ease upon this isle
Set in the glassy ocean's azure swoon,
What sward of parsely and of violet,
And poplars shivering in a silvery dream,
And smell of cedar sawn, and sandal-wood,
And these low-crying birds that haunt the deep.

Admirably told is the poet's sense of Herod's anxiety before the news of the rise of the Nazarene prophet:

. . . And all behind him is
A sense of something coming on the world,
A crying of dead prophets from their tombs,
A singing of dead poets from their graves.
I ever dread the young . . .

Manifestly speeches, the last two. Manifestly to be acted. Written by an actor, the poet's plays reveal, as their first aim, their dramatic intent. All else is subordinated to the action. In this endeavor the author, as he has told us, deliberately broke away from the traditional path in which English writers of lyric drama had so long followed Elizabethan guides. He sought a more unified and focussed execution in his productions. Leaving other qualifications quite unconsidered, it would, I suppose, hardly be denied that in this respect—in unified and direct presentation—Stephen Phillips certainly excels his predecessors in poetic drama—Tennyson, Swinburne, and Browning. Lesser as a poet, he was an abler master of the art of writing an acting play. In my own view, it was not the poetry but the drama of the lesser poet's effort which gave the plays their public success.

Perhaps mere honesty should compel here the statement that, from regarding the bestowal of one's interest on poetry as a recreation, I have never fully shared, nor even quite understood, the great, world-wide, medicinal movement for poetry: the concept that the more poetry people can be got to gulp down the better off they will be. Without entering into the question of the validity of this concept, it should be said that undoubtedly a main purpose of Stephen Phillips, second only to his intent of composing acting plays, was this design of using the drama as a means of pouring poetry down the throats of vast audiences. The fact that he did get them to take it in enormous doses for hours, for weeks, for months, has always justly been regarded as a fascinating and extraordinary achievement.

You realize the poet's firmness in the execution of this achievement much less in reading those portions of the plays which present fresh, English ideas, in attractive English verse, attributed to historic, foreign personages, than in the scenes which seem merely a species of rather dull and formal translation. Such is the scene on Olympus in the opening act of *Ulysses* when God after God and Goddess after God-

dess of the Homeric cosmogony comes on with all the old properties, the trident and the rolling thunder and the Olympic mirth and the caduceus and the aegis, and says again the kind of thing the last antique-cast-copier reported and always reports for the Olympian assemblage, until your chief impression is a hope that somebody who has to leave soon will rise and move that we waive the minutes of the last meeting.

This act might have been composed by Bernard Shaw's Britannicus, in *Cæsar and Cleopatra*; and much of the criticism written in the *Poetry Review* by Stephen Phillips seems created from the Britannicus elements of his mind—from formalistic references, and a tendency to construct a platform to speak from in the most unlikely situations.

But he had here, too, moments beyond platforms—moments catholic and relative. It seems only yesterday that we were hearing him quote side by side Heine's sympathetic saying, in his despair, that his only hope was that God would forgive him because it was His business, and Goethe's belief that death cannot be an evil because it is universal.

III

Everyone is thinking very gravely now of the great need of a common and sincere understanding among nations. In the last year and a half, as one singing voice after another has been stilled on the air in France, in Germany, in England, those of us who are especially interested in poetry and the fate of poets consider with an especial thoughtfulness what each of these has told us in his hours here—told us not only by the word of his song, but by the way of his singing.

All must wish the world to keep in its own integrity and variety the individual beauty of each of the little and large languages of the earth. What we need first for an honest Internationalism is an attempt to know the ways of other peoples. This can never be done by translating their songs; still less by making them over in our own image; or even by imitating them: but only by learning to understand them as they were conceived in the speech of their origin.

This is the only sincere Internationalism which poetry can further. To this end, each one who has understood how to use the peculiar genius and faculty of his own tongue has done a service to the world. Such was Stephen Phillips' service.

The mists, the sorrowing echoes of our speech, the cloudy passage of the sailing swan, the shadows of rippled waters, the mysterious reflections of eternity remembered and unascertainable, sang from the motion of his music:

I came at dawn on a river visited never,
Strange, yet unstrange,
For I could follow faithful the wind of that river
Away to sea.
I was driven late in the night to the house of a stranger,
Never that house had I seen;
Though I never slept in it, yet could I tell each room of it,
I knew my way.
At times a lonely face from a crowd looks out at me,
Startling me, wherefore?
That sudden, flitting face I remember dimly,
Dimly familiar.
They played me music at midnight, never yet heard by me;
Unheard, yet heard,
Ah, when?

It is one of the poems of his last printed volume—one of those quieter songs that seem to me to have the singing tone that will carry farthest through mysterious space.

For a poet, it is enough to have truly sung; and one may find fitting for the history of Stephen Phillips the word spoken by a brother poet of another fate:

Light and song and sleep at last,—
Struggling hands and suppliant knees
Get no goodlier gift than these.
Song that holds remembrance fast,
Light than lightens death attend
Round their graves who have to friend
Light, and song, and sleep at last.

EDITH WYATT.

DRAMA AND MUSIC

THE ADVENT OF THE "Ballet Russe."—"Prince Igor" at
THE METROPOLITAN.—"The Weavers" in English.

BY LAWRENCE GILMAN

At last we have seen the illustrious *Ballet Russe*, which for almost a decade has been stirring mightily the waters of European culture by its revolutionary exhibitions of scenic, choregraphic, and mimetic art and music; so that, even in barbarian America, the names of its chief deities—Bakst and Nijinski and Karsavina and Stravinsky—have become almost as familiar as those of our own beloved gods and goddesses of the films. And now Serge de Diaghilev has brought his famous organization out of a tragically preoccupied Europe and has deposited it upon our bæotian shores.

It is a pity that this celebrated institution (for such it has virtually become) has waited so long before seeking to penetrate the thickets of American culture; for, as a matter of fact, it had already, vicariously, accomplished that not very troublesome feat. The organization, with its startling adornments by Bakst, its innovations in dancing and pantomime, its brilliantly successful blending of dramatic, musical, and pictorial art, has long been a thrice-told tale; from New York to Greater Punxsutawney, from Boston to Painted Post, the word has gone forth, so that there is no lecture-course which has not paid its tribute to the fame of the Russian Ballet. As a result, we have become a little wearisomely over-familiar with its rumored excitements and innovations. Representation and report and an excess of exegetical comment have done too much for it. We have become so habituated to the characteristics of Léon Bakst's decorative genius through their influence upon lampshades and women's fashions, and through their imitators in

our own theatres, that the vividness of their address to us has become considerably dulled. Much of the thunder of the *Ballet Russe* was stolen years ago by the designers of wall-paper and parasols, to say nothing of Mme. Pavlova and her associates.

But all this should discourage no one from witnessing for himself the performances of this incomparable organization—the simon-pure, blown-in-the-bottle *Ballet Russe* of Serge de Diaghilev, which made its debut a fortnight ago in New York. It is, indeed, a true congeries of marvels: a magical blend of color and sound and movement—a gorgeous phantasmagoria woven out of hues and patterns that have the insolent and audacious splendor of barbaric music, of music that is as heightening and enriching color, of pantomimic dance that is dramatizing, poetizing, kaleidoscopically beautiful: that sends the fancy into a Never-Never Land of exotic and magnificent dreams,—a fantastic fairyland peopled by a dazzling and deliciously incongruous host: Arabian princesses and courtiers out of Versailles, black, lustful slaves, nymphs and satyrs out of the Golden Age, Arcadian shepherdesses, Pierrots and priests, Russian peasants and Tartar warriors, monsters and demons and enchanters, and fabulous birds with miracle-breeding plumage—a wonderworld of strange excitements and romantic loveliness and terror.

It is not to be denied that there are sources of disappointment. In the first place, this is not precisely that *Ballet Russe* that Europe thrilled to and extolled: its two chief members, the inimitable Nijinski and the scarcely less matchless Karsavina, are languishing abroad. In the second place, Stravinsky's music, so far as it has been disclosed to us at the moment of writing (in *L'Oiseau de Feu*), is remarkable only for its skilful, effective, and calmly unconcealed adaptation to his particular uses of the style that Debussy has made notoriously his own. And yet, despite its shortcomings, there are rare experiences, unforgettable artistic adventures, to be enjoyed at these performances. You will find nowhere else just this daring and eloquent harmonization of rhythm and color, tone and design, the same seductions for eye and ear. Above all, you will find here that supreme æsthetic achievement—an imaginative extension of beauty.

Considering the fugacity and congestion of human life,

there is really only one kind of music worth listening to: and that is music written by a genius. There would appear to be little occasion for exhibiting this seemingly elementary platitude; yet again and again we are asked to listen to music for a dozen other reasons than because it proceeds from a creator of genius. When the Metropolitan Opera House opened its doors to Moussorgsky's *Boris Godounov* a few years ago, the public took Moussorgsky and his opera to its heart with prompt and persistent enthusiasm. What portent, from the standpoint of the Metropolitan, could have been clearer? *Boris* was a Russian opera—therefore, why not produce another Russian opera, that cakes and ale and public joy might continue in the land? Pursuing this apparently sagacious counsel, the Metropolitan selected Alexander Porphyrievich Borodin's opera, *Prince Igor*, and it was duly produced in New York in the last week of 1915. Its reception by the public and those unaccountable but negligible functionaries, the professional reviewers, was one of considerably modified rapture. The reason can be very briefly and baldly stated. *Boris* was Russian, and so, indisputably, is *Prince Igor*; but besides being Russian, *Boris* was also a work of genius, and *Prince Igor* is not. Now, inasmuch as no one outside of our resident Russian population and a few inconsequential æstheticians and "intellectuals" cares a perforated penny whether *Prince Igor* was written by a Russian or a Chinaman, but only whether its music is dramatically stirring or beautiful, it is scarcely surprising that Borodin's opera has proved to be, for the general public, somewhat less than a second *Boris*.

Borodin was not primarily a music-maker. He was chiefly a man of science—a chemist and a physician. He was by no means, musically, a dilettante, a mere amateur: he has written music for the concert-room which displays both imagination and originality. But there is neither imagination nor originality in *Prince Igor*. Borodin died before he was able to complete the score, and it was finished by his friends Rimsky-Korsakov and Glazounov. The result is far from impressive. In style, the music, which is consorted with what we believe to be the stupidest libretto ever concocted for the operatic stage, is a curious blend of sweetmeats from Italy and spices from the Orient. That is to say, half of the music is damned by its conventionally mellifluous *cantilena* and half of it is saved, in a measure, by its

vigorous Asiatic rhythms. In artistic interest, the opera does not begin before the Polovtsian Ballet at the close of the second act, and it stops when this is over.

"*Prince Igor*," said Borodin himself, "is essentially a national opera, which can only be of interest to us Russians." Well, we are willing to let it go at that.

Mr. Emanuel Reicher's enterprise, "The Modern Stage," is now in its second season. He produced last Spring the *Elga* of Hauptmann and Ibsen's *John Gabriel Borkmann*. Already this season he has given Björnson's *When the Young Vine Blooms* and Hauptmann's *The Weavers*. Björnson's play—a curiously flaccid and amorphous piece, mildly distinguished in style and as mildly amusing—has apparently been dropped out of the repertoire of the company. As for *The Weavers*, it is now a quarter of a century old; yet it belongs to our own time as essentially, as if it had come only yesterday from Hauptmann's desk. That it deals with industrial conditions which, in their special relation to the miseries of the laborers in Silesia, no longer obtain, has nothing to do with the immutability of its appeal. "Organized efficiency" has done its work there, as elsewhere in Germany, since Hauptmann spilled his agonized pity for oppressed and suffering humanity into this poignant document of protest and revolt. But misery and injustice, oppression and hunger, industrial wrong and industrial wretchedness, are not yet quite eliminated from Browning's beloved and "best of all possible worlds" (would he call it so today, we wonder?); and so you can still watch, with unassuaged compassion, the slow and simple and grave procession of pitiful tableaux which Hauptmann passes before you in his five cumulative acts.

It would be idle to pretend that the play is pure gold throughout. It has its *longueurs*—not a few of them. Its movement is sometimes sluggish; it does not always escape dulness. Like many masterworks, in and out of the theatre, its rewards are not at every moment in proportion to its exactions. It is performed by Mr. Reicher and his associates with admirable skill and complete devotion—though in an English version that leaves a number of things to be desired.

LAWRENCE GILMAN.

THE BOOK OF THE MONTH

THE BIOGRAPHY OF AN AMORIST¹

BY LAWRENCE GILMAN

WE have Mr. Theodore Dreiser's word for it that Eugene Witla was charming—and indeed he must have been, with his black hair, his dark, almond-shaped eyes, his straight nose, his chin “shapely but not aggressive,” his white and even teeth, which showed with a curious delicacy when he smiled. Eugene—who was troubled with anaemia and a weak stomach—was moody and artistic; moreover, he had emotion, fire, longings, that were “concealed beneath a wall of reserve”; for he was proud and shy and sensitive, and very uncertain of himself. Before he became metropolitan and commercialized, he affected a loose, flowing tie, a soft turn-down collar, and a brown corduroy suit, the coat cut with a belt, like a shooting-jacket. His hands were very thin and white, and he wore a black iron ring of curious design.

The trouble with Eugene was that he was dominated all his life by an idea. As Mr. Dreiser states it, this idea was “the perfection of eighteen.” Put thus compactly, the utterance is slightly cryptic; but no one can read far in the history of Eugene's career without understanding it with entire clearness. The truth is that Eugene was pursued by an inescapable dream. The dream was Woman—Girlhood, rather: lovely and youthful Girlhood, preferably virginal, though this was not an indispensable requisite. “That blossoming of life in womanhood at eighteen!—there was no other thing under the sun like it to him.” Mr. Dreiser's phrase for it is classically familiar: Eugene, he tells us, was in love with love, and so “there was no permanent faith in

¹*The “Genius.”* By Theodore Dreiser. New York: John Lane Company, 1915.

him for anybody—except the impossible she.” But Eugene was an artist, and his *libido sexualis* was complicated by æsthetic needs and prepossessions. Like Idas in Mr. Phillips’ *Marpessa*, he was “wounded by beauty”—that Ideal Beauty which has ever perturbed all poets and mystics of sensuous imagination. “You couldn’t love any woman long,” wrote poor little Ruby Kenny to Eugene when she saw that he was through with her—and Ruby was only an artist’s model out of the Chicago slums, who could not possibly have read Plato or Rossetti or Havelock Ellis or George Moore or Mr. Yeats or even Mr. Dreiser,—all of whom have understood and expounded this matter. Long after he had begun to acquire experience and to precipitate tragedy, Eugene discovered the writings of Mr. Yeats. Perhaps he wondered at the similarity between himself and Michael Robartes, who, in loving a woman, loved not really herself, but rather an immortal and transcendent beauty of which she was the momentary and wandering incarnation. And what is this, Eugene (or Mr. Dreiser) might say to us, but a quest after that “divine beauty” of Plato, “pure and clear and unalloyed, not clogged with the pollutions of mortality and all the colors and vanities of human life”?

It must be said for Eugene that he did his best to achieve this ideal, which he had himself candidly defined. “That is the one great thing in the world—the beauty of girlhood,” he observed to himself as he watched young Frieda Roth standing against a lattice of spring leaves, with some house-martins flying above her against the morning sky. The world, he realized, said one life, one love. Could he accede to that? Could any one woman satisfy him? Could Frieda, if he had her? He did not know . . . “only this walking in a garden of flowers—how delicious it was!”

His propensities had been accelerated by seeing at a Chicago art exhibition a nude by Bouguereau. This picture spoke irresistibly to him of passion and beauty, “love of form, love of desire.” Bouguereau, Mr. Dreiser tells us, “painted with a sense of the bridal bed in the foreground”; and so it was perhaps fitting that Angela Blue, whom Eugene met soon afterward during a visit to his home town, Alexandria, Illinois, was the girl whom he eventually married—though not without intervening adventures.

It must not be supposed that Eugene’s marriage brings us within sight of the end of Mr. Dreiser’s faithful and un-

sparingly detailed chronicle; nor, it need hardly be said, does it indicate the cessation of Eugene's tireless quest. His passion for Frieda Roth, to which we have adverted, was the first to follow his marriage; but we have no intention of lingering upon that, or upon his succeeding adventure with the married siren, Carlotta Wilson. We shall come to his climacteric affair with Suzanne Dale.

Eugene was now close upon forty, affluent, powerful, a darling of the gods. He had long since abandoned his flowing tie, his soft hat, and his "rather indiscriminate manner" of combing his hair. He had made his mark as a painter, and was now radiating glory as the "managing-publisher" of a vast magazine-and-book-producing business in New York. His salary was \$25,000 a year; he had a motor-car, a valet, an apartment on Riverside Drive, and he always carried with him from \$150 to \$300 in cash, besides a small check-book; he rode freely in cabs, lunched at "the most exclusive restaurants and clubs," and consorted with Society upon familiar terms. Angela, though, was not quite so happily placed in what Mr. Dreiser calls "the highest circles," her one weakness being, we learn with profit, that she "lacked the blasé social air."

It was at this point in Eugene's career that he met Suzanne Dale. Suzanne, aristocratic and rich, was at the calamitous age—eighteen. She was radiantly healthy,—“she seemed to have the texture of the water chestnut and the lush, fat vegetables of the Spring.” Eugene gave his heart to her at once. There was a midnight love-scene at a country house under a waning moon, amid the humming of insects, the chirping of tree-toads, the calling of birds; Eugene kissed and embraced her, calling her “Flower Face,” “Silver Feet,” “Myrtle Bloom,” “Divine Fire” (Mr. Dreiser is a determined and incurable lyricist). Meanwhile Angela, thinking thus to secure his constancy, had allowed herself to become pregnant, and she was in this unpropitious situation when she discovered her husband's love-affair.

That Eugene's life seems about to fall in ruins as a consequence of the events that crowd upon him in the tragic finale of Mr. Dreiser's narrative, does not mean either that he reforms or that he regrets. Our last sight of him is under a windy November sky, gazing up through the falling leaves at the Milky Way, and thinking to himself what a

"sweet welter" life is—"how rich, how tender, how grim, how like a colorful symphony." And as he gazed, great dreams welled up into his soul. "'The sound of the wind—how fine it is to-night,' he thought."

Mr. Dreiser's critics have expended much energy in their attempts to classify him definitively. He is a "realist," says the average appraiser. He is *not* a "realist," says Professor Stuart Sherman, casting a cold and shrewdly unsympathetic eye over our redoubtable fictionist, but a "naturalist." To those who have lost something of their early zest for critical categories, the matter will not seem of primary importance. It would perhaps be possible to defend the classification of Mr. Dreiser as a sentimental mystic who employs the mimetic gestures of the realist. Certainly he is an emotional historian with an extraordinarily acute sense of a certain fundamental aspect of reality: he is a master in his comprehension and delineation of sexual emotion. He has no taste; he is grotesquely humorless; his style is amazingly bad; in details of execution he is naïvely crude and uncouth. And yet, despite his rawness and banality and ineptitude, despite his pitiless prolixity, his frequent sentimentality, his stylistic vulgarities and platitudes, his commission of a thousand unforgivable offenses as a literary workman—despite all this, it is hard to read him without being engrossed, and persuaded, and deeply moved. "No ship," said a great artist and unconquerable foe of sentimentalism, "can set sail without pathos;" and Mr. Dreiser, deliberately or not, has freighted his huge and awkward vessel with enough and to spare of pathos—despite all he can do to spoil its effect, it is at times extreme. He gives you a sense of actuality; but he gives you more than that: out of the vast welter and surge, the plethoric irrelevancies of this cyclopean novel, emerges a sense of the infinite sadness and mystery of human life. But even if you do not feel this, you will agree that Mr. Dreiser's intellectual and æsthetic probity is evident upon every page: no more honest fictionist is writing today in English. He reminds one of Swinburne's indication of the excellence of Byron: "The splendid and imperishable excellence of sincerity and strength."

LAWRENCE GILMAN.

NEW BOOKS REVIEWED

REMINISCENCES. By Lyman Abbott. New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1915.

A great virtue of the sermons which Dr. Abbott used to preach at the Plymouth Church in Brooklyn was that in an unusual degree they fused common sense with religious faith. There is a similar potency in most of what Dr. Abbott has written, and this is pre-eminently true of his recently published book of reminiscences. His life-story has the charm of a simply written narrative of personal experiences and impressions. It illustrates and sums up many of the important changes that have come over the spirit of American life in the last sixty years. It is a record of interesting work and an expression of sane views. Moreover, it contains a variety of anecdotes, always pleasant and sometimes highly entertaining. All this, however, does not sufficiently explain the hold which the story keeps upon the reader's attention and sympathy. The fact is that Dr. Abbott's reminiscences reveal an attitude towards life at once serene and intense, practical and religious, commonplace and mystical.

He relates that soon after he began to preach from the pulpit formerly occupied by Beecher a woman left the congregation and went to sit under DeWitt Talmage, explaining that Dr. Abbott's sermons so excited her that she had to hold on to the pew to keep from calling out a response. On the other hand, a stranger who went to hear Dr. Abbott preach is reported to have said that the minister "did not preach that morning, but just gave a little talk on religion." These curiously opposite views doubtless represent mere personal idiosyncracies; yet they may serve as symbols of two distinct qualities in his self-expression. To speak in extremes, his life-story is in one point of view as full of common sense as the "Rollo Books" and in another as stimulating as *The Imitation of Christ*.

Dr. Abbott's *Reminiscences*, then, is primarily the story of a religious life, but of a life in which religion, far from being a mere absorbing interest, is the vital spark. Religion pervades the whole man—his moral and intellectual judgments, his experiences and feeling, giving unity and consistency to the whole; hence it is never felt as dogma or as emotionalism.

As a child, Lyman Abbott, like many other children who think,

sometimes suffered from religious depression. "In the evening twilight, when the dusk was gathering and the melancholy frogs were croaking, I used to go to my bedroom and try to think of all the wicked things I had done during the day, and as that was not enough, of my mother in heaven and my father in New York, and of myself, a lonely, homeless, outcast boy, in the vain hope that conviction of sin would come. But it never came." The truth is that to Lyman Abbott as boy and man religion could never be a gloomy thing. The note of his whole life and the atmosphere of his reminiscences is not, indeed, a blind optimism nor a determined cheerfulness, but a sense of harmony arising from a reconciliation of all the elements of normal human experience—actuality, intellectuality, spirituality.

It is the actuality—the human interest and warmth, the clear practical vision—of the story that makes the strongest immediate appeal. Dr. Abbott writes of his childhood with mature appreciation and with a rare power of living over the past in its pristine freshness. He tells zestfully of his college days, re-creating the atmosphere of the University of the City of New York as it was in the fifties and giving vivid glimpses of the condition of the metropolis in those days. His life, though not distinguished by outwardly dramatic or striking incidents, has been full of varied interests. As a lawyer, in partnership with his brothers, as a minister of the gospel, as corresponding secretary of the Freedmen's Union Commission, as an editor, he has always been in close and productive contact with men, with practical problems, and with the intellectual tendencies of his time. As a result, he is able to speak with uncommon directness and conviction of the industrial, the political, and the religious transformation which has occurred in America during his lifetime. His optimism is felt to be genuine, his point of view is seen to be not that of a specialist—not even of a specialist in religion or in journalism—but that of a man who has lived through the life of his time, surely, sympathetically, with adequate intellectual responsiveness and with adequate spiritual detachment.

These *Reminiscences* may be read with enjoyment as the diversely interesting record of a pleasant life-experience, and as a valuable commentary upon the history of recent times. But the special quality of the book lies deeper—in the conception of life which it expresses, in a comfortable union of the matter-of-fact with spiritual consciousness, such as few temperaments attain.

A VOICE FROM THE CROWD. By George Wharton Pepper. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1915.

In 1871 the Corporation of Yale College voted to accept the offer of Mr. Henry N. Sage, of Brooklyn, of the sum of ten thousand dollars, for the foundation of a lectureship in a branch of

pastoral theology, to be designated "The Lyman Beecher Lectureship on Preaching." In 1915, the lectures upon this foundation were delivered for the first time by a layman—Mr. George Wharton Pepper. The inspiration which led the Yale Corporation to depart from the traditional rule in this matter was a happy one. Few utterances about the church or about the state of religion today are more sound or stimulating than the lectures of Mr. Pepper, now published in book form under the title, *A Voice from the Crowd*.

The value of Mr. Pepper's book lies less in his precise criticisms, or in his statement of special needs, than in his conception of the religious frame of mind from which all good preaching proceeds. What the layman demands of the preacher, according to Mr. Pepper's view, is not greater efficiency, greater eloquence, greater professionalism of any kind, but rather more consecration, more reverence, more spirituality. And spirituality is to be gained not only through solitary meditation but through human contacts. "To be Christlike is neither to be given over to mysticism nor cumbered with serving, but it is to make such constant draughts upon the life of God as can be assimilated only if we are spending ourselves in service." This is the conclusion of the whole matter in a nutshell. Mr. Pepper is not one of those who speak of the church as a decaying institution and try to account for its defects; his criticism is vital and constructive. But while he voices no complaint he undoubtedly expresses the real craving of the man in the pew—a craving perhaps not always fully understood by the man in the pulpit—for spiritual light and leading, for the word that is with power.

Only second to the need of spirituality in the pulpit is the need of intellect. Men may be turned away from the church as readily by a perception of argumentative feebleness on the part of the preacher as by a doubt as to his complete sincerity. Mr. Pepper effectively emphasizes the truth that precision and thoroughness are intellectual qualities, which the preacher should find indispensable. He reminds his readers that "if a man has genuine confidence in his solution of a difficulty, he will earnestly desire two things: first, that the difficulty itself be faced and appreciated by his hearers; and, second, that the precise difference between his solution and others be made clear. To misstate, either wilfully or from ignorance, an adversary's position and then to demolish the position as thus misstated is to win the hollowest kind of dialectic victory." The demand from the pew is not only for faith and goodness, but for intellectual honesty.

Considering his subject from many different angles Mr. Pepper in effect but develops in different ways the two requirements that are fundamental—the preaching of religion as a vital force, including both the element of godliness and the element of brotherhood, and the rigorous application of the laws of logic and common sense to subjects treated from the religious point of view. In his chapters upon

church unity and upon religious instruction the author enters, it is true, upon more debatable ground, and his conclusions to many readers will seem less convincing. Nevertheless, he argues in these chapters from the same standpoint as elsewhere: the standpoint of a man to whom religion is real; and his pleas for unity and for religious education will at least somewhat enlarge the views of readers who are indifferent upon these questions.

There are many laymen who will feel grateful for Mr. Pepper's clear and effective expression of the churchgoer's real desires and ideals. Without entertaining the spirit of unkindly criticism or sacrificing the essentially inspirational character of his book, the author describes with outspoken vigor certain ways in which the pulpit may become offensive to the pew. "I do not know which is worse," he writes, "to lavish upon an idol the worship due to God Almighty or to comport oneself toward the Lord of Hosts in a manner that would be offensive to a graven image." The thing could hardly be better said.

FORTY YEARS IN CONSTANTINOPLE. By Sir Edwin Pears. New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1916.

In 1873 a young man named Edwin Pears went to Constantinople to practice law. In the spring of 1876 rumors began to come into Constantinople of a dark and ugly business in Bulgaria. Mr. Pears was at that time writing occasional letters to the London *Daily News* and it was through him that the truth concerning the Moslem atrocities in Bulgaria became known to the world. From that time until 1908, the letters of Mr. (now Sir Edwin) Pears have appeared in the *Daily News*, and the writer has come to be recognized as perhaps the greatest living English authority upon the affairs of Turkey and the Near East.

Sir Edwin's book of reminiscences, *Forty Years in Constantinople*, is a work of that invaluable sort in which the almost incommunicable knowledge and wisdom which comes of long association with a people finds expression through anecdote, through more or less casual comment, through the description of personalities, and through the frank and shrewd narration of events not easily understood without the touch of nature which only such a narrator as Sir Edwin can supply. The book is a gallery of character portraits, including a long succession of English and other foreign ambassadors and of Turkish notables. It is a mine of facts not generally known concerning the inner workings of Turkish politics. It is replete with bizarre anecdotes, tales illustrating the odd conjunction of the important with the ridiculous, stories revealing or suggesting motives personal or political of which the world outside of Turkey has known little. Most of all the book gives the reader an intimate

impression of the Turkish people from the point of view of one who has known them well and feels toward them an entirely friendly spirit.

What Sir Edwin has written is by no means formal history nor political philosophy. Nevertheless whoever appreciatively reads this book of his will obtain an insight into the spirit of Turkish affairs during the last forty years that could be obtained in no other way. The period covers the Russo-Turkish War, the revolution of 1876, the settlement of the Egyptian question, the Armenian massacres which occurred between 1894 and 1898, the revolution of 1908, and the curious counter revolution of 1909; on all of which the author sheds new light either by his statement of facts or by his discussion of the human factors.

To most readers—even to those who have some knowledge of Turkey—the revelation contained in Sir Edwin's book of the childishness, malignity, and cowardice that were characteristic of the policy of Abdul Hamid will come as a surprise. It is, of course, especially interesting to know what Sir Edwin thinks of the revolutionists who abolished the Sultan's evil régime, and it is encouraging to learn that he regards their efforts as having been honest and promising. At the same time the difficulties encountered by the Committee of Union and Progress—difficulties due in part to their attempting, after the manner of Abdul Hamid, to do everything themselves, and to the blindness with which they followed out the traditional policy of "Turkifying everything"—make a strange and interesting political study.

The chapter devoted to the situation in Constantinople just previous to the outbreak of the present war is one of the most interesting in the book. Here the cause of German influence in Turkey at that time is made plain as well as the disadvantage under which English diplomacy labored. It is tolerably plain, however, according to Sir Edwin's account, that the Turkish Government was hustled into war on the side of Germany against its will and in opposition to what was probably the prevailing sentiment of the people. The Turks, declares Sir Edwin, would have been "unanimously and heartily on the side of England and France had it not been known that we were in alliance with Russia," and even with this latter circumstance weighing on their side the German ambassador and his associates seem to have found it impossible through unaided diplomacy to overcome the reluctance of the Turkish people to engage in war on the side of Germany. The concluding chapter of Sir Edwin's book deals with the future of Turkey after the conclusion of the war and discusses the fate of Constantinople, advocating a view quite different from any of those most commonly discussed.

Concise and vigorous in style, combining breadth of view with shrewd insight into human nature, sparing of disquisition and compact in the relation of facts, *Forty Years in Constantinople* imparts

to the reader more of the writer's own special knowledge and point of view than do most treatises of its kind.

SIX FRENCH POETS. By Amy Lowell. New York: the Macmillan Company, 1915.

"The sole excuse which a man can have for writing is to write down himself, to unveil for others the sort of world which mirrors itself in his individual glass; his only excuse is to be original; he should say things not yet said, and say them in a form not yet formulated. He should create his own æsthetics—and we should admit as many æsthetics as there are original minds, and judge them for what they are and not what they are not." So wrote Remy de Gourmont, one of the foremost *Symbolistes*, and his words may be taken as expressing the point of view or at least the practise of all of the six French poets whom Miss Lowell discusses in her recently published book. Whim, mood, individualism, reign supreme in the work of them all.

Against this individualism the classically minded lover of literature instinctively protests. He is sometimes provoked to say that individualism in poetry is synonymous with lunacy. If he is not only classically, but dogmatically, minded he may be led into a defence of the poetry that teaches as distinct from the poetry that merely conveys lovely impressions. If he is theologically minded he may denounce individualism in poetry as immorality—or as un-morality, which as an object of denunciation comes to the same thing. The use of such words as "sanity" and "immorality" in connection with the criticisms of poetry is, however, unfortunate. The truth is that the practically useful standards which these words express are too narrow to be applied to æsthetic questions, and the attempt to deal with art or literature from the standpoint of the alienist or the moralist has usually proved disastrous.

Certainly the poet may justly demand that his work be judged according to the purpose for which it was created. That purpose is primarily the creation of beauty; and since scientists, moralists, and philosophers have notoriously failed to supply a definition of beauty that shall satisfy everybody, the poet may with much color of reason assert his right to interpret beauty in any way that suits him, frankly undertaking to paint the thing as he sees it for the God of things as they are, without regarding the ultimate importance of the question *how* things are.

In interpreting to American readers the work of Verhaeren, Samain, de Gourmont, de R  gnier, Jammes, and Fort, Miss Lowell has done a real service to literature. One must be limited indeed who fails to appreciate the power of these writers as set forth through the comment, the discriminating extracts, and the appended

prose translations in her book. The author has wisely refrained from criticism of a profoundly analytical kind. For the most part she lets the poets speak for themselves, and the effect of her running commentary is chiefly to remove unpleasant prepossessions. Little more is needed. Once the reader has placed his mind in a sympathetic attitude toward the work of these undoubted geniuses, fascination follows. The striking impressionism of Verhaeren; the tender artificiality of Samain; the powerful suggestiveness of de R gnier, reporting the vision of the world which he sees from the gold casements of his onyx-pillared palace; the intoxicating sensuousness, verbal, musical, emotional, of de Gourmont; the childlike simpleness and surprising, quaint revelations of Jammes; the ingenuity, intensity, many-sidedness of the energetic Paul Fort—all these impress themselves deeply upon the mind that does not resist impressions.

Nevertheless, it is not unlikely that a perusal of Miss Lowell's book will leave the classically minded reader with a feeling of discontent. This feeling might perhaps be formulated somewhat as follows: If read in one way, the poems all seem to mean more than they actually do mean; they are overlaid with a troubling mysticism. Even Verhaeren's picture of the kitchen stove seems to claim the validity of vision. And if read in another way—if enjoyed simply as emotional experiences—the poems oppress one with a sense of futility: their beauty is nothing, a transitory feeling, a psychological affection.

Now the quarrel between the classically minded reader and the modern poet cannot be based upon moral or pathological grounds. It is of the same nature as the quarrel between the religious and the unreligious, between the monistic and the pluralistic philosopher. It rests ultimately upon a difference of intuition or of faith. The classically minded person is not necessarily devoted to the poetry that teaches; he simply cannot rid his mind of the conception that the universe is somehow rational. The "decadent" poet is not necessarily immoral or insane; he is simply an empiricist.

The lovers of the classic should frankly admit their inability to reduce this faith to dogma, or to define the ultimate goal of poetry. Yet they may cling to their faith and continue to believe that poetry, like metaphysics, has a rational though hidden end. To them it will never seem true that empiricism is a sufficient creed either in philosophy or art.

AMERICAN NEUTRALITY

HOSTILE FOREIGN FEELING HELD BY THE PRESS TO JUSTIFY THE COURSE OF THE PRESIDENT

Poor President Wilson! "The most unpopular governmental head in the world," as Colonel George Harvey (the original Wilson man), just returned from London, plaintively declares.

Colonel Harvey particularly deplores the marked unpopularity of the President in London. Our German-American friends, who have been bombarding Mr. Wilson for pro-British leanings and jughandle neutrality, will have some difficulty in realizing that.

But the fact remains that the President has been the recipient of much abuse in the English press, ranging from the scurrility of the "yellows" to the more civilly phrased but effective intimations of recusancy, spinelessness and disposition to favor the Central Powers, on the part of the heavy respectables.

The *Daily News* thinks the Monroe Doctrine has gone by the board because of the President's nerveless complaisance to Germany:

"It is doubtful whether the Monroe Doctrine will ever be tenable again, experience having shown that the United States can no longer rely on political isolation founded on geographical detachment, which has largely lost its meaning. . . . If Germany were victorious in this war the United States' guaranties of the independence of the states of South America would not be worth the paper on which that doctrine is written."

The *Times* is of the same mind:

"The President has striven, and is still striving hard, with the full approbation of the masses of the people, to cling fast to the notion that the United States can continue to live its own life, uphold exalted ideals throughout the new world, and promote their realization in the old world without abandoning the splendid isolation she has so long enjoyed. The hard realities of the situation created by the war are beginning to show that the notion is no longer tenable with the firm assurance of even last year."

The *Standard* roars at the President for not plunging into the fray because of "the abominations wrought in the name of German kultur." So it goes—only much worse in certain sheets of the lesser sort, particularly a pictorial rag (a sort of vulgarized *Punch*) whose highly disrespectable name escapes us.

"He that is not for us is against us;" that is the general idea. Open partisanship, not detachment of mind and an honest effort at neutrality: that is clearly what is wanted. Of course, Col. Roosevelt's violent fulminations against President Wilson, and particularly his preposterous theory

that our Government was obligated to rush into the mêlée because of the violation of Belgian neutrality, are eagerly exploited.

President Wilson's supporters may reasonably claim that all this dissatisfaction on both sides with the quality of his neutrality is no bad evidence of the studied impartiality of his attitude. When the time comes for real peace talk (and the fact that the President has dispatched Colonel House on a second mission to take soundings is to our thinking about the most hopeful sign of the times), will President Wilson be acceptable to both sides as mediator? It will be a fair test of the real feeling abroad as to his disposition to be fair.—*Milwaukee Sentinel*.

Colonel Harvey of THE NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW brings back from Europe the interesting news that President Wilson is, next to the Kaiser, the most unpopular governmental head in the world. There is no feeling against Americans as a whole, says this acute observer, but there is real bitterness against the Administration.

This probably was not pleasant reading for a governmental head upon his honeymoon, but can we look for foreigners to be less critical of our President than Americans themselves? It is characteristic of the average American to brush technicalities aside and do what seems right. His passion is to do substantial justice and to see it done regardless of the letter of the law. He does not split hairs or attach undue importance to precedents; and he resents nothing else so much as to see guilt crawl out to safety through a legal hole. He knows that it is infinitely more atrocious to kill men than to send cargoes of contraband to prize courts. His mind seizes the essential right and wrong of questions, and he is impatient with persons who lose sight of moral issues in their quibbling over less important things.

The course of President Wilson has not pleased the people. Even those who defend it and see excellences in him know, deep down in their hearts, that he does not measure up to the situation—that he is far from the ideal executive for a crisis like this. No act of his has made Americans prouder of their country. No policy of the Administration has quickened by a single beat a minute the blood in American veins. No utterances of the President, since it was discovered that their literary finish was the most significant thing about them, has wakened a responsive chord in American hearts.

This is not to say that President Wilson's countrymen are unappreciative of his worth, his estimable qualities, his efforts and his desire to do for the best. Men concede these and commend him for them; but beneath their approval is the feeling that he has temporized, has tinkered the situation, and is such by temperament and training that he could not do otherwise. A sentiment not always uttered but often, as we believe, among the unvoiced thoughts of men, is that if the nation's executive shall happily be able to tide the country over to a time when some American of heroic stature can grapple the momentous issues which confront us, he will have done the most and the best that can reasonably be expected of him.—*Rochester Post-Express*.

We know that America and America's Government are not popular in Europe; we know that we are cordially hated by both sides because of our neutrality. We know, too, that we should become very popular on either

side with which we might line up. As it is, we are regarded as mean, selfish bystanders and are given no credit whatsoever for the regret and sympathy that we feel for all the war-ridden peoples of the Old World. Thus we find in a Sydney (Australia) newspaper the following bit of doggerel:

"They may talk o' eagles screamin'
And the glory o' the Yank,
But of scrap he's never dreamin'
So it's only gol darn swank.
He guesses some each morning,
And he calculates at night;
He's something big at fawning,
When the dollars are in sight.
He's a cross-bred Dago Yankee,
A Noo Yark Port-a-gee,
Right smart and awful swanky
Since the old men spilled the tea.
But he ain't done no shootin'
Since the junkers drowned his kids,
And folks think 'e wants bootin'
Cos he held his hand for quids.
He's a gol darn,
He's a gol darn,
But 'e ain't what we call white.
He's a gol darn,
He's a gol darn,
He's a gol darn Yankee skite."

No doubt we Americans, as a people, have our faults. We ourselves see these faults, see them quite clearly, but we are conscious likewise of being imbued with ideals and of possessing, in fair measure, human virtues.—*Milwaukee Journal*.

What Europe thinks of the United States may be important. But what we think of Europe is far more important. Europe is always in a state of either hating us or despising us. Occasionally a surface friendship is professed for the United States when our interests happen to run parallel to the interests of some European country or we are patronizingly permitted to do them favors; but there is no love for us over there, never has been and probably never will be. Nor is there any particular reason why there should be.

At the present time the cause for hatred is of infinite proportions. Blundering European statesmanship has plunged civilization into the greatest war of all history. American statesmanship has thus far succeeded in keeping us out of it without yielding any of our rights under international law. The belligerents are bleeding themselves to death. Future generations will be burdened with a load of debt that already staggers the human imagination. We are not bleeding to death. We are immensely rich and prosperous, and we are likely to be the commanding nation of the world after the European Powers have exhausted themselves in a war brought on by third-rate diplomacy. Naturally, feeling runs strongly against a

Government that thinks more about the welfare of the United States than it thinks about the interests of the countries that are at war.

In the circumstances we are unable to mingle our tears with those of Colonel Harvey or to lament the President's unpopularity in London. We should as soon think of lamenting his unpopularity with the Kaiser. The Declaration of Independence has never been repealed.—*New York World*.

Colonel George Harvey, who has been on a tour of observation in Europe, is back with the information that next to the Kaiser the most unpopular government head is President Wilson. We do not know whether he consulted the Armenians when he gathered the data for this judgment or not, but, leaving the Turk out of consideration, we have no difficulty in believing that Colonel Harvey can make a pretty good case for his opinion.

One does not need a journey in Europe to remind him that men fighting mad and supremely convinced of their own righteousness are likely to hold that all who are not for them are against them. Many Englishmen think that President Wilson ought to have turned the United States over to their aid, and in this they are encouraged by a no less distinguished American than Colonel Roosevelt. They regard the President's efforts to make England obey international law as a blow at the cause of human liberty and a favor to a "baby-killing" Kaiser. As Great Britain goes so go her Allies for similar reasons.

The Central Powers do not like the President, of course. He has not stopped the munition sales, he has opposed and balked their U-boat policy, he has sent Dumba, Von Papen and Boy-Ed home, and he is an Englishman heart and soul, according to all hyphenated patriots.

Of course, it would be better if the war-mad people in Europe would be calmly dispassionate in all things—but they won't. The next generation of Europeans may see these matters differently.—*St. Louis Republic*.

There seem to be a good many people who are disturbed, if not distressed, to discover that the United States of America is not just now very popular in European circles. There are many writers, among them Colonel Harvey, the able editor of the NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW, a gentleman who ought to be greatly missed by *Harper's Weekly*, who are at great pains to spread the news. But really the key to the situation was, quite unconsciously, given by Mr. Rudyard Kipling months ago in a story, the characters of which united in the toast: "Damnation to neutrality." . . . We think that our unhappy fellow countrymen may profitably ponder the advice of *Life*, a strong pro-ally paper: "We should not take it too hard that Europe is not pleased with us. Colonel Harvey would have Dr. Wilson go abroad instead of Colonel House to learn what the European atmosphere is, but that would not help matters. This country may not properly regulate its behavior by European feelings in war time." That feeling is just now a bit superheated. That is a fact that it would be well to keep in mind. It should also be remembered that neutrals never have been popular in belligerent circles. The real question is whether we should have refused to be neutral. That is a fair subject for discussion.—*Indianapolis News*.

Colonel Harvey's word on this subject requires no stretch of credulity. It is corroborated by numberless expressions from other sources. Not that

it would be any other way with any President we might have had. It is the inevitable fate of the leading neutral nation that all its acts should be interpreted by one belligerent as favoring the other. The only way to satisfy either side would be to join it in the war. The impossibility of satisfying both sides in this way is obvious. But there is a fact of practical significance in Colonel Harvey's report and others of similar tenor. It is a fact that the United States, as virtual winner of the war in which Europe has done the suffering, is to become inevitably the envy, if not the object of hatred and contempt, of all nations. We shall hold the purse strings of the world and shall be frequently alluded to as the Shylock of nations. Great wars have grown from beginnings less significant than such sentiments as these. Considering all factors in our present and future relations toward the world Powers, the conclusion cannot be escaped that we will serve ourselves and our posterity best by carrying our honors modestly and providing ourselves substantially against the event of attack.—*St. Paul Dispatch*.

There was a particularly sound observation in the latter part of Colonel Harvey's statement:

It has been intimated that what Britain needs to insure victory, the interviewer ventured, is a strong, dominating personality to dictate the conduct of the war.

"That is absurd," replied the Colonel. "There is no such personage in the world to-day. No Cromwells, no Napoleons. What applies to war also applies to science, literature and politics. There is no such outstanding personality alive. Therefore the military, economic and governmental affairs must continue to be administered by groups of able men. The Kaiser is the nearest approach to a dominating personality in this war. Not because he is a superman. He isn't. But simply because he is practically an absolute monarch, the head of the house of Hohenzollern, and he has achieved only pyrrhic victories."

The truth of this is so plain that it is a wonder there has been so much talk about "the big man" that is needed. Under modern conditions there is practically always a large division of authority and brains in connection with every large enterprise. In the making of modern war it is inevitable. We should stop talking in the terms of the past.—*Edmonton Journal*.

Colonel Harvey thought he was voicing a condemnation of the President. He was doing nothing of the sort. He was testifying to the fact that the President, above all things, has been true to the ideal of putting the interests of all of the people of his whole country before all other considerations. It would have been a lot of personal satisfaction, no doubt, for the President to have avenged himself for the slanders of the German press of this country by permitting himself to have been borne along with the wave of anti-Teutonic feeling that has been engendered. That he has not done so the attack of Colonel Harvey, the scathing comment of anti-Germans like Colonel Roosevelt, and the undoubted unpopularity of this Government in Great Britain, France and Russia testifies eloquently. And it is rather funny to see how eagerly the Republican press of the country is snatching at the words of Colonel Harvey. Four years ago not one of them would have admitted that the Colonel could have told the truth under oath.—*Muskegon Chronicle*.

We made no "attack"; we portrayed a condition.—EDITOR.

Colonel George Harvey, back from Europe, tells how much the folk over there dislike us. He refers particularly to the British who, he says, are more incensed at President Wilson than at the American people in general, but other of our citizens who have recently returned relate experiences showing that John Bull is more inclined to shake fists than hands across the sea. Our people traveling in other European countries report Americans equally unpopular wherever they go. Each belligerent nation seems to have the idea that our strict neutrality is assumed expressly in order to injure its cause. However, it is encouraging to know that one gleam of friendliness illumines, in contrast, the general gloom of hostility. The Belgians like us. Cardinal Mercier says so. Notwithstanding all we have done for them, as the cynic might say, they do not hate us.—*Pittsburgh Chronicle Telegram*.

George Washington was not merely unpopular; he was hated, despised and abused in both England and France. So was Thomas Jefferson. So, naturally enough, in varying degrees, were James Madison and James Monroe. Ulysses S. Grant and Grover Cleveland sat in the same historic company. Perhaps the calm, patient statesman whose endurance of hateful, unfair, dishonest attacks at home and abroad in the name of "patriotism" and "humanity" presents in history the closest parallel to the case of Woodrow Wilson, is Abraham Lincoln. Let Colonel Harvey, when he returns to London, examine the files of any British newspaper of Lincoln's day. He will find that what was said of the Great Emancipator bankrupted the vocabulary of vituperation. We are not sure that that will console him for the harsh words he has had to hear of another President who has held America first in his heart, and not England, nor Germany, nor any other nation; but it ought to.—*Rochester Herald*.

It is really the personal rather than the political neutrality of the President that disappoints Englishmen. They do not maintain that our national position has been improper, or that American sentiment as a whole is not strongly with the Entente. They appear to feel that Mr. Wilson is playing politics with the blockade problem, that he is a moral as well as a political cipher in the vast trial of democracy, and they resent their inability to count him on their side, while convinced that he is equally aloof from their Teuton enemies. What they would like in the White House is a more humanly responsive president, a man of less controlled emotions and personality. But Mr. Wilson is as the Lord made him. If it is true that Mr. Wilson's prospects of ever acting as mediator in the peacemaking have practically vanished, the fact constitutes a personal criticism of Mr. Wilson. We do not say that it is deserved, but it is possible to believe that it might have been avoided.—*Pawtucket Times*.

Colonel George Harvey, editor of THE NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW, is one of the most brilliant writers of the day. He possesses a singularly graphic style. In the January number of his magazine he begins a series of articles on his observations in England. It will be remembered that the day he recently landed from that country he made the wise remark that to have things right Mr. House should go to the White House and President Wilson should go abroad on a tour of observation. Now Mr. Harvey tells of various dinners and other conversations, of course, concerning the

great war, and it is mortifying to find how widely this country is disliked, the more discouraging since it is admitted that the great majority of Americans sympathize with the Allies. All this is highly interesting and informing. It should be read.—*Hartford Courant*.

Colonel Harvey's report that President Wilson is as unpopular in London as in Berlin or Vienna does not disconcert the *Fatherland* for a moment. "England dislikes him," it says, "because he has not as yet complied with the terms of Professor Usher's secret alliance." This discovery may go with Professor Muensterberg's important discovery that Colonel Roosevelt is at heart a pro-German, and the logical candidate for pro-Germans whose quest is for "anybody to beat Wilson." The same spirit was encountered by Colonel Harvey in England; if American voters are really convinced that both Britain and Germany find the President *persona non grata* they will, of course, make haste to find a man who is more in favor abroad.—*Springfield Republican*.

What, in such circumstances, is a man to do but look around to his own countrymen, all of whom, except certain Republican politicians who are seeking office of one kind or another, hyphenates who are swearing at him because he will not violate his country's neutrality, and a few captains of industry who are missing the subsidies they have hitherto been exacting from the people by way of a tariff tax, are pronouncing him to be a big American, courageous, wise and conscientiously sensitive to the well-being of his fellow Americans. Now if only the Austrians would say that Mr. Wilson is a Frenchman or a Russian the circle would be complete, and the President's Americanism would have to be admitted even by Mr. Roosevelt.—*Chattanooga Times*.

Having recently returned from the theatre of war, Colonel Harvey declares that in the opinion of the English people President Wilson is, next to the Kaiser, the most unpopular government head in the world. This opinion is doubtless shared by the people of the other belligerent powers—notably the Germans, who, instead of being appreciative, are supremely contemptuous of the patient endurance manifested by our Government in connection with the numerous and flagrant violations of international law on the high seas. Such is, always has been and always will be the feeling of high-spirited people toward a nation's executive who lacks the courage to maintain the honor and dignity of his country.—*West Jersey Press*.

When were we really loved in Europe? At the present time we are informed by cable that neither Austria nor England cares to be on unfriendly terms with us, though we have spoken pretty plainly to both of them. If any person other than Mr. Roosevelt were President we would in all probability have pursued just the same neutral policy that we have pursued since August 1, 1914, and which we will probably pursue no matter how long the war lasts or what political party is in power, caring little whether or not that policy pleases any country or all foreign countries—because a policy of strict neutrality is the only just policy. Colonel Harvey not only muses but also talks without "method."—*Providence News*.

The report by that discerning home-coming traveler, Colonel George Harvey, that he found President Wilson to be the most-hated man in England and

France, except the German Emperor, is only another demonstration that the President has had wonderful success in playing no favorites in the neutrality business. Hated in all the belligerent countries, and even by some of his own passionate countrymen, the President of the United States is still America's own. He is to be judged, also, by Americans, and not by Englishmen or Frenchmen or Germans, inasmuch as his policy is made in America for America, no less.—*Springfield Republican*.

Colonel Harvey gives good and sufficient reasons why President Wilson is hated abroad. He says: "The people of France and England believe they are fighting for the United States as well as for their own countries." Naturally, then, they do not want the United States to interfere with any of their plans for starving out Germany. They simply want to control the seas to serve their best and most belligerent interests. This has been the whole trouble—all of the warring countries have found it impossible to see how the United States should look at the war except through their eyes. The President has preferred to view the war through neutral eyes.—*Elizabeth Journal*.

Colonel Harvey was astounded at the bitterness which he found in England against the President of the United States, but he says it does not extend to the American people. So far as can be judged by the expression of German-Americans, Mr. Wilson has succeeded in arousing equal bitterness among the Germans. Some may argue that this is good proof of genuine neutrality. Switzerland, Holland and Spain, however, have preserved an even stricter neutrality than has the United States and have retained the general respect of both sides.—*Buffalo Express*.

It would be a miracle indeed if President Wilson could please any of the belligerents without siding with them, because it is natural under such circumstances for countries to feel that those who are not with them are against them. And President Wilson as the head of the United States Government of course catches most of the censure. But so long as he strives to protect American interests and keep us out of the maelstrom of war, no American should find fault.—*Long Branch Record*.

All this is indication of the penalty that must be paid by one who would be neutral. We wonder how far it will go. When the test comes next fall, will the American people, or enough of them, forget their own interests and place the interests of Germany or England above those of the United States? The bitter and unpatriotic attacks in the Senate are not very encouraging. When men who should know better question the sincerity and honesty of their own Government, what is to be expected of the masses?—*Sandusky Journal*.

Colonel Harvey and Colonel Richard Harding Davis and all the other newspaper colonels who are so deeply concerned about British and French opinion that their own judgment respecting our duty is formed in London and Paris are the most bitter in denunciation of the German-American whose offense is that his loyalty is formed in Berlin. They see, as he does, the duty of America through the blurred spectacles of foreign opinions. In railing at his hyphen they refuse to see the hyphen in themselves.—*Syracuse Post-Standard*.

When Allies and Teutons all protest that the United States is not "for them," it is evident that the United States is, as it has proclaimed it would be, neutral. And when all the belligerents are bitter against the United States for its strict neutrality, there is all the more reason why there should be no question of the solidarity of the American people. The observant Colonel Harvey has found in Europe most convincing reasons why every patriotic citizen of the United States should stand loyally by his Government.—*Hazleton Standard*.

Assuming that the distinguished editor speaks verity, his tidings scarcely suffice to alarm—or even to produce lowness of spirits. For even if Mr. Wilson is intensely unpopular in Great Britain, he is equally so in Germany; and hence we have a "stand off," as it were, which, if having any striking significance at all, shows that the President has played and is playing the neutrality game according to the rules. No more satisfying evidence of the fact that the Administration is hewing closely to the line of an absolutely impartial policy can well be furnished than that belligerents on both sides should rail at it.—*Lynchburg News*.

Colonel George Harvey returns from Europe to tell us that, with the exception of the German Emperor, President Wilson is the most unpopular governmental head in the world. It is a remarkable declaration, and we are in no position to deny its accuracy.

But suppose it is true.

The very fact itself and the circumstances that make it a fact, if it be a fact, constitute a compelling reason why every American citizen should stand by their President.—*Houston Post*.

Not until the world has reached the happy state when gunstocks are but kindling wood and man is friend to man, whether a fence or a sea divide them, will Europe—or large parts of Europe—stop hating the United States. For that matter, however, European nations hate each other. There is more good feeling between the American nations than there will ever be between the European countries as long as the present system obtains in Europe.—*Chattanooga News*.

Editor Colonel George Harvey has discovered that President Wilson is intensely unpopular in Europe. The time was when such an announcement would have added popularity at home. At any rate, this may be taken as evidence of absolute neutrality. Harvey excepts Germany from this statement, but he leaves the doubt whether Germany likes Wilson or whether Harvey is ignorant of Teutonic sentiment.—*St. Paul Pioneer Press*.

What Colonel Harvey reports as the case in Europe may be true, but we would despair of America if it could possibly be true as to any of her Presidents. A Democrat ought to agree with Republicans that even a Republican President is better than any foreign detractor, who neither approves our form of government nor regards the ablest man in it as a statesman.—*Wilmington Star*.

Because Mr. Wilson and his Administration have earnestly endeavored to observe the laws of neutrality and civilization, he is criticised and condemned by both sides among the warring nations of Europe. Time will demonstrate that he is undeniably right, and even those now rushing to

criticise him will be among the first to admit it when the heat of conflict has cooled their tempers and reason once more holds sway.—*Tifton Gazette*.

Colonel Harvey may not know a knock from a boost, but when he declares President Wilson the most unpopular government head among Europeans he pays him the high testimonial of attesting the genuine, simon-pure quality of his brand of neutrality, on which the President prides himself and about which he is most solicitous at this stage of the world mix-up.—*Knoxville Sentinel*.

If it be true, as Colonel George Harvey, editor of *THE NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW* says, that on his recent tour abroad he found President Wilson the worst hated man in England and France except the Kaiser, more than ever Mr. Wilson is to be loved and admired for the enemies he has made. It's another convincing evidence that he has played the neutrality game fairly and squarely—has played no favorites.—*Richmond News-Leader*.

Colonel George Harvey returns from Europe and says that President Wilson is the most hated man in England and France, except the German Emperor. As the name of Wilson is not exactly popular in Germany and Austria, we may assume that the United States Government has been perfectly neutral.—*San Francisco Chronicle*.

Colonel Harvey, on returning home from England, is reported to have said that the British don't like President Wilson. If that is true there is no love lost. The American people have no especial love for the British, but they want to be fair with them, as with all the belligerents.—*Middle-town Argus*.

Colonel Harvey, who has been in England, thinks the President of the United States ought to know how unpopular he is with the government heads of Europe. As if Mr. Wilson were foolish enough to believe that keeping this country neutral is a thankful task.—*St. Louis Post-Dispatch*.

Colonel Harvey comes home bearing the sad news that nobody in Europe is pleased with President Wilson. The man seems to have committed the indiscretion of conducting these United States in the interests of these United States rather than in those of Europe.—*Hartford Times*.

Colonel Harvey says the British don't like President Wilson. The British don't love anybody very ardently, just now, whose engagements prevent alliance. Small blame to them, maybe, but no more to the President, as things stand.—*New York Evening Sun*.

It has often been difficult for some of our citizens to put America first. But that attitude is coming more and more to be the only test of loyalty, and no serious complaint will be made against the President while he continues to meet that test.—*Binghamton Press*.

Colonel George Harvey returns from Europe with the news that President Wilson, next to the Kaiser, is the most unpopular man in the world in London, but it is the American people that Mr. Wilson is trying to please, and not the British.—*Norfolk Ledger-Dispatch*.

Colonel Harvey, just home from Europe, tells us that, next to the Kaiser, President Wilson is the most unpopular governmental head in the world. And yet all that he has contended for is principles of humanity and justice.—*Altoona Mirror*.

Colonel Harvey for some three years now has never been keen for dropping neat little tributes in President Wilson's path, but this surely looks like one.—*Columbia Record*.

Perhaps Colonel George Harvey is right, and the British do not like President Wilson; but if the President is losing any sleep nobody has heard of it.—*New York Morning Telegraph*.

Colonel Harvey reports that President Wilson is unpopular in England. He will probably run behind in every English precinct at the next election.—*Detroit News Tribune*.

Colonel Harvey found America in disfavor abroad. This is the price of real neutrality.—*Troy Record*.

CONTEMPORARY ECHOES

FOR THE QUIET OF THE STUDY

(From the Boston Post)

Probably as a Christmas present to the Administration Colonel George Harvey, the accomplished editor of *THE NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW*, has gone abroad, and the President, the Assistant President and the Secretary of the Navy are allowed to pass their holidays in a peaceful serenity quite worthy of the season. For the sake of those at Washington we are glad, but for ourselves we trust the doughty Colonel will soon be back at his desk paying his compliments to all in his unique and brilliant fashion. We are of course interested in John Galsworthy, and Prohibition, and Oscar Wilde as a Critic, and the current issue of *THE REVIEW* is full of valuable and important articles, but we none the less miss the dash and élan of the "attack" to which we have become accustomed, and without Harvey the *REVIEW* is as *Hamlet* with the grave digger at the head of the cast, or as Paris must have been during those periods in the old days when Napoleon Bonaparte for one reason or another had turned away from the thrilling activities which made Parisian life just one dinged tingle after another. There are some things Harvey does so well that we like to "let George do it," and when he goes away we miss him.

We have a lurking suspicion that *THE NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW* will soon be giving our sprightly and diverting contemporary *Life* a run for its laurels in the matter of significant satire. Certainly since its editor, Colonel George Harvey, has begun to concentrate his energies upon its pages, instead of spreading himself out in numerous other highly diversified directions, there has come to be a very decided vein of pep, of the salt of wit and savor of satire, in these erstwhile scenes of solemnity to which we used to retire when we needed sleep. No journal of our own or other days that we recall has ever printed a more enlightening bit of engaging speculation than that to be found in the dialogue on "Patriotism and Profits" with which Colonel Harvey opens his November issue. It pricks with a sharply pointed pen certain bubbles of pretense and eagle-screaming "bunk" which a certain class of walrus-eyed promoters have blown in respect to the American loan to the Allies, and with a strong dramatic touch tells the truth about it in a climacterical outburst that we find truly impressive. If this piece of Harvey's had been written by Bernard Shaw it would be used by ladies' dramatic associations all over the country as a curtain raiser and possibly played by Arnold Daly in his vaudeville circuits; as it is, it is a thing to be read in the quiet of the study and to be thought about later in the silent

watches of the night, when we and our real selves have a chance to get better acquainted with each other.

AUTOCRACY BY INDIRECTION

(From the Bridgeport Telegram)

Colonel George Harvey, of THE NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW, is terribly worried at the present time because this nation is a "one-man despotism," and its president, he thinks, can at any time plunge the nation into a terrible war, without first consulting Congress, or the Cabinet, or military and naval experts. Not even the Kaiser has this power, says Colonel Harvey, and the president of the United States shouldn't have it.

Colonel Harvey has certainly hit upon a rich gem in the collections of Useless Worries. As a matter of fact this nation cannot declare war save by act of Congress; and as for any overt act causing a war—it takes two to make a war. If no other nation can get into war with us except by such an elaborate process at home as Colonel Harvey would have us adopt here, then we must be safe. Or if we are not safe, then what would be the difference should we adopt those self-same safeguards here?

Colonel Harvey says that the Kaiser can't declare war, the King of England can't declare war, the President of France can't declare war, and the Czar of Russia cannot; but the fact remains, that all of those nations, somehow, have blundered into a terribly disastrous war, while our nation, with its theoretically wrong system, remains at peace, and will continue to do so until Congress decrees otherwise.

Colonel Harvey is a fine theorist, but the fact is that he wants us to discard a system that has proved to work for one that has proved it will not work.

[We perceive little, if any, cause for apprehension in the existing situation. President Wilson at the outset declared his intentions to keep this nation out of conflict, and thus far has succeeded in doing so, to the quite general satisfaction of the country. But the fact remains that he or another holding his place—Mr. Roosevelt, for example—might at any moment, by the turn of a hand or a phrase, so commit us as to render embroilment inevitable. It is the mere possession of such power by any one man that we regard as a menace which should be guarded against.—EDITOR]

ATMOSPHERIC

(From the Hartford Courant)

Colonel George Harvey of THE NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW, the man who started Wilson and then was asked by that gentleman to let go, as such support was no longer helpful, has just returned from Europe. No man in the country has the gift of saying more crisp and pertinent things than Harvey, and now, as he stepped off the steamer he told the reporters that President Wilson ought to be the one to go abroad and Colonel House should take up the White House duties. However, it is Colonel House who goes abroad, and of this mission the New York Sun says that there should be an "inspector of ambassadors" and sarcastically it suggests that Senator Martine, the New Jersey Senator placed in his position by Wilson, who no longer loves him, should introduce the bill to this effect. The Sun says:

"Since the beginning of the Wilson administration there have been altogether too many Mr. Inspector Fixits traveling abroad at the public expense as 'personal representatives of the President,' and exercising without warrant of law an abnormal and highly mischievous influence on the course of public events. The deplorable results produced in the single instance of Mexico are sufficiently fresh in the nation's memory to require no advertisement. If further diplomatic or extra diplomatic experiments of the sort are to be undertaken in Europe, Asia Minor, Mesopotamia or elsewhere, let the Senate have its say in the matter. Let the exportation and importation of atmosphere be carried on in the manner intended by the Constitution."

PLAYING FAST AND LOOSE

(From the Boston Transcript)

Colonel George Harvey says that the Central Empires are "playing fast and loose with the United States." It would be hard to tell what foreign Powers are not playing fast and loose with the United States. Even Hayti and Santo Domingo have been doing a little of that, and the calm of Carranza has been doing a great deal. And really, since there is no placing our Government for a month's time together on any foreign matter, it may be unreasonable to expect foreign Governments to do anything else. For the sake of the country's interests, it is to be hoped that the Administration will at last see its way clear to maintain a persistent and consistent course on this submarine question, and will not permit itself to be entangled in questions of detail to the sacrifice of general principles. One of the principles that we should stand out for is that of ordinary common humanity. Considerations of humanity are not to be put out of sight and hearing and thought forever merely because a merchant ship at sea, supposing that a submarine may be in the neighborhood, puts on all steam and seeks to get out of harm's way. They are not utterly neutralized by the fact that a passenger ship may have a gun on board—a gun which would be utterly useless except for a certain amount of protection against a piratical attack.

DENSITY

(From the Knoxville Sentinel)

Mr. Wilson reserved his intimate and confidential counsels for the ear of his taciturn and somewhat mysterious friend, Colonel House. Hence, we presume, Colonel Harvey's ill-natured and official suggestion to the President that he go to Europe to learn what the Europeans think of him, and leave Colonel House in the chair.

But Mr. Wilson has all that he can attend to looking out for the interests and welfare of the American people, and as President he would not be at liberty to adopt Colonel Harvey's suggestion, even if he had the consuming curiosity with which Colonel Harvey apparently credits him, to take that trouble to learn what these foreigners think of him.

It has never been the American idea to take our cue from the Europeans in shaping our international politics, and it is not a good time to begin when the policies pursued by these have engulfed them in the cataclysm of which we are the eye-witnesses.

[He thinks we meant it.—EDITOR.]

SAVING FACES

(From the Hartford Courant)

Colonel George Harvey, back from England, says that he has information from an official that seventy German submarines have been destroyed or captured, but that the news has been kept from the public. The only reason the colonel advances for this reticence on the part of the authorities is that England didn't want her people to know that Germany had so many submarines! That's a good, all-sufficient reason—a reason that may be called typical with the British censor. Germany knew how many submarines she had and she went right along building more as fast as possible, whether any were lost or not, but the real reason of the British silence, officially, was probably that some one was ashamed because Great Britain didn't have more submarines when the war began. There were faces to be saved, so the enemy submarines, officially, were not destroyed.

WHY?

(From the Syracuse Post-Standard)

A newspaper correspondent has given Colonel House the title of "Assistant President of the United States." We suspect that President Wilson will not like that.—*Albany Journal*.

Tut, tut! 'Twas Colonel George Harvey dubbed him so; and no matter what the President may think, its aptness was so obvious that the title has stuck.

[To the best of our information, neither the President nor Colonel House has objected to an appellation which all must concede is both accurate and complimentary. Why should they?—EDITOR]

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

COMPENSATIONS OF THE WAR

SIR,—The article by Sydney Brooks on "The New England" in your December number is profoundly suggestive for philosophic thinkers.

Every process and phenomenon in nature is either generative or degenerative. Every force in nature is either creative or destructive. Our best philosophers realize that not only England, but Germany and Russia as well, are going through a most necessary evolution of immeasurable dimensions; and, terrible as the cost may be, they believe it best that the struggle should be carried through to its logical end. Each of these great dominant peoples has been cursed by most fatal errors of ideal and philosophy. The error of Great Britain is social; that of Germany is political and social; while that of Russia is religious and social. But in their genesis they all have the same origin, present the same problem, and must have the same solution.

As in all historic past times, the priesthoods, with their monopoly of learning, have been most responsible for the errors and false ideals of society, so Christianity was in its beginning a concretion of many theories of former times, blended with certain new reactions from the more repulsive features of the phallic, or sex, worship of the Jews; and, like all blinded human reactions, these went to an opposite extreme that has been the most destructive of all priestly inventions. To this error may justly be charged all of the worst discords of society, from personal vice to the present war. I refer to the dogma of contempt for the gender sense,—the spring and source of all of the family loves and affections,—and the idea that all of the impulses, emotions and organisms of the gender sense and generative system should be despised, degraded and strangled. The great Catholic Church still teaches that celibacy is a nobler form of life than the marriage state. Nearly all of the Protestant cults also treat these fundamentals of life in such a way as to keep the minds of their believers filled with ideas of embarrassment, vice, immodesty, vile conversation, and degenerating habits.

So long as people live in actual contact of their feet with the earth, the healing power of the earth constantly tends to correct this destructive influence, but as the population condenses into cities and factory towns, this healing or recuperating influence is largely lost, and the increasing tide of degeneracy works its vicious effects almost unchecked.

Human scientists agree that not one in ten of the people now living in our large cities will ever have a normal virile grandchild unless these false

ideals of society are corrected, and the recognition and teaching of natural law in the processes of human life are made a part of our system of education.

This awful condition is almost as true, by the way, in our own country as in the cities of Great Britain and Europe. Our cities are a great consuming maelstrom that is draining the best blood from the country, and sinking it in vice, disease, and social discords. Among the sporadic products of this unnaturalness may be noted the discordant marriages and resultant divorces in our own country; the caste and antagonism of classes in Great Britain; the abnormal glorification of the nation and of war, and of contempt for the individual and for humanity at large in Germany; and the darkness of ignorance and superstition, drunkenness and official cruelty in Russia.

A useful statement of evils should point to their correction. In the law of nature, every thing in life is of the same divine origin, and entitled to perfect respect. If it has proved useless to preach that we were created in "the image of God," it is still true that each human is a concretion of all the substances and intelligences of the universe, and is thereby related in blood and psychic fellowship to every other human.

If we had a true philosophy of life, and a sensible system of character analysis, culture and education, we would teach every boy and girl, by individual analysis, the three vital problems of life: how to live; how to love; and how to labor. In other words, how to develop and preserve all of his physical forces; how to love so that his children will not be scrubs, and he will not need or want divorce courts—and, finally, so that he shall become an efficient factor in working out the function of the human race.

How to restore lost human respect is, then, the problem of all, and every change noted by Mr. Brooks as working out with such painful travail in Great Britain, and every change toward human brotherhood noted by good observers in the other fighting nations, will, we hope, work out such a better and more natural system of human relations as will make an end of war, and of national or racial hatreds,—at least among the higher nations of the Earth. But shall we dare to wish the war to end until all of those fatal ideals of life are melted in common blood, and the time is ripe for the Divine law of human harmony to exercise its dominion over the world?

In our Civil War we endured ten times as much misery, loss of life, and destruction of property in proportion to the white population as the British empire has to the present date, and yet we made more progress during those terrible four years in strength, in modernism, and in liberation from the religious and social superstitions of the dark ages than we probably had during the fifty years before. May we not hope that the warring peoples of Europe will be equally compensated for their sufferings by progress in democracy and humanity?

JOHN E. AYER.

SEATTLE, WASH.

IN PRAISE OF BROMIDES

SIR,—In the November REVIEW you join in discussing the most discussed of all undiscussable subjects. In your editorial, "The Decline and Fall of Culture," you write, to be sure, in "lighter vein," but that doesn't

prevent your drawing a deadly parallel between Winston Churchill, Richard Harding Davis and Eleanor Hallowell Abbott, on the one hand, and Conrad, Galsworthy and Dostoevsky on the other. But I can't see the superiority of the latter trio as a protection of the American people against intellectual disaster.

Mr. Conrad is no more a bulwark of American culture than Mr. Churchill. He contributes no more to culture than does Mr. Churchill. Everybody knows he is a stylist, and that's why he has his public. His readers like to talk about his style. The Conrad style is a nuisance, as the Browning opaqueness used to be. If Browning Clubs hadn't come and gone, there would now be a Conrad Cult. There is a Conrad Cult, only it is concealed. People have caught on to the fact that Cults are not Culture. They deny the Cults but acknowledge the Culture. Cults are in disrepute. Culture not yet.

The mention of Conrad's name so close to Browning's reveals the comparative insignificance of Conrad's. With reference to Browning's name, Churchill's is quite as insignificant. But insofar as Mr. Churchill's books furnish the materials of culture—that is, knowledge of the ways of humankind—they are of equal significance with Mr. Conrad's in any discussion of the subject of culture. Any book that reveals facts of human life, both motives and actions, contributes to culture, which is a mental product formed of the most diverse materials, and the more diverse the better. A man's culture is what he makes out of all he has seen, heard, read, and done, and nothing less than all. The contribution which Mr. Conrad's books make is a knowledge of Mr. Conrad's style. It promotes culture just as much to be acquainted with the dullest style imaginable. Reading, as a means toward culture, is to be judged by the variety of experiences it presents, whether by the reader's contact and reaction or by the writer's power of realism and imagination. And not merely *variety* of experiences, but *quality*. And so I cannot see the superiority of Mr. Conrad over Mr. Churchill.

Conrad, Galsworthy and Dostoevsky represent the "cult of the modern" as truly as that other trio. Their readers are generally rather proud to be known as readers of Conrad, Galsworthy and Dostoevsky. If these writers are read humanly, for their own sakes, all well and good, but the moment they are read for their cleverness, their stylistic performance, their strangeness, their newness, their peculiarities, their startlingness, they lose much of their virtue as cultivators of culture. Then they are worth no more for that purpose than the dullest archaeologist. Not as much.

For culture is the capacity for sympathy and the exercise of sympathy, and sympathy is very human. Culture is not criticism. Culture is appreciation. And the culture that the majority of readers of Conrad, Galsworthy and Dostoevsky claim is claimed chiefly in the name of Literary Criticism.

Modern literature, as such, is no worse than old-time literature. But modern books, if you cannot read them with any feeling that you are in the company of eternal truth, are worse. If you say that the sense of eternal truth is hardly distinguishable, in some cases, from the recognition of the bromidic, I say that the bromidic deserves honor—which isn't an argument, but a statement. Every bromidiom has an honorable and many a one an

inspiring history. The trouble with numerous seekers after culture is that they don't know bromidioms for what they are worth. They are passed over as unimportant, like axioms. But it takes real thinking and real thoughtfulness to understand and enjoy anything so simple and fundamental as a bromidiom or an axiom.

ROBERT HILDRETH.

PHILADELPHIA, PA.

WAS PAUL A CHRISTIAN?

SIR,—Although I go to church three times every Sunday, like it, and believe in the power of the church for good, I am neither angry with Mr. Ellwood Hendrick nor do I pity his ignorance. His article *Saul of Tarsus* is an instance of how a man can put one or two good written thoughts in a mess of nonsense. I was glad to see in print on the page of a magazine as great as THE NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW the words, “—if the world were to follow the advice of Jesus the Kingdom of God would be at hand.” That is sensible and the kind of stuff this world needs. We need to practice and live the truths of Jesus and not dress them up for an hour's parade on Sunday only. But the world certainly does not need to be told that one of the greatest exponents of Christianity was in reality no follower of the Christ at all. One of old said of Paul: “Much learning doth make thee mad.” Now comes forth a modern one who says: “Paul, much logic doth make thee a fool.” There is just about as much connection between learning and madness as there is between logic and a fool. Paul was not mad and he was “no fool,” Mr. Ellwood Hendrick to the contrary notwithstanding. Paul spent less time in establishing dogma than he did in making converts. To be a persecutor and then to bend one's back willingly to the persecutor is some change for one who was logical and consistent to the point of being a fool. For, according to Mr. Hendrick's theory, Paul was so logical that he fooled himself, or else we could not account for his earnestness. Paul talked constantly because he had experienced a salvation which gave him something to talk about, but he never was guilty of making any such a statement as: “Stand up and say you believe, and you are saved; fail in this opportunity, and you shall go to hell.” “BELIEVE!” not “say that you believe,” is the statement which Paul brings out one way and another, over and over. “Faith, hope, love, these three, but the greatest of these is to see the reasoning of my logic and to stand up and say you believe.” No, the grandest theme of Christ and of his apostle is love. If love had always been the theme of Christendom, and all Christians had been willing to suffer and to labor for the sake of love, as Paul did, the Kingdom of Righteousness would have been here long ago. As I read Mr. Hendrick's article, I could not help but ask myself the question: “Why is it that some men who have come into possession of one or two great truths imagine that, in order to possess more truth, they must tear to pieces the character of some old hero of the cross, turn the Church over to the bats and owls, or treat all the creeds of Christendom as ‘mere scraps of paper?’” Perhaps somebody may be able to give us an answer some day.

JESSE F. BENTON.

GARY, WEST VIRGINIA.

WE TEMPT TO LARCENY

SIR,—Just a line to let you know how much I have enjoyed my trial subscription to THE NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW, so much so that I can not resist the temptation to become a regular subscriber! As an American sojourning in Russia these past eight years, I need just such a genuinely American patriotic tonic as your unique magazine so generously supplies. The only unpleasant feature about being one of your regular subscribers is that every now and then some dear compatriot of ours is apt to run away with the REVIEW even before we have finished reading it!

GEO. A. SIMONS.

(Superintendent of Methodist Episcopal Work in Russia)

PETROGRAD, RUSSIA

A REPUBLICAN BOUQUET

SIR,—Being a Republican, I hesitate to write you the second time in one year in approval of your editorials, but in "Patriotism and Profits" you say so much that I cannot refrain from sending this word of approval. The last paragraph contains what should be a sort of confession of faith of all true Americans, and you crown the entire article with glowing words when you say, "Go sell your bonds, my boy; but tell no lies."

Your editorial with the heading, "The Decline and Fall of Culture," is also worthy of a place in the front rank of such discussions.

SAMUEL H. THOMPSON.

BRISTOL, TENN.

WHY NOT ONE HUNDRED TIMES?

SIR,—Please mail to me the January (1916) number of THE NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW as soon as convenient after it is published. We cannot do without it. It's the greatest thing of the kind on this planet. I have absolute confidence in Colonel Harvey. He is right 99 times out of 100. Now that he is back from Europe we shall be well and correctly informed about the great war. I would like to expose the fallacies of John Haines Holmes when he argues that Christ was a Non-Resistant. I was amazed when I read his article in the last number of the REVIEW.

Yours with best wishes for the success of the greatest magazine of the modern world.

W. MITCHELL.


HERRIN, ILL.

WE SHOULD LIKE TO OBLIGE

SIR,—Having read you in the January number, I am moved to suggest that you issue an "extra." We cannot wait until the February issue.

H. McK.

ST. LOUIS, MO.



CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS NUMBER

ARTHUR H. POLLEN

is an Oxford graduate and noted writer on naval subjects. Any utterances he makes on such matters are eagerly listened to in England, and he has rendered notable service to the English Navy. He writes regularly for the authoritative English publication *Land and Water*.

SYDNEY BROOKS,

now making one of his frequent visits to America, is one of the best known of English journalists. His contributions to important reviews and magazines on both sides of the Atlantic have won him an international reputation as an observer and publicist.

DAVID JAYNE HILL,

ex-Ambassador to Germany, and former Minister to Switzerland and The Netherlands, also served his country as Assistant-Secretary of State from 1898 to 1903. Dr. Hill is the author of numerous volumes dealing with literature, philosophy, and diplomacy. His more recent publications include *The Establishment of Territorial Sovereignty: World Organization as Affected by the Nature of the Modern State*, and *A History of European Diplomacy*.

PERCIVAL FARQUHAR

is a graduate of the Yale Sheffield Scientific School of the class of 1884. He is thoroughly familiar with conditions in South America, and he has been engaged in organizing various important foreign enterprises, among which are: The Havana Electric Railway Company, The Cuba Company, and The Brazil Railway Company.

CHARLES H. SHERRILL,

Former United States Minister to the Argentine, is a graduate of Yale University, which institution has conferred upon him the degrees of Bachelor of Laws and Master of Arts. He is the author of a number of books, which include: *Stained Glass Tours in France*, *Stained Glass Tours in England*, and *French Memories of Eighteenth Century America*.

J. LAURENCE LAUGHLIN

is head of the department of Political Economy at Chicago University. Professor Laughlin is a recognized authority on monetary matters, and prepared for the Government of San Domingo the monetary system which was adopted by that Government. *Principles of Money*, *Industrial America*, and *Latter Day Problems* are among his published volumes.

L. AMES BROWN

is a journalist of Washington, D. C., and a correspondent for a number of the important dailies. The University of North Carolina conferred the degree of Master of Arts upon him in recognition of his work.

JOHN BURROUGHS,


the veteran naturalist and author, was born at Roxbury, New York, in 1837. Among his most popular volumes are *Winter Sunshine*, *Birds and Poets*, *The Light of Day*, *Literary Values*, *Ways of Nature*, and *Leaf and Tendril*.

JOHN M. THOMAS

is President of Middlebury College, Vermont, which institution was his Alma Mater. In 1911 the University of Vermont conferred upon him the degree of Doctor of Laws. He has contributed to numerous periodicals and has published a volume on *The Christian Faith and The Old Testament*.


SIR ARTHUR QUILLER-ROUCH

has held the King Edward VII. Professorship of English Literature at Cambridge University since 1912. A prolific writer, there being some thirty and more volumes to his credit, his notable work as an anthologist is indicated by *The Oxford Book of English Verse*, *The Oxford Book of Ballads*, and *The Oxford Book of Victorian Verse*. The REVIEW plans to publish other Shakespeare papers by Sir Arthur in this year of the Shakespeare Tercentenary.




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THEODORE ROOSEVELT